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ABSTRACT
The economic and urban restructuring which transpired
during the 1980's has important consequences for
organizations engaged in social change. Labor unions and
constituency-based neo-Alinsky neighborhood organizations
and their memberships must adapt to new economic,
political and social conditions. Research was conducted
with six organizations in Hartford, Connecticut, to
ascertain various means by which these types of
organizations are adjusting to the restructured economy
and also to compare their practices and examine the
potential for collaboration between labor and community
organizations.
Three labor unions with substantial membership bases in
Hartford, Connecticut: Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees Local 217; New England Health Care Employees--
District 1199/Service Employees International Union; and
United Auto Workers Local 376 and Region 9A; and three
neo-Alinsky neighborhood organizations that operate in
Hartford: Asylum Hill Organizing Project; Hartford Areas
Rally Together; and Organized North Easterners--Clay Hill
and North End were each observed during the period of time
from 1987 through 1990. Participant-observation,
documentary research and extensive interviews were
conducted.
Labor unions have innovated in the area of new organizing
through the use of techniques which identify worksite
leadership and maximize union contact with prospective
members before employers become aware of unionization
efforts. Strikes have become increasingly more difficult
to win and unions have built community-labor coalitions
and invigorated political action programs in order to
broaden support for their efforts, especially in strike
situations. Public policy trends of recent years and
increasingly sophisticated employer resistance to
unionization efforts continue to undermine union security.
New political avenues are being developed by unions in
response to these developments.
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Neighborhood organizations involve participants in
numerous campaigns on urban social consumption issues such
as crime, education, taxation, housing and local
development. These organizations select issues which yield
the greatest possibility for organizational success.
Participation in partisan politics on the part of these
groups is prohibited in bi-laws and discouraged by the
staff and leadership in order to- preserve the role and
cohesion of the organizations. The organizations make
extensive use of protest and media to orchestrate issues
and bring pressure upon local public and corporate
officials.
Both types of organizations use similar criteria and
methods to identify and cultivate local grassroots-level
and shopfloor-level leadership. The two types of
organizations have very different relationships to legal
structures and processes. Labor unions are constrained by
the system of U.S. labor law and must devise methods to
circumvent these constraints. Neighborhood organizations
are often constrained by insufficient power to achieve
their goals and sometimes confined by the methodological
limitations of an exclusively local focus.
Successful coalitions between labor and community
organizations require attention to and respect for
differences in methodology and philosophy. In Hartford, a
four year long strike at Colt Firearms by the United Auto
Workers Local 376 spawned the formation of the Community-
Labor Alliance for Strike Support in which organizational
differences became problematic. Subsequently in a local
third party initiative, People for Change, other
organizational differences emerged and were confronted,
both sets of problems involving conflicting organizational
processes and different roles and responsibilities of
leadership.
Activities in Hartford demonstrate a vitality in local
urban politics and also offer examples of innovative
responses to economic and urban restructuring. Continued
exploration and analysis of localized responses are
necessary and provide useful data to enhance and build
theory.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr.Gary Marx, Professor of Sociology
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INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 1988, tenants affiliated with the
Asylum Hill Organizing Project marched into the office of
Hartford City Manager Alfred Gatta with bags of garbage.
They collected the garbage from a building owned by a
notorious slumlord who had recently been given an
extension by city officials on court mandated
improvements. Two days earlier, members of the New
England Health Care Employees-District 1199 took over the
office of Anthony Milano, the Director of the State of
Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, demanding
state action on the nursing shortage in State of
Connecticut health care institutions. Throughout the same
week on the twenty-first floor of a recently constructed
skyscraper in downtown Hartford, in the National Labor
Relations Board's Hartford office, an administrative law
judge concluded daily sessions in a lengthy trial over a
then two year continuing strike by the United Auto Workers
against Colt Firearms. Meanwhile, an emerging political
organization--People for Change--fresh from stunning
successes in local elections, was about to begin a one and
one-half day conference to chart its future.
At one level these events are evidence of the
variety of activism and popular struggles in Hartford,
Connecticut. Hartford offers a rich, interesting array of
urban social movements. It is a city plagued with all of
the problems experienced in large American cities, but at
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a scale small enough to offer the activist a ready arena
for organizing and the researcher opportunities for in-
depth observations. It contains dramatic contrasts
between concentrated corporate wealth downtown and
pervasive neighborhood poverty. It has a powerful, highly
organized business community and an increasingly
sophisticated set of community and labor organizations.
On a somewhat different but related level, Hartford
provides a setting in which one can readily examine the
effects of economic restructuring and the varied responses
of individuals and organizations affected by this
restructuring. The economy of the city illustrates the
shift of a once-vibrant manufacturing center to a finance,
service and real estate driven economy.
What is taking place in Hartford is replicated in
other American cities, each with its particular set of
forces and institutions, and each with particular outcomes
within the general contours of economic restructuring.
The process of de-industrialization, the emergence of a
large service sector, the resulting patterns of urban
development and ensuring political strategies and
ramifications--all elements of restructuring--impact
millions of lives and entire communities in the United
States. Plant closings, large-scale layoffs and the
creation of low-wage service sector employment combine to
create pressing new social realities. How individuals
confront the very immediate changes in their lives as a
result of broader social and economic trends is an
11
important aspect of the restructuring phenomenon. In
particular, the organizational responses of collectivities
who exist to defend and assist individuals in the throws
of such change are key to our understanding of the
outcomes.
This dissertation will examine how community and
labor organizations in Hartford, Connecticut are
confronting the changing economy. The economic
restructuring taking place over recent decades has
important implications for organizations that attempt to
foster social change and presents new conditions to
organizations engaged in collective action. Whether in
the workplace or in the community, organizations who
challenge the powerful interests that benefit from the
emerging economic order themselves face profound
challenges. The foci of this dissertation are how these
organizations understand, interpret and adjust to the
changes; how they organize and mobilize existing
memberships in the current environment, with an emphasis
on what are new techniques and practices; how they
coalesce and work together to defend past achievements and
foster new forms of social change; and the difficulties
and conflicts they encounter in their efforts.
The Emerging Economy
Since the 1970's the U.S. economy has undergone a
process of restructuring that impacts workers and
communities. Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller (1982) and
12
Noyelle (1982) describe the phenomenon and assess its
implications. Noyelle outlines its contours in terms of
three propositions: 1) a new global economy in which U.S.
manufacturing is declining relative to a growing service
sector, and an increasing division in the labor process
between highly skilled workers and unskilled workers; 2) a
transformation of American urban economic structures based
on service sector growth, and a resulting redefinition of
relations of economic dominance and dependence among
metropolitan areas; and 3) a transformation of urban labor
markets characterized by new forms of segmentation, in
turn contributing to and reinforcing the economic
restructuring of urban areas.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) elaborate the
conditions which have given rise to this transformation
and a number of the results for those who are caught in
its midst. Competition and market penetration by foreign
companies, the age and inefficiency of many older U.S.
plants, the management practices of U.S. corporations and
technological innovations facilitating the "hypermobility"
of capital all have contributed to the decline of American
manufacturing. The resulting displacement and economic
insecurity of blue collar workers is associated with a
plethora of health, mental health and other social and
personal problems. Corminities may experience the "ripple
effects" of tax base erosion, decline in small businesses
and municipal fiscal ills.
13
As the activities of U.S. corporations become
globalized, a new set of producer services has evolved to
facilitate these global operations which is shaping the
character of U.S. cities. Noyelle identifies an entire
range of services necessary for U.S. based multi-national
firms: accounting, advertising, law, financial, real
estate, consumer and other technical services. These
service activities are creating a "new urban hierarchy" in
which service-oriented decision-making centers comnand an
economic dominance over production-oriented centers. The
three-tiered hierarchy includes cities which are
diversified producer service centers (nodal centers such
as New York, Chicago, San Francisco and regional nodal
centers such as Atlanta, Boston, Dallas), specialized
producer service centers (Detroit, Hartford, Pittsburgh
and others), and dependent centers (Buffalo, Gary,
Worcester and others). Those cities which are able to
transform themselves into service centers experience the
downtown development boom of office construction,
employment creation, new upscale consumer and leisure
activities, as well as gentrification and real estate
speculation. Those areas which remain production centers
may suffer continual economic insecurities of capital
flight, unemployment, underemployment, tax base erosion
and generally depressed economies. The chart below
illustrates this hierarchy.
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The Urban Hierarchy
(per Noyelle, 1982)
Highest Tier: Diversified Producer Service Centers
-national and international corporate
decision-making and finance centers
-Examples: New York, Chicago, San
Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Dallas
Middle Tier: Specialized Producer Service Centers
-sectorally specific corporate decision-
making centers; government and education
centers
-Examples: Detroit, Hartford, Pittsburgh,
Washington, D.C.
Lowest Tier: Dependent Production Centers
-branch plant location, generally undeversified
-Examples: Buffalo, Gary, Worcester
While within the two upper tiered types of cities
manufacturing concerns may continue to operate, the
corporate decision-making activities are what define their
economies and enable growth and domiance.
Responses to the Emerging Economy
These changes do not transpire automatically and are
accompanied by a set of economic and political strategies
to mitigate popular reaction and resistance. A general
attack on the social wage, increased opposition to unions
and a general disciplining of labor and the poor have
accompanied the transformation (Fainstein and Fainstein,
1985 and Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). Fisher (1984)
characterizes these strategies as a "concerted ideological
attack on the 'welfare state' and Keynesian economics."
He describes an orchestrated set of corporate and
political responses to the problems posed by the changing
economy: the theme of an "age of limits", embodied in
15
budget balancing measures, reductions in social services,
taxation policies to enhance corporate profitability,
attacks on minority and women's rights.
Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller (1982) identify six
objectives of what they term "recapitalization", the basic
policy response in the early 1980's of "big business and
banking interests", supported by "influential economists
and policy analysts", designed to restore American
competitiveness and the profitability of U.S. firms:
(1) Reduce taxation on corporations and the well-to-
do in order to promote investment and thereby
productivity.
(2) Contract the public sector in order to offset
the decline in tax revenues, decrease federal
deficits, and reduce inflationary pressure.
(3) Increase the role of manufacturing, especially
of exported goods, within the private sector.
(4) Reduce inflationary pressures by restraining
expansion of the domestic economy and dampening wage
increases.
(5) Decrease governmental regulation of business
and industry; reduce anti-trust action, especially
against export-oriented firms; contraction of
environmental, occupational safety and consumer
protections.
(6) Lessen macro intervention in the economy and
rely more on regulating the supply of money (p.24).
The objectives of this policy of recapitalization
are to increase physical capital, i.e., investment in
industry, to expand the role of private economic
capitalism by ,reducing the role of government in the
economy, and to diminish obligatory support for vulnerable
16
population groups. These national policies implicitly
constitute an urban policy as much or moreso than any
explicit national urban policy since the fate of urban
centers is heavily dependent on larger economic trends.
On the local level, particularly in the older
manufacturing centers of the Northeast and Midwest,
municipal financial crises served as the prelude to
recapitalization. Conservative solutions which emphasized
local fiscal restraint, service curtailment and government
inducements to business for reinvestment served to obscure
the relationship of structural economic changes to
municipal fiscal ills (Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller, 1982).
Recent patterns of economic development find cities,
states and regions competing with each other through
various tax incentive to gain a share of the growth within
the economy (Gordon, 1979). A process of "underbidding"
each other through tax incentive schemes such as
enterprise zones at state levels and local property tax
abatements and deferrals at municipal levels are some of
the means by which states attempt to attract industry and
cities attempt to attract real estate development.
Connecticut was the first state in the nation to enact
state-level enterprise zone legislation. Hartford's
downtown skyline features a number of new large office
buildings which were built with in the past fifteen years
with the help of generous tax abatement agreements by the
municipal government.
Analyses of the impact of this emerging economy
17
spell out a number of difficulties for labor and community
organizations in confronting these developments.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) detail the problems unions
face: demands for concessions in contract negotiations
which take on the form of blackmail; impotence in the face
of certain plant closings; a general undermining of the
expectations and standards of living for workers;
declining success of organizing drives in the face of
sophisticated employer campaigns against unions. These
factors are compounded by the fact that a large portion of
the new employment in the service sector are low wage and
dead-end jobs which lack union protection. As such, by
the latter 1980's the level of unionization of the United
States workforce was at a 30 year low of under 18%.
The problems for community organizations attempting
to respond to these developments are likewise formidable.
Community organization responses to issues such as
downtown development vary from city to city, but generally
are in a context of minimal resources and power, and often
are construed by their targets and opponents as anti-
growth. Fainstein and Fainstein (1985) analyze the
impotency of commnity response to large scale
redevelopment of the Times Square area in New York City.
Mobilization efforts to defend adjacent neighborhood
residents' interests which were channeled through
"regular" political institutions had only minor impact on
the planning process. In a study of Hartford, Neubeck and
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Ratcliff (1988) argue that community organization efforts
with respect to urban development questions are
circumscribed by a set of political and economic factors
which limit possibilities for redistribution of urban
resources. Public policy leaders and even "enlightened"
local corporate leadership make choices in the context of
larger economic trends over which they themselves have
very limited control. Both the reality and the threat of
capital mobility emerge as disciplining forces on
community organization initiatives, as well as on labor.
Harrison and Bluestone (1988) analyze new patterns
of job creation in the United States. Compounding all of
the problems described above are the low wages and
salaries of a majority of the jobs created in the 1980's
and the increasing use of part-time and temporary labor.
Therefore, it is not even a question of whether or not new
employment opportunities exist and are being created--they
are indeed--it is the nature of the employment and what is
feared will be the increasing inequality resulting from
this new employment and its dire impacts on urban labor
markets, in particular, that are of concern to analysts.
In the face of seemingly inexorable trends, unions
and neighborhood organizations are placed in the position
of attempting to defend and advance their members'
interests. These organizations, in particular, confront
the social and human costs of economic transformation and
are called upon to mitigate its effects both in an
objective and subjective sense. Objectively, the purpose
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of these organizations is to represent individuals as
workers or community residents. Subjectively, these are
organizations to whom individuals turn and expect help in
times of uncertainty when they feel that their interests
are threatened. Plant closings, strikes over healthcare
costs, income loss associated with concessions are but a
few of the human issues labor unions encounter;
deteriorating public services, displacement associated
with new development projects, increasing tax burdens and
other issues face community and neighborhood
organizations.
The majority of workers in the United States are not
members of unions: as stated earlier, under 18% of the
workforce is organized and the number is shrinking.
Moreover, many communities do not have active neighborhood
organizations. There are, of course, other types of
organizations who confront the effects of socio-economic
change: advocacy groups, social service providers,
community development corporations, religious
institutions, as well as state and local governments all
are involved in developing strategies and policies which
respond to emerging social and economic conditions. Issue
oriented groups concerned with civil rights, peace or
foreign policy matters must pursue their agendas in this
context, also. However, where they exist, labor unions
and constituency-based neighborhood organizations are
among those who penetrate most deeply into the grassroots
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level of American society. They attempt to engage
individuals in the process of social change by the direct
organizing of working class and low income populations to
act on their own behalf. These are precisely the
populations whose lives are most severely affected by the
emerging economy. Moreover, these organizations
correspond to two very basic aspects of people's everday
lives--work and cominunity.. Developing effective
strategies to counter the power of capital and organize on
their members' behalf is complicated by a dichotomy in
American social consciousness corresponding to these two
spheres of life.
The Separation of Work and. Community
Labor unions and constituency-based neighborhood
groups reflect a dichotomy in American social and
political consciousness described by Katznelson (1981) in
his analysis of the urban political terrain:
... The centerpiece of these rules (of urban
politics) has been the radical separation in
people's consciousness, speech and activity of the
politics of work from the politics of community.
This subjective division has been such a powerful
feature of American urban life that it has been
operative even in situations where blue-collar
workers live in immediate proximity to their
factories (p.6).
He asserts that in the workplace, workers generally
respond as labor, but in their communities, working class
people define their identity in terms of race, ethnicity
and territoriality. In other Western nations, mass-based
political parties of the left serve to link these two
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aspects of people's lives. However, in the United States,
the absense of such mass left parties, the history and
present state of race relations, and the nature of the
American two-party system translate into a very different
set of political realities, most notably a very muted
politics of class in the electoral arena. The void
created by this absence, particularly in urban settings,
has led instead to a politics based on patronage and
services.
Katznelson's analysis begins with an account of the
gradual physical separation of the workplace and the home
in early capitalism, a process which rapidly accelerated
during the evolution and expansion of industrial
capitalism. Concurrently, with the extension of the
franchise, ".. .two new kinds of links were forged between
a developing working class and the dominant class: between
capital and labor at work, and between the state and
workers where they lived. These links framed much of the
class activity for generations to come" (p.42).
Industrialization also wrought new forms of social
conflict and new imperatives of social control:
Everywhere in the West the state responded in
pursuit of order in unprecedented ways. These
responses were hardly identical from place to place,
but they did always have three constituent elements:
the attempt to regulate, and often to proscribe,
combinations of workers at the point of production;
the use of the franchise to incorporate workers and
their leaders into the polity in ways that least
threatened social cohesion; and the development of a
new nexus of political relationships linking
residence communities to government. Collectively,
these responses by the state replaced traditional
"private" forms of social control with public
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authoritative activity. One consequence was the
displacement of much of the emerging dynamics of
conflict between capital and labor into relations
between the state and citizen (p. 44).
Within each industrializing capitalist country, the
patterns of social control and the relationships between
developing political parties, -unions, the church,
voluntary associations and other institutions varied
considerably. Katznelson argues that in the United States,
a pattern was forged in which workers' identification
outside of work came to rest on ethnicity and
territoriality in contrast to Britain or other European
countries. In the British context, workers undergoing
the process of industrialization and urbanization tended
to "arrive at a coherent presocialist interpretation of
class that saw the new society divided along a single
class cleavage at work, in politics,- and in community
life" (p. 52). However, in the societies such as Belgium
or Holland, "ethnicity rather than class came to frame
political conflicts both at work and in residential areas"
(p. 53).
Despite examples of the formation of workingmen's
parties during the nineteenth century in the United
States, those political parties which endured contributed
to the system of "city trenches" in which community life
has come to be substantially defined in terms other than
class and the financial and industrial elite is insulated
from political conflict. In the formative antebellum years
of this party system, trade unions developed in a manner
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which confined the major portion of their activities to
the worksite, "eschewing party activity and political
action outside the workplace" (p. 55). Voting and
representation were tied to and defined by geography and
patterns of residential settlement which reflected ethnic
migration.
Nineteenth century ethnic conflicts presented grave
challenges to the "unified Anglo-Protestant elite that had
governed the older cities into the age of Jackson"
(p. 66). Gradually this elite withdrew from governance
into the world of business, relinquishing political
matters to the developing ethnic political machines:
"(t)he residence community became the political forum
managed by parties and bureaucracies that were divorced
from workplace concerns" (p.67). The political machines
rested on social networks experienced in pubs, corner
bars, churches and other localized institutions.
While the urban political machine served to insulate
financial and industrial elites from political turmoil,
it also eventually became the object of reform movements
aimed at elimination of the graft and corruption
surrounding patronage systems. What Shefter (1985)
describes as the "machine/reform dialectic" involves
successive reconfigurations of urban political power,
alternating between the traditional machine and urban
reform movements. Analyzing the New York City example, he
observes:
The cyclical pattern characterizing New York
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politics during the first half of the twentieth
century--the periodic election of reform
administrations and the subsequent defeat by
candidates who had the support of the city' s regular
party organizations--can be understood, then, as a
process of "serial bargaining." This process of
bargaining carried out over time enabled machine
politicians to adjust to the demands of (1) business
interests that wanted the municipal government to
pursue sound financial policies and construct
projects they believed were crucial for the city's
continued prosperity; (2) new ethnic or racial
groups that wanted political recognition; and (3)
middle-class professionals and the local allies or
newly powerful national forces that wanted to extend
their influence over the city government (p.27-28).
Shefter examines the trade-offs and accoumodations between
these competing interests, culminating in the financial
crisis of New York City in the mid 1970's. In this
situation, New York's fiscal problems were "resolved" by
the reassertion of financial elites into the affairs of
urban government. He concludes that the resolution of
this crisis was "weighted toward the concerns of
creditors--and against the democratic impulse" (p.235),
boding ill for the possibility of truly democractic
governance of the city.
Neo-Alinskyism
In recent decades, out of the patterns of urban
politics analyzed by such authdrs as Katznelson and
Shefter, a space has emerged for the development of
constituency-based neighborhood organizing in cities
across the country. Although these efforts are often
labeled as "new populism", "Neo-Alinskyism" is the term
used by Fisher (1984) to describe the organizations. The
reference to Saul Alinsky's model of community organizing
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seems to more precisely capture the flavor of these
organizations. Fisher characterizes these movements as
follows:
The essence of neo-Alinskyism is to develop mass
political organizations rooted in neighborhoods,
grounded in local concerns, and focused on winning
concrete gains. The goal is to advance social and
economic democracy, empower people, and challenge
power relations within and beyond the
neighborhood...All neo-Alinskyite projects employ
the ideology of the new populism--decentralization,
participatory democracy, self-reliance, mistrust of
government and corporate institutions, empowering
low- and moderate-income people--and at best see
themselves as grassroots organizations working to
connect up with the national political process (p.
133-134).
Although Katznelson posits a separation of work and
community in American political consciousness, the roots
of the "new populism"--Saul Alinsky's models and methods--
are informed by labor organizing. Alinsky's background
included actual CIO organizing experience in the 1930's
and he consciously drew upon this experience to fashion
his method of community organizing (see Alinsky, 1946,
1971). However, the neo-Alinskylte organizations spawned
during the 1970's and the organizers on their staffs do
not necessarily share a prior association with labor.
They employ the Alinksy model without the benefit of the
experiences which inspired it. Labor organizing and
neighborhood organizing, while often focusing on the same
target populations, have taken separate paths and gone
through separate evolutions.
Neo-Alinskyism is to be distinguished from other
more traditional forms of community organizing and from
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the types of organizations which were created in the
1960's. It is not advisory, nor is it tied to government
funding or services, nor does it necessarily focus on one
specific issue. Rather, it is built upon the myriad
concerns which arise in local neighborhoods, often very
simple in nature, but sometimes extremely complex matters
involving municipal taxation structures and budgets, or
the practices of financial institutions. Moreover, in
contrast to Alinsky's organizing endeavors in which he
sought to overcome the gulf between the workplace and the
community, the leadership of many of the newer
neighborhood organizing networks trace their roots to the
era of student activism against the war in Viet Nam.
During that era, relationships between the anti-war
movement and labor were at best tenuous and most often
antagonistic. So, while perhaps seeking similar types of
empowerment goals for working class populations,
contemporary labor and neighborhood organizing rest on
very different methodologies and processes.
Contextual Distinctions in Labor and Neighborhood
Organizing
Labor unions and neighborhood organizations face
serious challenges today, some similar and some quite
different, as they confront the changing socio-economic
environment. Certain important contextual distinctions
between the two types of organizations serve to define the
nature of their respective challenges. These are
delineated next, as well as the basic common elements in
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both types of practices.
Labor Unions: Union organizing is circumscribed by a
complex legal framework and unions as organizations are
subject to various laws. In essence, the "rules" that
govern their activities are not necessarily of their own
making, but rather a result of political processes, and
these processes are rooted in the configuration of forces
during the 1930's which led to the passage of the Wagner
Act.
The focus of a union organizing drive is very
specific--employees in a particular firm or worksite. The
immediate goals are winning a certification election for
the right to represent a specific set of workers,
recognition of the union as the collective bargaining
agent by the employer, and a first contract. Once a
worksite becomes unionized, an entire new set of issues
are presented ranging from assisting the workers in
grievances and arbitrations, to future negotiations, to
orientation and education of new members, to activation of
members for political action and the entire scope of union
activities. When strikes occur, the intense mobilization
of workers which is required presents even greater
challenges to the organization.
The framework of American labor relations has
changed considerably as the economy has evolved. While
these issues will be analyzed in more detail in the next
chapter, a brief summary is presented here in order to
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demonstrate the contrasting contexts of unions and
neighborhood organizations.
When the National Labor Relations Act was passed in
1935, the legal parameters outlined in the Act embodied a
public policy posture which accepted unions as somewhat
legitimate participants in the economy. Moreover,
collective bargaining came to be accepted as the preferred
method of resolving labor-management conflict. Militant
organizing drives preceding World War 11 and the strike
wave following the end of the war eventually forced
industrial leaders to accept the reality of unionization
and to agree to collective bargaining. Negotiation was
preferable to unpredictable and disruptive strikes and
rank-and-file actions.
In the post World War II era through the mid 1970's,
labor effectively ceded to management the right to control
firms' investment and location decision in exchange for
union recognition, organizational security, and regular
wage and working condition improvements which were tied to
increases in productivity. During the early years of this
Pax Americana (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982), the McCarthy
era helped to quash labor militancy of earlier decades as
Communist and radical elements were purged from union
ranks, particularly from roles in leadership. Unions were
accorded their "seat at the table" as long as their
demands remained confined to the wage arena and at least
the leadership of the labor movement did not challenge the
prevailing ideology embodied in the domestic and foreign
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policy of the country (Tomlins , 1985; Montgomery , 1979).
These features of the post World War II system of
industrial relations began to unravel in the mid 1970's as
the economic shifts described earlier transpired.
Organized labor in recent years- has lost millions of
members as American manufacturing has restructured, closed
plants in this country and moved operations to low wage
regions of the U.S. and overseas. The threat of capital
flight, ensuing demands from employers for concessions,
outright union-busing campaigns and a National Labor
Relations Board which is characterized by labor as
decidedly pro-management all combine to produce an
environment in which union growth is exceedingly difficult
and many unions fear for their own survival.
Beyond this loss of membership, changes in public
policy postures toward unions have also eroded their
ability to gain new members. The actions of the Reagan
administration during the PATCO strike of 1981 symbolized
the new labor relations to a stunned and horrified labor
movement. Moreover, even where there is job creation in
the service sector, it has yet to translate into expanded
membership in unions, although these workers are
increasingly becoming targets of organizing drives.
New organizing is also made difficult by the
changing nature of both the workplace and the workforce:
with more and more employment creation in smaller
businesses and with greater numbers of workers who have
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limited exposure or previous affiliations with unions,
unionization is not necessarily an "automatic" response on
the part of workers facing problems. The labor movement
is plagued by negative public relations and perceptions.
Neighborhood Organizations: Unencumbered by the
complex legal structure which circumscribes labor union
activities in the United States, neo-Alinskyite
neighborhood organizations are free to employ a variety of
methods to achieve their goals. There are no legally
proscribed sets of procedures which they must follow. The
boundaries of a neighborhood often are not rigid
boundaries and there is no numerical majority of 51% which
must be won in order to operate within a neighborhood.
Moreover, there is no equivalent of a "union shop" for
neighborhood organizations--the terms of membership are
completely voluntary. Their targets are varied:
landlords, financial institutions, political bodies and
corporations. However, these organizations encounter the
problems of unstable membership bases, restrictions from
funders in some cases on certain types of political
activities, revolving door staffing patterns and often the
inability to effectively harness the requisite power to
achieve objectives (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1985). Many
neighborhood organizations are relatively young and have
not yet thoroughly analyzed their experiences with an eye
toward reformulation of their methodologies. Since urban
neighborhoods are currently undergoing rapid change in
many cities, some analysts call for re-examining Alinsky-
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style organizing techniques in order to adapt to these new
contours (McKnight and Kretzmann, 198 4).
Neo-Alinskyite organizations in various locations
may sometimes serve as competitors with other types of
community organizations or, in -other instances, with
political organizations and parties. They are challenged
to accommodate local cultures, to factor ethnic and racial
traditions into their style of community organizing and to
fashion relationships with political leaders and forces.
While they enjoy an immense degree of freedom in their
choices of targets and strategies and in their
relationship to legal proceses and structures, they may
also experience periodic deficiencies in focusing their
work or in maintaining their mobilization capacities.
Participants in this form of neighborhood organizing may
be pulled in conflicting directions in terms of time and
energy to the activities of their churches, their families
or other local organizations.
The Exercise of Power: The means by which each type
of organization has exercised power reflects other facets
of their differences, although new strategies are
evolving. In the period following World War II through
the 1970's, labor's power was exercised largely in the
economic arena with its ultimate weapon that of the strike
in order to gain wage increases and other improvements.
It generally participated in politics as a partner in the
Democratic Party and derived political power by virtue of
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its numbers (Brecher and Costello, 1988a). Organized labor
functions politically on the federal, state and local
levels and is affected by policies set at each of these
levels. Yet, given the national framework for labor
relations described above which obtained throughout the
first three post-World War II decades, labor usually did
not have to resort to political pressure and the creation
of a favorable public opinion climate to achieve success
in individual organizing drives or at the bargaining
table.
Simply preserving past achievements, however, has
been extremely difficult for organized labor since the mid
1970's. In order to succeed in organizing or in
collective bargaining, some unions have opted to
invigorate political act-ion programs in all three levels
of government and initiate new public relations
strategies.. In the contemporary climate collective
bargaining demands are often difficult to win through
withholding labor in a strike situation. Galvanizing
public opinion through such tactics as protest and civil
disobedience are now among the repertoire of unions in
organizing drives and strike situations.
The power of neighborhood groups, on the other hand,
generally has been exercised at the level of local
politics and often focuses on the realm of public
opinion. Their tactics range from negotiation to protest
and confrontation. The model of protest set forth by
Lipsky (1970) articulates one of their main strategies to
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achieve goals: the activation of "reference publics" on
the targets of protest through creation of a public
opinion climate which calls for the resolution of protest.
Within this model, symbolic rewards are sometimes offered
which satisfy or appease the reference publics more than
the protesters, and in some instances material rewards are
dispensed which satisfy the both the protesters and
reference publics. Neighborhood groups rely heavily on
protest tactics because they generally do not possess
sufficient economic power to achieve goals through direct
economic pressure, and sometimes their goals may not be of
a purely economic nature. The voluntary nature of their
membership contributes to problems of defining a cohesive
or solid base in the community: protest tactics often help
to create the impression of a large unified base.
Mutual Discovery: In recent years a process of
mutual discovery has been unfolding between labor and
neighborhood organizations in various communities. The
experiences vary from city to city and region to region.
Often the nature of the local leadership has a great
influence on the outcome of the process, but coalitions of
trade unions and commnity and neighborhood organizations
are dotting the American landscape (Brecher and Costello,
1988a, 1990). Sometimes in the context of difficult
strikes in which labor needs community allies, at other
times in the face of devastating plant closings, labor is
now reaching out beyond its own ranks to wage its
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struggles. Electoral coalitions, as well, are developing
and Connecticut offers several important examples which
will be analyzed later. These coalitions and alliances
constitute a new and emerging means of exercising power
and their potential is rapidly becoming recognized by the
participants as a necessity in the current political and
economic environment. However, unless carefully nurtured,
these coalitions can have very tenuous existences.
The organizational contexts described above have
distinguished neighborhood groups from unions in the past
and, as such, each type organization has operated within
its own sphere, employing its own methods. However, as
unions implicitly adapt community organizing strategies
such as protest to their needs in resolving issues and as
labor unions and community organizations form coalitions
to advance mutual goals, the question arises as to how
similar the activities of the two types of organizations
will become over time and if certain aspects of the
dichotomy between work and community will diminish.
Commonalities: Despite many differences in the
contexts and the frameworks within which unions and
constituency-based neighborhood organizations operate,
there are certain common elements in their efforts. Both
attempt to improve the living conditions of their members
or constituents by redefining relations of power in their
respective environments. These are the organizations that
individuals turn to when they face a plant closing, a
property tax revaluation, a gentrifying neighborhood or a
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disciplinary action by a supervisor.
organizations must overcome feelings apathy and powerless,
and develop a sense of confidence within their members.
Both rely on the power of numbers over the power of wealth
and to be at all successful, they must harness the
collective power of individuals acting self-consciously to
achieve goals.
In an introductory essay to Lee Staple's work on
community organizing, Roots to Power A Manual for
Grassroots Organizing (1984), Cloward and Piven eloquently
characterize some of the common elements that drive both
types of organizations:
...Ordinary people have always been moved to
political action in the local settings where they
live and work. It is in the local settings that
people come together in solidarity groups, where
they discover common grievances, and where they
sometime find sources of institutional power. What
people can do is a reflection of their particular
objective circumstances: as workers, they can
withhold labor; as tenants, they can withhold rent;
as savers, they can withhold savings; as consumers,
they can withold purchases; and, as citizens, they
can withhold obedience to the rules governing civil
society... Whether people band together as tenants,
workers, minority groups members, women, or
environmental and peace activists, it is their
neighborhoods, factories, housing projects and
churches that provide the nexus for mobilization.
Terminology should not mislead us. In this respect,
community organizing is not different from other
efforts to organize popular political power. And
that has always been so, no matter the moment in
history when popular mobilization erupted (xiv).
Understanding this generic nature of organizing and its
operation in the spheres of work and community within the
context of social and economic transformation is what
motivates this research. The capacities of community
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Both types of
organizations and labor unions to reach and motivate
individuals to engage in collective action are important
elements in both the processes and outcomes of economic
restructuring and are the focus of this effort.
RESEARCH FOCUS
This dissertation focuses on neighborhood
organizations and labor unions in Hartford, Connecticut
and examines several questions in relation to the two
types of organizations:
1) How do the unions and neighborhood groups
understand the changing socio-economic environment?
2) How do organizational leaderships articulate the
changes to their members and activate their members?
3) What types of changes in their own tactics,
especially in relation to organizing, electoral and
coalition activities, have occurred in recent years?
What models do they draw upon and how do they make
choices in this environment?
4) How are their activities similar and different,
and which factors facilitate or impede mutual
collaboration?
5) How do they understand each other, work together
and inform each other across the boundary of work
and community?
One of the key conceptual points of departure for
this project is Katznelson's analysis of the separation of
37
work and community in American social consciousness. This
separation has implications for American social movements,
and in Hartford certain aspects of this separation
manifest in the economic and political organizing which
takes place, as well as in the character of the
organizations that engage in the organizing. Hartford
also serves an example of a city in which organizations in
both the spheres of work and community are not only
active, but also slowly attempting to work together by
forming coalitions and engaging in joint activities.
Within these contexts, the differences and similarities in
their respective models and approaches are not necessarily
mutually understood. However, each type of organization
confronts various forms of capital, as well as various
public policy questions, and occassionally the targets of
organizing overlap. Since organizations from both spheres
are elements in the political processes responding to
economic restructuring, analyzing their methodologies
affords a deeper understanding of contemporary political
phenomena. In that vane, this research is intended to
serve several purposes:
1) to examine the frameworks and the methods
employed by labor and community organizations;
2) to present evidence of how labor and
neighborhood organizations understand and assert
themselves in the process of restructuring in order
to defend their members' interests;
3) to assess the implications of their respective
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and combined activities within this context for
urban politics.
Field Research With Organizations in Hartford
Field research was conducted with labor unions and
neighborhood organizations based in Hartford, Connecticut,
over the period of time between 1987 and 1990. Specific
characteristics of Hartford are described in Chapter 3.
However, the dramatic contrasts of wealth and poverty
within the city, the organizational presence of the
constituency-based neighborhood organizations and labor
unions, and the access to and familiarity with these
groups on the part of the author afforded a unique
opportunity to examine the consequences of economic
restructuring from the perspective of the inner-workings
and logics of the organizations.
The research involved participant observation,
documentary research and extensive interviews in order to
analyze various dimensions of the organizations within
different phases of their work as described below. In
selecting organizations for inclusion into the project,
the effort was not to obtain an exhaustive sample of labor
unions or neighborhood organizations. Rather, the choice
was to select organizations who were first accessible and
open to the project, and those whose organizational
practices would potentially yield models of how socio-
economic change is effectively confronted. If not
yielding fully developed models, the methods of these
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groups at least offer important insights for social change
practitioners and an academic audience concerned with the
effects of socio-economic transformation.
Three different organizations of each type were
analyzed for comparisons of viewpoints and practices
within groups. Since there is variation among labor
unions and among neighborhood organizations as well as
between the two organizational types, these variations are
also of interest in order to understand different forms of
response to the economic and social environment. These
organizations all are among the most "activist" in their
respective spheres, yet they each face unique
organizational challenges and give different emphasis to
various aspects of their work: organizing, electoral,
coalitions and other areas. Consequently, although they
are all activist and innovative in their approaches, they
represent a range of methodologies and choices in terms of
pursuing respective agendas.
To help focus the research and to provide a basis of
comparison between the two types of organizations,
interviews and observations were initially organized
around several aspects of each organization's work: the
organizing phase, the mobilization phase and
organizational maintenance issues. These aspects were
selected because they corresponded generally to the
underlying concerns of the research and would provide a
"handle" to examine how these groups confront distinct
problems and issues, many of which have sharpened or
40
intensified within the context of restructuring. The
neighborhood groups and unions all need to attract new
members and/or respond to situations in which individuals
approach them with specific problems. They also undertake
organizational endeavors which require mobilizing existing
memberships and, more than simply mobilization of people
to attend events, these activities sometimes require
individuals to make sacrifices and face serious
consequences, as in labor strikes or rent strikes.
Moreover, even as the organizations undertake these
activities, they must deal with issues of structure,
resources and basic organizational maintenance.
As the research proceded, the distinction between an
organizing phase and a mobilization phase in the work of
the neighborhood organizations seemed artificial, and
therefore when the results are presented in Chapter 6,
these two phases are collapsed into one area of work.
This point is explained in greater detail in the beginning
of Chapter 6. However, the research initially proceded
with the distinctions and categories which are described
below. With this proviso, these categories provide the
basis for the presentation of findings on Labor Organizing
in Chapter 5 and Neighborhood Organizing in Chapter 6.
The Organizing Phase: In the realm of organizing new
members, the attempt was to ascertain how each group
articulates its goals and philosophies, and how it
characterizes the target or opposition in relation to
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those philosophies: on what basis it attempts to appeal to
new members. Are the targets described in personalized
terms or are they described in corporate or institutional
terms, or both? Are systemic explanations offered for the
behavior of opposition in a context of describing larger
societal trends? These questions were intended to
discover how organizations view themselves in the social
world and what they impart to individuals they hope to
attract. Additionally, representatives of the
organizations were asked what incentives they thought
existed for individuals to joint--material, social or
personal rewards. The assumptions and models of
organizing were also explored with the intention of
discovering how organizations confront legal and resource
contraints, and adapt to changing and challenging forms of
resistance.
The Mobilization Phase: Questions focusing on the
mobilization phase attempted to ascertain how strategies
and tactics are selected, how members are involved in
mobilizations and campaigns, and in what types of
coalitions and electoral activities the organizations
engage. All of the organizations have the choice of using
routine types of behavior or disruptive behavior in
various situations, but in order to use disruptive
tactics, certain judgments are made by organizational
leadership as to the readiness of members and the reaction
of the target, the authorities, the media and the public.
Understanding the criteria used by the leadership to make
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such decisions generated one set of questions posed to the
organizational representatives. Another area of questions
focused on how the organizations understood the role of
protest--do their ideas conform to Lipsky's model, for
example? How are members prepared to take part in such
actions? When are routine, less confrontational tactics
used? What types of compromises are made and under what
circumstances? Additionally, how do the leadership of the
organizations transmit their own messages to the
membership and what are the ways in which they attempt to
steer and guide organizational directions?
All of the organizations participate in various
types of coalitions and pursue some type of electoral
stragegies, even if they don't participate directly in
elections. The effort was to understand when the
organizations choose to participate in coalitions, what
types of coalitions they engage in, who participates from
the organizations (leadership or rank-and-file), and what
they feel they gain from these endeavors. In terms of
electoral politics, the groups were asked if they
participate and how they participate, as well as what
importance they attach to these activities. Finally, when
they engage in coalitions, how do the various styles and
models of the two types of organizations confront
each other, that is, what features of the other type of
organization either facilitate or inhibit coalitions and
alliances? These issues of coalition activity are
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presented in Chapter 4.
Organizational Maintenance Issues: Organizational
maintenance issues are those issues which relate to the
organizations' functioning and involve structure, staff
and membership development. What types of internal
structures exist within the organizations to develop
membership? How is participation encouraged? What
motivates already organized members to participate? What
types of decisions are made at the various levels of
organizations? Another set of questions dealt with the
types of external structural constraints that exist and
how these constraints are confronted. For example, how do
various laws impede or facilitate organizational growth
and development. Finally, the area of staffing was
explored. Questions here revolved around the role of
staff who are hired versus those who are elected. How are
unelected . staff hired? To whom are staffmembers
accountable? How much autonomy do staffmembers have in
carrying out their responsibilities? These organizational
maintenance issues reflect the logics used within the
various organizations to achieve goals, and by comparing
the patterns within the different organizations, we can
gain additional evidence as to the ways in which they
attempt to achieve their goals.
Presentation of Research Findings in the Following
Chapters
Having outlined the problems and the research
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framework in this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 next
offers a brief historical background and reviews relevant
literature for both labor organizing and neighborhood
organizing in order to locate the issues facing Hartford
organizations in a more general context. Chapter 3
provides information on Hartford and an introduction to
the specific organizations which are the focus of the
research and considers recent analytical work on Hartford.
In Chapter 4, we begin to present the results of the
research in Hartford by analyzing several coalition and
electoral experiences of the organizations. In that
chapter, after listing several examples of coalitions, the
work of the Connunity Labor Alliance for Strike Support,
the support group which formed around the Colt strike, and
People for Change, a local third political party, are
analyzed in depth in terms of why organizations
participated and the extent to which they were able to
work together. This chapter concerning alliances and
elections is presented first so that the reader can
reflect upon specific examples during the more detailed
accounts of the respective methodologies in the succeeding
two chapters. In other words, we will begin at what may
be conceived of as an outcome of a set of organizational
choices, aspects of methodology that reflect
organizational layers and processes which are most
apparent in external relationships, and then peel away the
layers in subsequent chapters to trace and reveal the
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inner-logics of the methodologies and the assessment of
the organizations' leadership.
In Chapter 5 on Labor Organizing and in Chapter 6 on
Neighborhood Organizing we will analyze the functioning of
the organizations within the various organizational phases
and features outlined in the previous section (organizing,
mobilizing and maintenance/structural issues). We will
highlight innovations and adaptations in response to
restructuring, as well as unique issues faced in each
sphere of organizing.
In our final chapter, Chapter 7, we present
comparisons of the two types of organizing and our
conclusions. We will attempt to address several areas in
the conclusion: implications for theory, implications for
practice and implications for the social fabric of the
city, specifically conditions and social movements in
Hartford.
Throughout the chapters, the focus is on the
stragetic choices made by the two types of organizations,
particularly by their leaderships. Therefore, this is not
so much a study of industrial relations as it is a study
of choices and innovations attempted by several innovative
unions in a changing economic environment. Likewise, this
work does not examine the range of alternatives within
community organization practice, nor is it a study of
community development options, but rather a study of
choices and innovations embodied in the particular type
of neighborhood organizing practiced in Hartford, again,
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given the city's specific social environment. Issues of
urban politics are also considered within the specific
context. However, what seems to be most generalizable is
identified in Chapter 7 as we speculate about the
implications of the project.
An overriding concern within the project is how
these organizations actually confront the changing social
and economic environment within their organizational
practices as they themselves attempt to foster change. We
attempt to show several ways in which their practices have
evolved in recent years and how, in turn, these practices
are shaping the processes of change that these groups
seek. New organizing methods which facilitate
organizational growth and goals are not only important to
the groups themselves, but may mitigate certain effects of
the economic phenomena previously described. For example,
since one possibility of attempting to maintain the living
standards of displaced blue collar workers is to unionize
the growing service sector in which many of these workers
are now finding employment and potentially raise the wage
levels in these sectors, the success or failure of
organizing in the service sector is instructive.
Moreover, unions such as the UAW who once exclusively
organized in manufacturing sectors are now targeting the
service sector. Therefore, the progress of service sector
organizing is important in the process of economic change.
In their communities, these same displaced workers
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may require new or different public services or public
policies which are advocated by the neighborhood
organizations, i.e., tax relief, training or retraining
and other employment programs, assistance in the housing
arena or other issues. Accordingly, the relationship
between the issues and campaigns within the two spheres of
organizing is also explored.
We also identify factors that help to explain
successes or failure of the groups. Certain factors may
be within their control: matters of techniques, internal
structures and decision-making, individual leadership.
However, other factors related to economic and political
processes may not be within their control. Understanding
how these factors combine and interact provides further
clues as to the potential of organizing activities.
We have also tried to ascertain what are the common
elements of organizing within each setting in this current
period. As outlined above, the organizing contexts and
organizational styles are generally understood to be quite
different. Identifying generic elements of organizing
provides indications as to where the boundaries of work
and community might be penetrated, or perhaps where
there are opportunities to fashion joint strategies by
neighborhood forces and labor. Joint strategies are not
necessarily readily chosen by either type of organization,
despite what might seem to be obvious strategic
requirements. These issues are also considered.
This research may be most useful to practitioners
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who often do not have the option of stepping back and
analyzing their work or methodologies. Perhaps by way of
comparison to events and processes in Hartford, others may
be able to identify new approaches or problems to be
corrected. This work can also be useful to those
interested in analysis of contemporary social movements
and the patterns, processes and issues inherent in urban
movements of the 80's and 90's. Hartford is unique in
terms of its specific configuration of forces, but part
of much larger economic developments. Therefore, these
specific experiences speak to larger issues and
accordingly, what happens in Hartford may be of interest
elsewhere. Perhaps what is most important in the entire
effort is that we are exploring social and economic change
at' a very grassroots, "micro" level vantage point, and
have focused on the structures of human action and agency
that most directly confront these developments.
Supportina Materials
There are several appendices which consist of
materials'to augment and support the findings. Training
curricula and materials and meeting agenda are provided as
examples of the methods and messages imparted to members
and participants by the organizations. These are
referenced in Chapters 5 and 6. Additionally, a list of
meetings and activities which were attended is provided,
and a listing of the interviews conducted and the
interview outline are attached.
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Beyond these materials and activities, important
insights were gathered in hundreds of informal
conversations, at dinners, at social and political events
and in the everyday course of my life during the years in
which the research was conducted. The Acknowledgements
section provides an indication of the interest, support,
encouragement and contributions which were forthcoming in
these settings.
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REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR RESEARCH
The economic restructuring outlined in the previous
chapter is often described in global terms: the "new
international division of labor", "global restructuring",
the "global economy", "urban economic restructuring" and
other phrasing. Yet economic restructuring affects local
communities and specific industrial sectors in quite
distinct and varying ways. A very important ingredient in
the outcome of this restructuring is the combinations of
responses of those affected: the specific policies of the
state; organizational and individual leadership
responses; local and/or national political-cultural
contexts and traditions; and other types of local or
sectoral conditions. Human and economic geographers may
express this in terms of spatiality or spatial
variations, sociologists or political scientists may
refer to local cultural or political variables, and
economists detail the specific consequences in regions or
industries. What is key is that there is no one outcome,
no easily predictable pattern for a given community
undergoing economic change:
Depending on the balance of social forces
embodied in state policies, the economic development
policies of the local and regional state vary from
purely capital-serving concessions to more balanced
"linkage" development policies where local state
officials are able to impose neighborhood and other
political conditions on the development process.
Concessions of the latter sort have been extracted
from the developers by progressive movements in
cities such as San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles
and Santa Monica, California, where neighborhood
pressure has been an important factor in local
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politics...
The crucial variable producing popular responsive
policies affecting urban development is the extent
to which the networks of ordinary people in
households, communities and workplaces can combine
to produce forms of organization leading to the
effective expression of demands for better
neighborhood and working conditions, improved urban
public services, and the self-management of their
communities. From the Third World squatter
settlements.. .to core country women's organizations
demanding childcare facilities, to the progressive
neighborhood movements in the United States, to
urban social movements in Europe, it is clear that
Popular praxis matters (emphasis mine). It is an
essential element in community politics; and when
present, the balance of power within the state, and
hence the state role in urban restructuring, becomes
more than a matter of capital accumulation (Feagin
and Smith, 1987 pg. 29-30).
This research, by focusing on organizations in Hartford,
Connecticut, examines different responses within one
locality by organizations who confront the effects of
restructuring in a number of different settings and
contexts, i.e., popular praxis in diverse yet somewhat
comparable circumstances. It is quite clear that labor
and neighborhood organizations have distinct
methodologies. However, their practices, in combination
with other forms of popular response, are important
features in the local outcomes of economic restructuring.
To set the stage for an examination of the neighborhood
organizations and labor unions in Hartford, a review of
literature relevant to the general context in which these
organizations operate is presented in this chapter.
Chapter 3 will provide background on the specific local
context in Hartford.
Much has been written about the dilemmas of the
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labor movement in the Reagan and now Bush era.
Neighborhood organizing techniques also have been
analyzed, however the focus is often on the limits of
their methodologies and directions rather than on external
conditions which may serve to constrain their work. We
will focus first on the situation of labor, and then on
neighborhood organizing.
CHALLENGES FOR LABOR
Often an analysis of the current predicament of the
American labor movement begins by locating the problems in
an unraveling of the New Deal political alignment which
produced the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 (NLRA,
also known as the Wagner Act) and in the dismantling of
the post World War II era "social contract". Barbash
(1984), for example, summarizes each decade since the
1930's in terms of labor's situation as follows: "the
1930's ushered in the modern union era and the rebirth of
collective bargaining"; the 1940's served to consolidate
the gains of the previous decade and to demonstrate that
unions "were here to stay." During the 1950's the law and
a "resurgent" management were able to slow union growth.
In the 1960's unions penetrated the public sector and make
progress among white collar workers. During the
inflation-plagued 1970's, unions became a target of wage
and income policies, and the 1980's is the decade of union
retrenchment. He ends this outline questioning whether
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the 1980's are merely a cyclical downturn or the mark of a
"long-term change in union strategy from offense to
defense?" and goes on to assess various options for labor,
issues to which we will return later.
The Development of the Moder Labor Relations System in
the U.S.
To expand upon Barbash's outline, several points in
David Montgomery's essay "American workers and the New
Deal formula" (1979) are especially worth considering in
some detail. In explaining the implications of the
passage of the NLRA in 1935, he comments:
The collapse of the "Coolidge Propserity" in 1929
produced a celebrated surge of trade union and
political activity among workers and forced
government to assume a vastly expanded role in the
economy and in industrial relations. Its new
policies fixed the legal and political parameters of
workers' control struggles to the present time, but
as those policies evolved over ensuing decades, they
became less and less beneficial and more and more
restrictive for workers. They had three basic
ingredients of concern here: state subsidization of
economic growth, the encouragement of legally
regulated collective bargaining, and the marriage of
the union movement to the Democratic Party. (p. 161)
As unions made notable organizing gains in the late
1930's, often through militant and violent strikes,
factory occupations and other tactics, power relations in
factories and mines changed dramatically. However, as
disruptive as these developments were for individual
enterprises and industries, there was also recognition of
the potential for bringing more stability to American
industrial relations through unionization:
The response of the Roosevelt administration
and Congress to this militancy involved both major
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concessions and a many-faceted effort to steer the
organizing activities of workers into channels which
would not threaten the economy's basic market and
profit mechanisms. For all the hostility exhibited
by most business leaders toward the unions which
were trying to organize their workers, the idea of
some formalized plan of employee representation
within the firm had been a basic element of the
American Plan of the twenties. Moreover, men as
prominent as President Herbert Hoover and Gerard
Swope of the General Electric Company had long
argued that national unions (under the proper
leadership, of course) could help industry reduce
price competition and "eliminate waste." The
economic crisis and the ensuing efforts of the
Roosevelt administration to rescue the economy by
stabilizing prices lent special force to this
argument. While some New Deal advisers... looked
forward to national economic planning by industrial
councils in which industry, labor and consumers
would all be represented, others .. .argued that only
strong unions could raise popular purchasing power
sufficiently to get the economy growing again (p.
164).
The passage of the NLRA in 1935 established the
National Labor Relations Board whose purposes included
protecting workers attempting to organize into unions
against persecution by employers, and conducting elections
through which workers would choose their collective
bargaining agent with whom employers were legally bound
to bargain. Montgomery notes that in its initial years,
the NLRB "pursued its assignment vigorously" and
facilitated the firm establishment of unions in many basic
industries.
Yet, as Montgomery asserts, this "government
activity was simultaneously liberating and cooptive for
the workers." While the absolute control of the managers
was lifted from the working lives of many Americans,
"government's intervention also opened a new avenue
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through which the rank and file could in time by tamed and
the newly powerful unions be subjected to tight legal and
political control." After World War II and with the end of
the no-strike agreements which had been in effect during
the war, the pent-up wage demands of workers exploded into
a massive strike wave. In 1946 over 4-1/2 million workers
were involved in strikes. In response, during 1947 a set
of amendments to the NLRA was passed, the Taft-Hartley
Act, and a much more restrictive legal environment for
unions began. This act banned sympathy strikes, secondary
boycotts, mass picketing (this provision was later
repealed) and required elected union officers to sign
affidavits stipulating that they were not members of the
Communist Party. Additionally, the president of the
United States could seek injunctions to order strikers to
return to work, and unions were subject to legal
liabilities if members struck in violation of written
contracts. Subsequent court rulings, Montgomery claims,
have "progressively tightened the legal noose around those
historic forms of working class struggle which do not fit
within the certified contractual framework." His essay
continues by providing poignant examples of the increasing
difficulties encountered by labor through the 1970's,
foreshadowing of the even more serious problems during the
1980's.
Tomlins (1985), in his detailed historical analysis
of U.S. labor law and the relationship of unions and the
state, generally concurs with Montgomery as he examines
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the early years of the National Labor Relations Board
activity. While in earlier decades the issue of employee
representation had been. a "private" matter outside the
scope of state activity, the passage of the NLRA "made
collective bargaining a matter- of public concern,
conducted by institutions with statutorily-defined rights
and responsibilities within a framework shaped by state
agencies. While this represented a major encouragement to
collective bargaining, it also represented what was
potentially a severe encroachment upon union autonomy"
(p.101). The simultaneously "liberating and cooptive"
aspects of this arrangement that Montgomery posits are of
concern to Tomlins, as well:
... (The Wagner Act's) passage meant that collective
bargaining was guaranteed to play a major role in
the regulation of employment practices in a wide
range of industries. This held out the opportunity
of participation in determining the direction of the
American political economy which organized labor had
been seeking since the turn of the century.
Simultaneously, however, the act reconstituted
collective bargaining, bringing this hitherto
private activity fully within the regulatory ambit
of the administrative state. This had major
implication for employees and unions. For
employees, it meant that the right to create the
institutional structures required for participation
in collective bargaining could now be vindicated
through public proceedings. The right was to be
exercised, however, subject to the state's
determination of how the public interest might best
be served in the resolution of industrial
controversies. . ..this would eventually come to mean
in practice that the right to organize and bargain
could be maintained only so far as the state
conceived it to serve an overriding goal of
industrial peace (p.147).
Later in his book, Tomlins again discusses this
"conditional legitimacy" of unions' status:
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... Even before the Taft-Hartley debates, it had
become clear that such institutional legitimacy as
unions could expect to enjoy in the post-war
industrial relations system would be limited to
activities which seemed to contribute to the well-
being of the corporate political economy...
In fact, the legitimacy of collective activity
putatively guaranteed by labor relations law had
been conditional almost from the outset. During the
debates of the 1930's, proponents of the Wagner Act
had stressed, both before and after its passage,
that collective bargaining was a means to an end,
and that the end was industrial stability and labor
peace.. .By the end of the 1940's it was firmly
established as the central pillar of the pluralist
consensus which emerged during that decade and which
set the terms of the post-was capital-labor-state
relationship (p.318-319).
Just how precarious this conditional legitimacy was would
not necessarily become fully apparent for several decades.
Several other developments of the late 1940's and early
1950's, however, were quite important in the life of the
American. labor movement.
First was the pattern of collective bargaining that
was established in the automobile industry. The 1948
agreement between General Motors and the United Auto
Workers (UAW) is one milestone of the post World War 11
era of economic growth and industrial relations. Piore
and Sable (1984) characterize this agreement as "(t)he
keystone of the whole system of (postwar) macroeconomic
stabilization." While union membership after World War II
did not constitute a majority of the labor force, close to
70% of production workers in major industries were
unionized and covered by union contracts. Their wage
rates would eventually support a standard of living
58
sufficient to fuel a mass-consumption society and the UAW-
GM agreement would influence the wage rates in other
unionized industries and non-union sectors, as well:
...The (UAW-GM) formula established as the standard
for wage setting the long-run, economy-wide increase
in labor productivity plus the change in consumer
price index; wages, it was agreed should rise by
this amount every year. Given that labor
productivity adjusted for price changes is a measure
of productive capacity, consistent and uniform
application of the formula to all wages and salaries
would ensure that private-consumer purchasing power
would expand at the same rate as national productive
capacity. The complex of labor-relations and wage-
setting institutions generalized the formula in
precisely this way (p.80).
As this collective bargaining system evolved, a
number of other important features emerged. Brody (1980)
traces how labor conceded more and more of what have
become known as "management prerogatives" or "management
rights" as the price for regular increases in wages and
benefits. Throughout the late 1940's and into the 1950's,
in the auto industry and elsewhere this trend
strengthened. Commenting on the situation between GM and
the UAW, Brody notes:
The company thus defined the terms for dealing
with the UAW. The union was accepted as a permanent
presence. Benefits would be forthcoming at regular
intervals and in decent increments. The essentials
of managerial authority had to be left alone.
... Instead of seeking an accommodation that
would forestall organization, now the purpose (of
GM's strategy) shifted to confining unions within
acceptable limits. (p.185-186).
In this process, moreover, the legalistic character of
industrial relations also began its entrenchment. Rank-
and-file shop floor action and militancy to resolve issues
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gave way to a system of contract rules, grievances
arbitrations.
One other key ingredient of the post was era
labor's development was the purging of Communists
and
in
and
radicals from the union movement in the context of the
emerging Cold War and the rise of Senator Joseph
McCarthy's anti-communist campaign. As Bluestone and
Harrison (1982) observe, "management was willing to share
the proceeds from economic growth to some extent, but it
was absolutely unwilling to concede any control over the
process of production to what it viewed as 'radical
elements"' (p.136). These purges had long lasting
effects, well beyond the demise of Senator
McCarthy's crusade. Montgomery (1979) asserts that these
ideological dispositions "served to suffocate political
and ideological debate in working-class America",
culminating in the George Meany-led AFL-CIO opposing the
peace movement of the Viet Nam War era and the
presidential candidacy of George McGovern.
Within the paramaters described above, labor took
part in the economic expansion after World War II through
the 1960's. U.S. firms were yet to face the competition
from foreign firms which became so important and pervasive
in the economic life of country during the 1970's and
which continues to the present. Although the growth in
unionization peaked quite early in this period--1954 was
the peak year with 34.7% of the non-agricultural workforce
unionized (Goldfield, 1987)--the gradual decline in union
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members did not command the attention it has come to in
the 1980's. As private sector unionization began its
deline, public sector workers were increasingly becoming
unionized. Moreover, throughout this period labor could
rely on an expanding "social wage", as Bluestone and
Harrison (1982) describe, "that amalgam of benefits,
worker protections, and legal rights that acts to
generally increase the social security of the working
class" (p. 133).
All of this should not lead one to believe that
labor easily had its way and that corporate management
simply acquiesced to unions' demands. There were
considerable numbers of strikes and Goldfield (1987)
asserts that U.S. strike rates in the post World War II
era were among the highest in the developed capitalist
countries. However, as Harrison and Bluestone (1988)
document, average family incomes and the standard of
living in America were "on the rise".
Recent Difficulties and Problems
Now there is a dramatically different picture. The
commentary and analysis of the labor movement in the mid
and late 1980's and early 1990's focuses on questions of
the survival of the labor movement in an era of rampant
union-busting and the lowest level of unionization since
the mid 1930's (see for example, Piore, 1986). Kuttner
(1986) discusses the vulnerability of the labor movement
under the collapse of the post World War II social
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contract. Pressures for concessions in the face of
vigorous foreign competition and domestic non-union
sectors, mass layoffs, a decline in the unionized portion
of the workforce, the collapse of industry-wide
contracts and the institution of two-tier wage systems are
among the developments which place American unions in a
"particularly grim" situation. Beyond these issues, labor
is publically characterized as "a selfish special
interest, retarding industrial innovation, serving only
union members rather than the wage-earning citizenry in
general" (p. 33, also Piore, 1986). Why these problems
concern Kuttner and other progressives is because of the
role that he envisions unions play in society, a role that
"has never quite received adequate notice in democratic
theory". This role is two-fold, first as instruments of
industrial democracy facilitating workers a collective
"voice" in the workplace, and second as a "prime
constituency for a social democratic conception of
society, whether that conception was explicitly socialist
or reformist" (p. 33).
The disadvantageous position of organized labor
described above and throughout this project is the result
of the convergence of a number of trends and factors.
Miller (1987) presents a quite thorough list and although
several of the items he includes have already been
mentioned, the entire listing is worth enumerating to
envision just how serious the situation is:
-structural changes in the economy shifting
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employment from heavily unionized "smokestack"
manufacturing to lightly unionized service
industries and smaller factories;
-regional shifts in employment, particularly in the
manufacturing sector, from the more unionized
"frostbelt" to the less unionized "sunbelt",
concurrent with resurgent economic development in
the North in sectors and firms resistant to
unionization;
-high unemployment in older industrial regions,
resulting in greater competition among workers for
jobs and in employers engaging in concessionary
bargaining;
-difficulties for unions in penetrating the "white
collar" workforce in the private sector, despite
notable gains in the public sector white collar
workforce;
-deregulation in highly organized industries such as
trucking, airlines and communications, changing the
nature of industrial relations in these sectors and
resulting in delining union membership;
-operation of parallel non-union plants and
worksites by companies with unionized operations
(e.g. construction and mining);
-the development and expansion of personnel
administration apparatus within firms which, by its
problem-solving function, serves to undercut the
role of unions;
-employers' use of labor law to frustrate union
organization and the concomminant rise of anti-union
lawyers and consultants;
-increasingly poor results in private sector
organizing by unions;
-the "free-rider" problem in the public sector in
certain states where unions are required to
represent workers who refuse to become union
members;
-low levels of unionization in the expanding female
portion of the labor force;
-legislation on various aspects of employment
(discrimination, health and safety, etc.) which
undermines the specific, traditional role of unions
in these matters;
-the public impression of corruption within the
labor movement.
Goldfield (1987), in attempting to explain the
decline of organized labor, reviews many of the arguments
presented by Miller and others and asserts that several of
these factors are not the insurmountable obstacles they
are often assumed to be. He argues, for example, that the
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low union density in the South and Southwest of the United
States should be separated conceptually from arguments
about the difficulty in organizing new members in these
regions. He presents data which show that union success
rates in parts of the South are comparable to the North.
He also reviews research which supports the notion that
organizing women workers is not necessarily more difficult
than organizing male workers, and in some cases less
difficult. Likewise, economic restructuring, itself, does
not necessarily preclude new organizing in the more recent
growth sectors, particularly if one compares the U.S.
situation to other capitalist countries in Western Europe
and especially to Canada in which some of the sectors
experiencing economic growth are also becoming unionized.
What he does emphasize in accounting for union decline is
what he terms the relation of class forces: the trends in
U.S. public labor policy, the increased effectiveness of
employer resistance and the lack of agressive organizing
on the part of American unions to compensate for
membership losses. These trends, particularly the first
two, warrant some discussion.
A wide spectrum of authors agree that the system of
labor law which once facilitated union organization and
growth in this country now hinders that organization, and
that political appointments to the National Labor
Relations Board during the Reagan administration were
particularly damaging to labor's standing. The
"conditional legitimacy" described by Tomlins has been
severely undermined as public policy has shifted decidedly
against labor. As employers have become quite bold in
their attempts to resist new organization efforts and
break existing unions, organized labor finds it
increasingly difficult to obtain the relief and protection
from the NLRB it found in previous decades. Several
specific developments serve as examples.
As noted earlier, union-busting has itself become a
big industry. Goldfield lists a number of trade
associations who have developed vigorous anti-union
programs: the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM),
the American Hospital Association, the Associated Builders
and Contractors and others (p. 190).. NAM established a
tax-exempt educational and research arm, the Council on a
Union-Free Environment, which provides technical
assistance in the field of "union avoidance". Anti-union
consulting firms have also formed and are retained by
companies to prevent unionization or break existing unions
through a variety of methods, some clearly illegal. They
carefully design programs within a firm in which an
organizing drive is taking place which include
pyschological profiles of employees, "captive audience"
meetings, discharges and transfers of union activists and
other forms of harassment. Moreover, once a union files
with the NLRB for a certification election, employers
attempt to forestall the election by arguing with the
union through the NLRB over the workers who will be
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eligible to vote, the "unit determination" battle.
Although the firings of unions activists are often
found to be illegal and many are eventually reinstated,
and although the units involved in elections are
eventually determined and elections held, the delays can
be devasting to unionization efforts. Goldfield
documents the rise in the number of reported unfair labor
practices committed by employers from 1950 to 1980, 4472
to 31,281 (p. 196). He also demonstrates that in the
period between 1972 and 1984, delays in holding
certification elections substantially reduced union
victories. For example, if the election was held in the
same month as the union filed with the NLRB there was a
53.9% victory rate, within 3 months a 46.3% victory rate,
within 8 months a 39.9% victory rate (p. 202).
Goldfield also traces the changes in public policy
which have effected union growth. He claims that the
passage of the Taft-Hartley in 1947 marked the beginning
of such a shift and in particular the provision of the act
which grants "free speech" rights to employers in pre-
election periods opened the way to the development of the
modern union-busting industry. In 1978, organized labor
campaigned vigorously for a Labor Law Reform Act which
would have eliminated delays in holding certification
elections. That act failed in Congress. With the
election of Ronald Reagan, the shifts in public policy
intensified: his firing of air traffic controllers in the
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PATCO strike of 1981 and NLRB appointments were clear
signals that labor would face increased difficulties.
Besides these difficulties in the organizing arena,
the labor movement has also encountered grave obstacles
when it attempts to exercise its power by striking.
Employers now are increasingly hiring permanent
replacement workers in strike situations and, unless
unions can prove that the employer is guilty of unfair
labor practices in the context of the strike (which
involves lengthy procedings before the NLRB), striking
workers may never regain their previous jobs. Given the
defeats in such publicized strikes as that of the
paperworkers in Jay, Maine, some commentators are
questioning the viability of utilizing the strike option
in the contemporary climate of industrial relations
(Geoghegan, 1989).
Organized labor is also vulnerable to internal
division as transnational corporations make decisions
about where to locate or where to continue their
operations. Clark (1989) analyzes how different local
unions of the same international organization may become
involved in the "contests" between the different locations
under consideration for industrial sites and, in effect,
are pitted against eachother. The larger international
structure of the union is placed in the difficult position
of mediating the contest, a situation not amenable to easy
resolution when the stakes involved are so critical to the
future financial health and security of not only the
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affected workers but entire communities. In Clark's
estimation, this type of dilemma owes in part to the
prominent role of localized conditions within the American
industrial relations system both in terms of the success
of union organizing and collective bargaining, as well as
in the calculus of corporate decision-making. This
dependence upon "inter-community solidarity" as the means
of countering the power of capital in such locational
disputes and other matters is something that is unique to
and a complicating factor in U.S. labor relations.
Directions for the Future
Various remedies are suggested to face these
problems. The solutions envisioned span a range of
approaches including public relations campaigns,
cooperative power-sharing arrangements with corporations,
utilization of pension funds for economic leverage,
political action, invigoration of organizing
departments and massive new organizing drives,
mergers among unions to achieve greater power, as well
as continued defense of existing achievements and
standards through more traditional collective bargaining
(AFL-CIO, 1985; Barbash, 1984; Kuttner, 1986, and 1987;
Miller, 1987; Oswald, 1984).
There is certainly not unanimity on the directions
in which labor should move in the future. While some
analysts suggest strategies for unions in relation to
specific employers which would emphasize cooperation,
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flexibility, employee profit-sharing and ownership, and
even accepting concessions in various situations, others
conceptualize labor's future as bound up with larger
trends and other progressive forces and emphasize new
organizing, international solidarity with unions in
foreign countries, maintaining and building militancy in
existing memberships, and coalition-building in local and
national politics. The public relations approach,
somewhere between these two perspectives, stresses
advertising and marketing techniques such as the "Union
Yes!" campaign and also suggests enticements such as low
interest credit cards, low cost insurance, pre-paid legal
services and other benefits. There has also been a
proposal to develop an associate membership category for
the AFL-CIO, available to individuals in unorganized
workplaces which would feature the credit cards, insurance
and other benefits (AFL-CIO, 1985).
There is no one single solution which would
adequately address all of the problems faced by the
American labor movement and no single option which could
apply in all situations. Different unions in different
sectors and regions face very different specific problems.
For example, while private sector unions confront
corporate strategies designed to meet corporate
competition, public sector unions may face tax-payer
revolts and/or state and local government budget crises.
These problems pose different issues in terms of
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fashioning responses. Moreover, new organizing drives may
require commitments of massive resources, dedicated and
tenacious staffmembers to work the drive, as well as a
capacity to develop innovative strategies and tactics.
The relative importance assigned to organizing varies from
union to union, and so the suggestion to launch new
organizing drives means different things to different
unions. The point being that even in a discussion of how
labor should respond in this era of economic
restructuring, there are many different possibilities that
any single union might pursue.
Union Leadership Roles in the Midst of These Issues
While the constraints under which unions operate may
flow from any combination of the problems described in
this chapter, the subjective assessment of the leadership
of a union as to the nature of the problems is another
important feature of labor's response. In large measure,
the options or directions pursued by a union are very
much products of the judgment of its leadership, one area
which I address within this research. Schwartz and
Hoyman (1984) identify several different requirements of
union leadership in the context of modern labor relations:
s/he must be able to represent the membership and relate
to multiple constituencies such as other union leaders,
staffmembers of the union and political elites. The union
leader must be technically competent in terms of
compliance with laws, knowledge of pension issues, health
insurance and a host of other issues, as well as a
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competent and astute manager of a union bureaucracy.
Union presidents are considered the "chief bargainer" for
their unions in important negotiations and may also be
significant actors on the national political scene. As is
apparent from this characterization, the job of a
contemporary labor leader is an immensely complex one.
Schwartz and Hoyman also identify three principle
paths to union leadership: the traditional rank-and-file
road; rising from within the union bureaucracy; and the
route of the "outside professional" moving directly into
leadership. Fink and Greenberg (1989) in documenting and
analayzing the history of the Hospital Workers Union--
Local 1199 (the original union from which the New
England Health Care Employees Union District 1199
developed) characterize another type of union leader which
applies to various individuals in 1199's leadership,
leadership who are political activists and who enter the
labor movement to further a left political vision and
agenda. To some extent Schwartz and Hoyman' s "outs ide
professional" may attempt to capture this type of
leadership, but the political activists who have helped to
build 1199 and other unions often do so not with a
professional motivation, but rather with political
motivation and there can be a distinct difference between
these two orientations.
Whatever the route to leadership, the path which a
leader charts involves choices and assessments based on an
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interpretation of contemporary events and trends. This is
an area which does not seem to cormmand a great deal of
attention in the literature, but which is a rather
important aspect of popular response to economic
restructuring . A large portion of the research in this
project attempts to understand the assessments of union
leadership, as well as neighborhood organization
leadership, in order to answer the questions of how labor
and community forces respond and adapt to new economic and
political realities. Next we will review relevant
literature in the area of neighborhood organizing.
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CHALLENGES FOR NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS
Within the literature on neighborhood organizing,
analyses focus on somewhat different types of issues and
problems than those facing labor. There are two very
different literatures in which issues of neighborhood
organizing are considered: one type, which is highly
theoretical, examines urban social movements in relation
to class structure and in comparison to other forms of
working class movements, while another more practical
literature analyzes the organizations, history and various
methodologies of neighborhood organizing.
Urban Social Movement Literature
Within the theoretical treatments of urban social
movements intense debates have transpired over the degree
to which these movements can be characterized as resulting
from capitalist relations of production and how they are
related to various other forms of class antagonisms within
society. Much of the debate revolves around Castell's
(1977, 1983) formulations regarding the politics of
consumption being autonomous from and containing a
different logic than the politics of production.. Indeed
Katznelson's (1981) inspiring work undertakes to reveal
how urban social movements, especially racially and
ethnically divisive conflicts, result from the class
structure of the larger society and ultimately serve to
protect and reinforce that structure, that is, how these
conflicts function as the "trenches" which protect and
insulate class relations. Harvey (1989:126) attempts to
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show that the "relative autonomy" of urban politics from
the politics of production fits within the "geographical
dynamics of capital accumulation and class struggle."
Both in terms of the competition between regions and
cities for industrial location and the social and
political innovation required in the process of capital
accumulation, the different patterns of urban politics and
consumption are important elements and offer varied
options in the continual renewal of capitalism.
Cox (1988) reviews recent work on urban social
movements and neighborhood conflicts concerning the
relationship of these movements with state structures, and
the role of mobilization and ideology within the
movements. In terms of relations with the state, Cox
situates grassroots movements within a demobilization-
mobilization dialectic involving popular demands on the
state in the sphere of consumption and the provision of
public goods and services:
...grassroots movements in their relation to the
state appear to be part of a demobilization-
mobilization dialectic: although it is necessary
that the state demobilize, it is also structurally
incapable of resolving the contradiction in an
enduring manner. Remobilization remains, therefore,
an ongoing possibility: significantly, this appears
to be so whether demobilization takes the form of
incorporation into state structures or the types of
privatization associated with the Reagan and
Thatcher governments, suggesting that the underlying
contradictions can be resolved neither with, nor
without, the state (p.421).
Cox concurs with the assessment of Fainstein and Fainstein
(1985) as to the importance of the ideological content (or
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lack thereof) within urban social movements. The
Fainsteins note the failure of urban social movements
within the context of economic restructuring to articulate
an oppositional political ideology analagous to that
which emerged during the civil rights movement in the
1960's. Instead, the Fainsteins argue, much of the
response which has been fashioned has been based on a
localism lacking a coherent political analysis and
unifying ideology. This localism has not yet allowed for
development of a national political movement or party, yet
the Fainsteins hold out that option as a future
possibility, however remote.
Delgado (1986) in his work which assesses the
experiences of one of the major national organizing
groups, the Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now (ACORN), succinctly analyzes the place of
conmuity organizations in the spectrum of social
movements:
...Community organizations currently struggle in two
arenas: they pose demands for immediate economic
improvements, in terms of the distribution of the
social wage, and they demand democratic rights and
liberties.
Community organizations are the major
instrumentalities through which fiscal struggles
with the state are waged. They link the provision
of collective goods and services to geographically
defined class interest; by so doing, they create new
avenues for understanding power and inequality. The
process of organizing.. .has demystified the
production and allocation of collective goods, and
created replicable local organizations that
encourage and validate a contradictory system of
opposistional behavior (p.213).
Delgado is also concerned with the inherent limitations of
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neighborhood organizing, including the constricting
localism that the Fainsteins idenfity, and these issues
will be enumerated in the next section.
Fisher and Kling (1989) speculate on the prospects
for community mobilization in the 90's and the potential
role of Alinsky style organizations. They contend that the
"service economy of the corporate central city leads to a
different kind of politics of mobilization than does the
traditional industrial urban economy, which helps account
for the fragmented character of recent movement
organizations" (p.205). Moreover, concurring with some of
Castells' ideas, they assert that as the urban industrial
proletariat "disappears", other sources of identity such
as race, gender and neighborhood become the primary
mobilizing factors in social movements. They characterize
these identities as "constituency-based" identities. The
problem then becomes how to move this consciousness into
larger social movements which challenge the systemic
nature of urban problems:
Regardless of whether urban-focused social
movements are about consumption, identity, power, or
some combination of these, the linkages between
community experience and larger class structures
must be made explicit and manifest. Otherwise,
protest and organizational movements that may follow
will be undermined continually. The possibility for
transformative community mobilization remains, we
believe, but the political economy and organization
of space in the global capitalist city clearly pose
unique, formidable structural barriers to the
emergence of a coherent and overarching movement
(p.206).
They advocate the necessity of both building coalitions
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among various constituency groups and engaging in
electoral activity. Most important, from their
perspective, is the question of ideological organizing,
that is, neighborhood organizing which contains an
ideological dimension that brings "people to deeper levels
of understanding about the character of their political-
economic world" (p. 208). Without this element, they
contend, community movements will be bound by the "limits
of personalized and localized consciousness" and remain
very parochial.
The concerns raised in this work by Fisher and
Kling, a previous piece by them (1987), as well as
Fisher's (1984) book in some sense bridge the two types of
literature on neighborhood organizing. These works
exhibit many of the theoretical concerns of the urban
social movement literature and attempt to incorporate and
apply them to the more practical analyses found both in
the community organization literature and in the social
commentary of the left. We will turn next to these two
sources of analysis.
Community Organization Literature and Social Commentary
The Rothman Model
Community organization literature which is utilized
in social work scholarship and education characterizes
neighborhood organizing as one of several strategies of
community intervention. Rothman's model (1979) which is
widely accepted by community organization practitioners
posits three types of intervention: locality development
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which closely resembles community economic development,
social service delivery planning which is technical in
nature, and social action into which Alinsky style
organizing and other social movements fit. Social action
is characterized as redistributive in orientation with
themes of social justice, equality and empowerment.
Neighborhood organizing is one important and enduring
example of social action, as well as civil rights,
political organizing and trade union organizing.
There are many forms of social movements in which
different social dynamics come into play. The challenges
which face organizations in the civil rights arena, for
example, are different than either of the two types of
social movements we will analyze in this project.
Moreover, there are different approaches to local
neighborhood empowerment--some organizations emphasize
economic development to the exclusion of political
strategies and vice versa--as well as several variations
of neo-Alinsky neighborhood organizing which will be
assessed below. While not intending to diminish other
forms of local, grassroots initiatives, what is most
relevant for this project is a more thorough of neo-
Alinskyism and its roots, areas which we will consider
next.
Saul Alinsky
Saul Alinsky's original ideas and writings continue
to be important to community organization practitioners
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since he is regarded as the originator of a unique model
of neighborhood organizing. This particular model
emphasizes neighborhood residents being organized to act
on their own behalf to achieve goals, rather than relying
on social welfare agencies and their personnel to do
things for the neighborhood. It adapts techniques from
CIO labor organizing methods of the 1930's and the radical
Communist Party style of neighborhood organizing of that
era, both of which were very familiar to and influential
upon Alinsky (see Fisher, 1984:50-51). While several
biographical treatments of Alinsky (Fink, 1984; Reitzes
and Reitzes, 1987) focus on his concerns with democracy
and democractic processes, his own writings (1946, 1949,
1971) also demonstrate a deep sensitivity and concern
with issues of class, race, inequality and class conflict,
as well as democracy. In Reveilee for Radicals (1946) many
of the examples and analyses use people in in their roles
as workers as a departure point:
Every man and woman belonging to a labor union
must be educated to understand that in order to
improve their lot, they must grasp the relationship
existing between their work in the factory, their
union, and every other part of what makes up their
whole life. What does it avail the workingman to
fight for a raise in pay if this raise is
accompanied by increased cost of rent, food,
clothing, and medical care?... What does it avail the
workingman if his working conditions at the factory
are made more healthful but he and his family are
still forced to live in disease-ridden quarters?...
When we think of a better life for the worker, we
must keep clearly in mind the obvious and true
picture of the worker as a living man who votes,
rents, consumes, breeds, and participates in every
avenue of what se call life...As a consumer he is
vitally concerned with all economic elements which
tend to exploit him... As a human being he has to
79
have a roof over his and his family's heads.. .As a
voter the worker finds that every problem in the
political arena is his problem. The welfare of many
of the organizations with which he is affiliated,
including the labor union, depend upon his active
and informed political participation... (p.58-59).
Ultimately, Alinsky viewed community organization as
a complement to or an extension of labor organizing:
If the organized labor movement cannot stretch to
the broad horizon of objectives, it must then help
in the building of a broad general People's
Organization whose very character would involve an
over-all philosophy and attack. In its simplest
sense it would be an extension of the principles and
practices of organized collective bargaining beyond
their present confines of the factory gate. In this
kind of People's Organization the organized labor
movement by virtue of its popular constituency would
be an essential element (1946:61).
Despite an orientation which seems to incorporate
notions of class structure and class conflict in society,
Alinsky nonetheless fashioned an organizing model which
was explicitly non-ideological, focusing on immediate
everyday concerns of the residents of specific
neighborhoods. Over time, Alinsky took great pains to
distance himself from any identification with Marxism or
communism (see Fisher and Kling, 1987), and in Rules for
Radicals (1971), while championing the causes of the
"Have-Nots" as the basis for organizing, he identifies
political relativism as his ideology. This relativism
encompasses a constant search for "the causes of man's
plight" and a constant adjusting of tactics and strategies
toward "those values of equality, justice, freedom, peace,
a deep concern for the preciousness of human life, and all
those rights and values propounded by Judaeo-Christianity
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and the democratic political tradition" (p. 12).
Alinsky's first major neighborhood organizing
initiative during 1938 and 1939 in Chicago's Back of the
Yards neighborhood convinced him that "people's
organizations" could be built within local poor and
working class neighborhoods which could unite divergent
segments of the community in order to redefine power
relationships. Conflict and confrontation were employed
to unify the neighborhood against designated outside
targets. Although the Back of the Yards Neighborhood
Council (BYNC) eventually succumbed to conservative and
even segregationist tendencies (see Fisher, 1984:58;
Fisher and Kling, 1987:40), and its present incarnation is
no longer viewed as consistent with the Alinsky methods of
organizing but rather a more traditional social service
agency (Reitzes and Reitzes, 1987:73), its initial
successes inspired Alinsky to attempt the model elsewhere.
With various adaptations, Alinsky took his model to other
cities.
Alinsky's Legacy
The histories of Alinsky's organizing efforts are
det.ailed in his own works (1946, 1971) and by others
including Fink (1984), Fisher (1984), and Reitzes and
Reitzes (1987), but what is particularly relevant for this
project are the connections and influence of Alinsky on
the neighborhood organizing initiatives of the 1970's and
1980's. Fisher describes the connections:
... Heather Booth (founder of the Midwest
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Academy organizing training center) calls him the
Sigmund Freud of modern community organizing. And
as Freud and his disciples codified the field of
psychoanalysis, so Alinsky and his successors have
done with the tactics of populist-style organizing
(p.129).
In the early 1970s, the limits of Alinsky
organizing were not well known or understood.
People active in movements of the 1960s felt a deep
need, especially after United States withdrawl from
Vietnam, to continue moving the nation toward
greater democracy, equality and justice. They were
attracted to Alinsky-style strategies primarily
based on their perception of what was wrong with the
student-based and student-led movements of the
previous decade. What they knew of the Alinsky
method sounded good, especially the fact that it
rejected the revolutionary rhetoric and openly
socialist ideology of the late 1960s that isolated
students from poor and working people. While many
sixties activists thought of themselves as
socialists, the seventies seemed to call for a
rethinking of traditional left views of how to bring
about radical changed in the United States. The
populist, democratic ideology of Alinskyism seemed
to be a good, if imperfect, place to begin that
rethinking (p.132).
While many leaders of the national networks of
neighborhood organizations which emerged in the 1970s
began their activist careers in the student anti-war and
civil rights movements of the 1960s, there were also
several who were trained directly by Alinsky and worked in
organizations which Alinsky himself initiated. However,
as Fisher suggests in the passage above and in greater
detail in his book, some reformulations of the Alinsky
method took place in order to correct a number of
perceived weaknesses. Fisher designates this
reformulation as "neo-Alinskyism".
Neo-Alinskyism is characterized as broader in scope
than the original Alinsky model. One of the major
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concepts which helps focus the work of these organizations
is the "majoritarian strategy", that is, an organizational
agenda which can appeal to the majority of the population,
both the poor and middle income groups, and which retains
redistributive and empowerment goals. Fisher asserts that
neo-Alinskyite groups:
...work hard to hurdle the weaknesses of Alinsky-
style neighborhood organizing in the 1960s which
defined and limited itself to a neighborhood, race,
or ethnic group--often pitting one oppressed group
against another--and which suffered a good degree of
isolation in relation to other groups and the
political system as a whole (p. 134).
Besides an orientation incorporating notions of
social change that go beyond the local community unit,
Fisher highlights several other features which distinguish
neo-Alinskyite organizations from Alinsky's earlier
efforts. The newer groups generally do not require large
degrees of foundation support before initiating operations
in a local community. They also utilize organizers
somewhat differently, moving away from reliance on both
the "super-organizer" and existing organizational leaders
in a given locale, and instead attempt to develop more
indigenous leadership. Moreover, while Alinsky, according
to Fisher (1984:135) feared the "facist" potential of
large organizations, the national leaders of several neo-
Alinsky groups envision the need for statewide and
national organizations that can mount national campaigns
and relate to a multi-issue agenda.
Critiques of the Method
The weaknesses of both the original Alinsky method
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and neo-Alinsky organizations have been the subject of
various analyses and criticisms, some rather pointed (see
for example Miller, 1987; Fisher and Kling, 1987, and
1989; Fisher, 1984; Delgado, 1986). Several consistent
themes appear in the critiques:
-these methods do not incorporate a clearly defined
analysis of the political-economic context of
neighborhood problems and issues;
-these methods lack an explicit ideological stance
which would help to place the issues of the local
neighborhood into a broader context and analysis;
-the localism and parochialism of the methods
severely limit and constrain the potential of these
organizations to identify and link up with national
social movements;
-the role of the organizer can become problematic,
that is, there is the potential for members to
come to rely too heavily on organizers and for
the organizers to manipulate members especially
because they do not explicitly articulate an
ideology.
The over-arching question running through all of
these issues is undoubtedly that of the lack of an
explicit ideology which is critical of the existing
political and economic system in the United States.
Fisher, Fisher and Kling and the others repeatedly raise
this necessity of ideological organizing.
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Delgado (1986) raises other issues, as well, which
impact the potential of these neo-Alinsky organizations:
their ability to mobilize and allocate resources, and to
collaborate (rather than compete) with eachother and other
social movements; their ability to establish a national
presence and participate in electoral politics; and the
level of external opposition to their efforts, especially
in an era of general political conservatism. Moreover,
the ability of these organizations to adapt to the needs
of women and minorities, increasingly the majority of
their constituencies, and to the movements which
articulate the demands of these constituencies will also
figure in their futures.
McKnight and Kretzman (1984) raise a number of very
interesting concepts in their discussion of the need to
develop ' a "post-Alinsky" agenda. They outline the
assumptions in the Alinsky model and argue that conditions
have changed sufficiently to render these assumptions
virtually inoperable. One of the most important
assumptions is that within a given neighborhood there are
a number of vital organizations which could be drawn
together to begin a neighborhood organizations. These
organizations include churches, ethnic groupings,
political groupings and labor. Another assumption was
that an outside target or "enemy" could be identified and
become the focus of organizing. This target is conceived
of as "(a) visible, and therefore concretely definable;
(b) local, and therefore accessible; and (c) capable, and
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therefore possessed of the resources and authority to
correct the problem." However, both of these assumptions
must be questioned today since neighborhoods have changed
dramatically since Alinsky began to organize.
First, participation in political parties is
diminishing. Second, with the shifts in the economy by
which industry has left central cities, industrial unions
have undergone shrinkage as well as centralization of
operations, and the newer service sector unions have not
achieved the type of presence in local areas as did their
industrial predecessors in Alinsky's era. Moreover, as
second and third generation ethnics have moved out of
neighborhoods of origin, the basis of ethnic organizations
has changed. Therefore, the local churches remain as the
most authentic neighborhood institutions (and even these
inner-city churches often come to rely on suburban members
for resources) and are indeed the main institutions to
which neighborhood groups turn.
The targets of neighborhood organizations are also
changing, that is, they are increasingly more difficult to
view in local, visible terms. Besides industry, many
other institutions such as banks have left inner-city
neighborhoods. Those economic entities that remain are
often local arms of multi-national corporations:
... (a)ccelerating centralization and consolidation
of control across economic sectors have left local
managers marginal pawns in the high-stakes games run
from headquarters in a few rebuilt downtowns.
Effects of economc decisions on neighborhoods
themselves are not even a part of the headquarters
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calculations. It is in this light that neighborhood
conditions are understood as "residual" rather than
direct results of capital movement and investment
policies (p. 16).
The institutions which remain in the neighborhoods are
often publicly funded service agencies, generally
overwhelmed by myriad demands and incapable of producing
rapid visible results.
In light of all of these changes in the context for
neighborhood organizing, McKnight and Kretzman advocate
the need for experimentation and innovation in the work of
neighborhood organizations. Their suggestions involve
community development through economic strategies
involving the neighborhood itself, public resources and
private resources. They advocate strategies such as
housing development, neighborhood cooperatives, community-
owned enterprises, as well as pressure for public
investment and initiatives in local governance. Moreover,
they recognize the need for "insert(ing) locality into the
equations by which businesses make decisions", and a
national movement to achieve this goal. Expanded uses of
laws and regulations such as the Community Reinvestment
Act are additional measures to revitalize urban
neighborhoods. In summary, the "post-Alinsky" agenda
would focus largely on neighborhood economic strategies,
while retaining the confrontational options traditionally
associated with Alinsky organizing.
In an attempt to build a theoretical approach to
neighborhood organizing, Fisher offers several conclusions
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which are quite useful here in beginning to summarize this
review of neighborhood organizing:
1) Neighborhood organizing cuts across the political
spectrum: it is neither inherently progressive or
conservative, but rather a method which can be
utilized to achieve goals.
2) Neighborhood organizing develops in historical
contexts that include but transcend local
conditions: while unique at the specific local
levels, these movements are greatly determined by
the national political-economic context. They
develop most readily in periods of profound social
dislocation when either the regulatory power of
social institutions breaks down, or sharp economic
change occurs, either for the better (producing
rising expectations) or for the worse (producing
defensive action) (see also Piven and Cloward,
1977).
3) There is a critical interaction between
neighborhood organizing, national politics and
national social movements: the national government
may respond by repressing, attempting to coopt or
becoming the battleground of struggle. Neighborhood
movements and other national movements generally are
mutually reinforcing, but in some instances may
detract from eachother.
4) The problems besetting neighborhoods demand
political organization and action beyond the
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neighborhood level, and therefore, neighborhood
organizations need to relate to national
organizations.
5) Neighborhood organizing must be built on more
than material rewards and incentives: although
Alinskyism is based on the notion of economic self-
interest as the motivation for particiation, since
neighborhood organizations do not possess the
resources to deliver many material rewards, they
must be built around issues of personal development
and a sense of purpose beyond individual
advancement, allowing individuals to see themselves
as part of a larger cause.
6) Neighborhood organizing must provide a
galvanizing vision rooted in people's lives and
traditions, an ideology which addresses long term
goals while attending to immediate needs.
7) Neighborhood organizing requires a balance
between organizing, leading and educating: the
organizer must be able to bring forward and develop
indigenous leadership in an honest, democratic
manner. The organizer should neither do everything
for the organization, nor manipulate local
participants.
8) Political education must be incorporated into
neighborhood organizing in order to broaden the
assessments of participants. This education should
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expose the workings of the political and economic
system from a class perspective.
9) Success must be both tangible and intangible:
since achievement of objectives is difficult under
most circumstances, neighborhood groups must be able
to point to rewards and effects which are other than
quantifiable and observable, those which develop a
sense of dignity, hope and self-confidence among
members.
Fisher's critique and analysis suggest his leftist
framework and his desire to see the emergence of an
explicitly anti-capitalist model of community organizing.
Whether or not one accepts these goals, many of the
problems he identifies can become issues in building even
local community-labor alliances, let alone any type of
socialist movement. Localism and a lack of ideological
content to neighborhood organizing may lead neighborhood
people to see no inherent common interest with members of
labor unions. Fisher's concerns therefore are readily
apparent in the type of experiences described in the
chapter in this dissertation on coalitions and alliances.
Before closing this review of neighborhood
organizing, it is important to cover one additional area
which is relevant to the study of neighborhood
organizations in Hartford. Within this literature, the
different national networks of neighborhood organizations
are described. While much of Fisher's and Delgado's
analyses refer to ACORN, three additional national
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networks exist and utilize somewhat different varieties of
the neo-Alinsky methodologies. Citizen Action, associated
with the Midwest Academy and Heather Booth; the Industrial
Areas Foundation, originally founded by Alinsky; and the
National People's Action (NPA), associated with the
National Training and Information Center (NTIC) are the
three other networks. There are different structures,
different relationships with local organizations,
different positions on electoral politics and different
emphases on tactics and stragies among the four networks.
The three neighborhood organizations in Hartford all
are loosely affiliated with NPA, the most loosely
federated of the networks. NPA, unlike Citizen Action or
IAF, neither establishes nor gives direction to local or
state organizations. Its major activity is an annual
national convention in Washington, D. C. , during which time
it stages demonstrations or confrontations with various
federal departments and bureaucrats. Reitzes and Reitzes
(1987) assess NPA as the weakest national network and the
least sophisticated in terms of training or brokering
national campaigns for reform. They also assert that its
local affiliates are "fiercely independent and unwilling
to give up any local autonomy and so are hesitant to
participate in joint actions" (p.198). Fisher (1984)
points out that NPA does not adhere to electoral politics,
but rather to the "pressure group model, convinced that
electoral participation will undermine the effectiveness
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and grassroots nature of community organization" (p. 139).
This fierce local automony and unwillingness to
participate in electoral politics both have distinct
impacts in Hartford, as will be analyzed in later
chapters.
Having reviewed many of the issues facing the labor
movement and the questions confronting neighborhood
organizations, we will move next to a description of the
location of the research and examine the social, economic
and political conditions in Hartford, Connecticut.
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BACKGROUND - HARTFORD
The City of Hartford, Connecticut is a dramatic and
compact example of modern urban dilemmas in the
northeastern United States. If one read only such
glowing accounts of Hartford's downtown revival as that of
Richard Matthews featured in the business travel-oriented
U.S. Air Magazine in May, 1988, one would never be able to
discern that within its 17.2 square miles reside 136,000
people, 1/4 of whom lived below the poverty level as of
1980. Accordingly, Hartford gained the unfortunate
distinction of being the 4th poorest city in the country,
using the measure of percent of population in poverty.
While it is the capitol city of the state with the
highest per capita income in the country ($21,226 in
1987), Hartford is Connecticut's poorest city with a per
capita income of $8,677. Hartford also has the nation's
second highest child poverty rate: over 39% of its
children live in poverty, many in single parent
households headed by women (McCarthy, 1988). Infant
mortality rates resemble those of impoverished third world
nations, owing in large part to high levels of teenage
pregnancy. Lack of affordable housing, soaring crime
rates, rampant drug traffic, racial segregation and
isolation within the City's educational system and a
litany of other compelling problems combine to produce a
truly distressed social environment. The 1990 census data
are anticipated with a certain amount of dread in
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Hartford: many in the city believe conditions have only
worsened over the last decade.
This pervasive poverty is ringed by affluent suburbs
with a very different social structure. While Hartford's
population in 1980 was 33% Black and 21% Hispanic, all but
two of its neighboring 37 towns in the Hartford SMSA were
over 92% white. Put another way, "although Hartford
houses just 19% of the 726,000 people who live in the
metropolitan area, it is home to 75% of the area's black
population and 80% of its Hispanic population" (Williams,
1988). White households in the region enjoyed an average
income of $24,749 in 1980, while Black household incomes
averaged $15,812 and Hispanics $12,694 (Williams, 1988).
As stark as the differences between Hartford and its
suburbs are, the contrast between Hartford's downtown and
its neighborhoods is perhaps even more portentous. Local
actors describe Hartford as a "tale of two cities" within
one geo-political boundary. Downtown Hartford has
exploded with development in the past decade. Gleaming
modern skycrapers, conjested construction-clogged streets,
fancy boutiques and a bustling Civic Center which hosts
home games of the city's National Hockey League franchise
have transformed the small rather sleepy commercial
district of 20 years ago into a truly thriving regional
financial center. Downtown Hartford is the location of
corporate headquarters of several major national insurance
companies, pre-eminent among them Travelers Insurance and
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Aetna Life and Casualty, as well as the defense giant
United Technologies. The insurance companies' presence in
particular provides the drive and in some cases the
financing of the development boom.
DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT
Hartford's downtown skyline was dramatically
different in the late 1980's than 10 years earlier.
New development in Hartford's downtown has taken place
quite rapidly. Between 1980 and mid-1986 over 5,000,000
new square feet of downtown office space was built (City
of Hartford, June, 1986). As of mid-1988, a total of 9.29
million square feet of office space existed in downtown
Hartford, 1.1 million was under construction and an
additional 9.9 million was proposed for development within
5 years (Pazkiokas, 1988). It should be noted that of the
proposed projects, not all are necessarily expected to be
constructed within the 5 year time frame. However, in the
first half of the 1980's, office space more than doubled.
While Hartford boasted the tightest market for downtown
office space in the country through 1988 (as low as 5% to
7%) (Horgan, 1988), by early 1989 vacancy rates for Class
A space rose to over 10%, signaling the beginning of a
slowdown in the pacing of office construction.
In a two-part series on development in the city, the
Hartford Courant (6/12/88 and 6/13/88) interviewed a
number of developers and local officials. The comments of
several individuals reflect the general contours of
economic restructing as described in earlier sections of
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this dissertation.
William Farley, President of Farley Company, a real
estate brokerage firm: The real growth started
in the late 1970's and right at the decade
really started to move ... The insurance companies
started it, and then the banks followed on somewhat
the same track. We've also had three other waves of
growth - a series of reinsurance firms, software and
hardware people and, in the past 18 months, out-of-
state mortgage lenders (Horgan, 1988).
Anthony Caruso, Executive Director, Hartford
Downtown Council: The insurance industry in the
past several years has exhibited what seems to be an
insatiable appetite for space.. .I guess some
developers look at it as if the service industry
will continue with business as usual, resulting in
their building being leased up in a reasonable
period of time. Then there are some that are a
little more cautious. (Horgan, 1988).
Caruso's last statement alluded to the impending
slowdown in new construction, yet the amount of office
space used by the insurance companies in downtown Hartford
is still impressive. For example, at the time of the
Courant's series, Travelers was cited as leasing 1.25
million square feet in downtown, having added an average
of 100,000 square feet each year for the preceding six
years. This is all in addition to the relatively large
building which the company owns and which is officially
considered the corporate headquarters.
EMPLOYMENT
Examining the employment picture in Hartford
provides another dimension of the economic change underway
in the city. As of 1987, manufacturing accounted for 5.5%
of the employment within the city (approximately 8,620
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jobs), while the finanial/insurance/real estate (FIRE)
sector accounted for 30. 1% and the service sector for
29.6% (Connecticut Department of Labor). In 1960
manufacturing accounted for 21% of the city's non-
agricultural employment. Between then and 1987,
approximately 17,600 manufacturing jobs left the city
(City of Hartford, 1983 and Conn. Department of Labor).
Despite the loss within the City of Hartford,
manufacturing jobs increased in the larger Hartford Labor
Market Area (LMA) until 1980. For example, 15,000 new
manufacturing jobs were created in the Hartford LMA
between 1975 and 1980, peeking at 100,400 in 1980.
However after 1980, manufacturing jobs steadily left the
entire area so that by October, 1988, over 10,000 fewer
manufacturing jobs existed than in 1980, totaling
approximately 90,000 jobs.
Even before the development boom of the 1980's
gathered full steam, employment within the City of
Hartford focused more and more in the FIRE and service
sectors. Listed below are figures indicating both the
number of jobs and percentages of Hartford's workforce
employed in manufacturing, FIRE, service and government
sectors for 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980.
97
Table 1
Selected Types of Non-Agricultural Employment in Hartford
EMPLOYMENT
SECTOR 1965 1970 1975
Total
Mnfcing.
FIRE
Services
Govt.
117,780
23,100
28,450
21,900
12,980
100.0%
19.6%
24.4%
18.6%
11.0%
134,450 100.0%
20,030 14.9%
35,040 26.1%
25,690 19.1%
20,530 15.3%
124,450 100.0%
11,600 9.3%
38.020 30.6%
29,023 23.3%
20,870 16.8%
1980
Total
Mnfcing.
FIRE
Services
Govt.
143,180
12,210
45,200
34,560
27,720
100.0%
8.5%
31.6%
24.1%
15.9%
Source: Connecticut Department of Labor
Throughout this period Hartford was also losing its share
of the total employment in the labor market area, from
41.2% in 1970 to 34.9% in 1983 (City of Hartford, 1984).
Moreover, Hartford residents' labor force participation
was less in 1980 than in 1960, during which time the total
number of jobs in Hartford increased significantly, as
illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2
Changes in Jobs and Labor Force,
Hartford, Connecticut
1960 1970 1980
1960-1980
CHANGE
1960-80
Jobs in
Hartford 115,840 134,450 143,180
Hartford
Labor Force 77,855 71,408 61,688
+27,340
-16,167
Source: Conn. Dept. of Labor and U.S. Census, as compiled
in Hartford State of the City September 1983.
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As the development boom took off in the mid-1980's,
new jobs were created in Hartford, the largest segment in
the service sector. If we look at the number of jobs in
several different sectors in Hartford in two year
intervals from 1981 until 1987, we can see that
manufacturing continues to decline steadily, while the
government sector stays fairly constant, FIRE shows modest
growth with some fluctuation and service sector employment
climbs relatively and absolutely.
Table 3
Selected Types of Non-Agricultural Employment in Hartford
1981 - 1987
EMPLOYMENT
SECTOR 1981 1983 1985
Total 140,000 100.0% 140,160 100.0% 144,320 100.0%
Mnfcing. 12,450 8.9% 10,130 7.2% 9,230 6.3%
FIRE 43,850 31.3% 45,680 32.6% 42,950 29.8%
Services 34,260 24.5% 36,760 26.2% 41,530 28.8%
Govt. 21,050 15.0% 20,780 14.8% 21,900 15.2%
1987
Total 156,050 100.0%
Mnfcing. 8,620 5.5%
FIRE 47,000 30.0%
Services 46,130 29.6%
Govt. 23,600 15.1%
Source: Connecticut Department of Labor
If we combine the information from Table 1 and Table
3, we can ascertain that during the 1980's employment
growth and contraction in the selected sectors can be
summarized as follows:
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Table 4
JOB CREATION: CITY OF HARTFORD
(Selected Sectors)
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE
SECTOR .1980-87
Total net change +12,870 (all sectors)
Manufacturing -3,590
FIRE +1,800
Services +11,570
Government +880
Source: Connecticut Department of Labor
Service sector employment accounted for 90% of the net job
growth in Hartford between 1980 and 1987. Employment
projections in a 1985 report for the United Way of the
Capitol Region listed janitors as the fastest growing
occupation in Hartford, followed by office clerks,
secretaries, sales clerks, nurses, waiters/waitresses,
cashiers, nurses aides/orderlies, accountants & auditors,
and bookkeepers, respectively. Not surprisingly, the top
10 growth occupations all fit within the contours of the
growing service economy. The fastest declining
occupations included teachers (at all levels, including
college and preschool), carpenters, sewing machine
operators, heavy equiment operators and other skilled
trades (United Way, 1985).
The Hartford LMA also experienced substantial job
creation in the 1980's. Again, the service and FIRE
sectors led the way in job creation:
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Table 5
Job Creation: Hartford Labor Market Area
Selected Sectors
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE
SECTOR 1980 1987 1980-87
Total 396,200 473,900 (net)+77,700
Manufacturing 100,400 91,000 -9,400
FIRE 60,300 76,700 +5,700
Services 74,600 106,900 +40,400
Government 53,800 62,800 +9,000
Source: Connecticut Department of Labor
So by the late 1980's, manufacturing was not a
significant part of the City of Hartford's economic base.
However, it was still significant, but declining in the
larger labor market area. Hartford was once home to
numbers of large factories such as Fuller Brush, Royal
Typewriter, Underwood Typewriter and others which employed
thousands of workers. Well before the beginning of the
1980's many of these concerns had closed, moving
operations to the southern U.S., overseas or simply
ceasing operations. Royal Typewriter Company once
employed over 3000 people. It moved operations to England
in 1972. The Underwood Typewriter Plant in Hartford
closed even earlier in 1968, throwing close to 2000
workers out of their jobs. Underwood had been purchased
by the Italian concern Olivetti and became known as
Olivetti-Underwood. After several years of maintaining
the Hartford plant, the company decided to consolidate its
operations and eliminate this local operation. While the
Underwood plant was demolished and a massive new
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development project is now sited on the property, the
Royal factory lies vacant currently and is one of the next
prime sites for developers.
The largest manufacturing concern in the area, the
Pratt and Whitney Division of United Technologies located
in neighboring East Hartford, still employs some 8,000 to
10,000 people and supports a supplier network which
includes local companies. For the foreseeable future,
orders for jet engines both from the Defense Department
and commercial airline carriers will keep Pratt's
production levels quite high.
The growth in the insurance sector over the past
several decades reflects the diversification of the
insurance industry which is now involved in a vast array
of financial activities from real estate development to
pension - fund management and a myriad of financial
services. These companies have deep historical roots in
Hartford. Several have existed in the city since colonial
times when merchants involved in insurance underwriting
formed Connecticut's first insurance company in 1810, the
Hartford Fire Insurance Company--today a subsidiary of
IT&T. The Aetna Insurance Company was founded in 1819.
Other companies were formed in the 1850's and 1860's,
including Travelers in 1864 ("A City Built on Risk, 1986).
Throughout the twentieth century the insurance
companies have sponsored large construction projects that
have had far-reaching impacts in terms of shaping
Hartford's physical and economic growth. Earlier their
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own expanding workforces and office space requirements
drove the construction of office buildings, as well as the
development of housing for their employees. In recent
decades they have played a role in all phases of
Hartford ' s development. For example, Aetna financed the
construction of the Hartford Civic Center. Aetna and
IT&T, the parent company of The Hartford Insurance Group,
financed the adjoining Sheraton Hotel. Yet, even the
insurance companies are undergoing their own restructuring
in an attenipt to become "leaner". Between 1988 and 1989,
Travelers eliminated 1100 jobs in an attempt to cut its
costs by 40 percent ("More Job Loss at Travelers",
1/30/89).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Hartford's recent political history reflects both
the growing political organization of the city's African
American and Puerto Rican communities, as well as the
increasing needs and claims of the population on a
fragmented city government. The structure of municipal
government is an odd hybrid of reform and tradition.
Since a charter revision in the 1940's, the structure of
local government consists of a nine member City Council
elected at-large with three seats reserved (per State
Statute) for a minority party; a city manager who serves
as the city's chief administrative officer and who is
selected (and dismissed) by the City Council; and an
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elected mayor whose *position is largely ceremonial.
Numerous commissions and authorities also exist with their
own spheres of power and influence such as the
Redevelopment Authority and the Zoning Board of Appeals.
The city is solidly Democratic: registered Democrats
outnumber registered Republicans by over 7 to 1. Hartford
went for George McGovern in 1972, Carter in 1976 and 1980,
Mondale in 1984 and Dukakis in 1988. Jesse Jackson won
resounding primary victories in Hartford in both 1984 and
1988. Given this intense loyalty to the Democratic Party
within the city's population, intra-party divisions and
contests are what fuel the political fires of Hartford.
Just as Katznelson (1981) brilliantly describes, the
factions of Hartford's Democratic Party tend to organize
around race, ethnicity and territoriality. These bases of
organization, in turn, reflect the segregated housing
patterns of the City.
The African American community in Hartford has
achieved some notable electoral successes during the
1980's. In 1981, Thirman Milner was elected mayor, the
first popularly elected Black mayor not only in
Connecticut, but in all of New England. While the mayor's
post is not vested by the City Charter with a significant
degree of power within the city government, the mayor does
preside over Council meetings and is highly visible in the
city. The symbolic importance of electing a Black mayor
served as a milestone of racial pride for Hartford's
African American community. To the rest of the city and
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the region, his election signaled the advent of a
different power equation in the city.
After two successful re-election bids but with a
growing frustration from the limitations of the office,
Milner chose not to seek re-election in 1987. The person
he urged to seek election to replace him was successful
and another "first" took place in Hartford. Carrie Saxon
Perry, a Black woman who had served several terms as a
State Representative, was elected Mayor in 1987. Her
election drew national attention of both the major media
and numerous national Black organizations.
The City Council is the city's policy-making body.
Since the Democratic members have an effective "lock" on 6
seats, they control the setting of policy goals and
directives. However, the City Manager has a wide range of
discretion in carrying out policy initiatives,
particularly in budgetary matters, and is the individual
to whom City departments are accountable. Within this
setup, there is a certain ambiguity of accountability
that is quite apparent to the citizenry. Community
organizations or people with individual grievances
sometimes take their concerns to Councilmembers, at other
times attempt to call upon the City Manager, or may go to
see the Mayor.
Throughout the 1970's one individual amassed a great
deal of power on the Council in the position of Deputy
Mayor. Nicholas Carbone, widely celebrated as a
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progressive policy leader (Clavel, 1986), set the tone for
Hartford's city government. He is credited with bringing
together the public and private forces which began initial
"revitalization" of Hartford. The position of Deputy
Mayor, the leader of the Council selected by the majority
party caucus, came to be regarded as the most powerful
elected position in Hartford.
By 1979, Carbone's political hold was unraveling and
he was defeated in a hotly contested Democratic primary.
After a chaotic two years in which the position of Deputy
Mayor was held by a maverick conservative Democrat, Robert
Ludgin, who forged an alliance with the three Council
Republicans to maintain a voting majority, a degree of
relative calm was restored in 1981. Rudolph Arnold, a
young, progressive Black attorney who had served on the
City Council for the previous two years, was selected by
the Democratic Caucus as Deputy Mayor. Here was another
Hartford "first" which placed the substantial power of the
position of Deputy Mayor in the hands of a Black person.
Arnold was highly regarded in the city by most sectors as
extremely competent, intelligent and possessing a demeanor
with which many groups could interact. However, until
1989 the members of the "part time" Hartford City Council
are only paid $4,000 annually for their services. (A 1989
referendum raised the renumeration to $15,000). Arnold
found it difficult to develop his private legal practice
and meet the heavy demands on his time that Council duty
and the Deputy Mayor position required. In 1983 he chose
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not to seek re-election.
From 1983 until 1989, the Deputy Mayor position was
held by Alphonse Marotta, a former state employee union
official from Hartford's heavily Italian South End. He
did not harnass the the degree of power that Carbone did,
nor was he as highly regarded as Arnold. In 1989, the
Deputy Mayor position was assumed by Councilmember I.
Charles Matthews, an African.American and an attorney for
United Technologies.
In 1987 a new entity entered the political arena in
Hartford. People for Change (PFC) constituted itself as a
combination third party and community coalition. The
group emerged from a battle for "linkage" waged by
community organizations in which they pressed for some
form of tax on downtown development to benefit the
neighborhoods, and from disatisfaction on the part of
labor unions for the Council's inaction in the lengthy
strike at Colt Firearms. A number of forces joined in the
coaltion effort, including the Puerto Rican Political
Action Committee, women's and gay rights organizations.
Taking advantage of the state statute which guarantees
minority party representation on the Council of three
seats, PFC ran a slate of three individuals for City
Council as a third party in the November, 1987 Municipal
Election and captured two seats. Their goal was to forge
an alliance with other progressive Council members in
order to pursue a reform agenda. They were aided in their
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electoral quest by disaffected Democrats and the technical
assistance of the Legislative Electoral Action Program
(LEAP), an organization formed to provide technical
assistance to progressive candidates. Marie Kirkley Bey,
a Black woman who was a respected neighborhood leader and
Eugenio Caro, a Puerto Rican community activist were
elected in the November, 1987 election.
As the Puerto Rican community began to realize its
political potential, its political leadership attempted to
redefine their client status with the Democratic Town
Committee
independen
the Puert
The Puerto
number of
community
ranks of
attempted
of Hartford and develop a measure of
ce from the existing machine. In the mid 1980's
o Rican Political Action Committee was formed.
Rican PAC, as it is called, brought together a
elements of leadership in the Puerto Rican
from education, social service, business and the
street level activists. The organization
to screen candidates and present its choices to
the Democratic Town Committee for inclusion on
Democratic tickets. In 1987 when the PAC's choice for the
City Council slate was ignored in favor of a less popular
choice, the PAC threw its energy into the People for
Change campaign which accepted onto its slate the
individual endorsed by the PAC, Eugenio Caro.
Even though the City Council is elected at large by
the voting public, the Democratic Town Committee attempts
to "balance" the six person slate it puts forward through
an equation which allocates positions based on
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the
geographical, racial and ethnic mix. Typically through
the 1980's the slate's composition has included:
-Two African American candidates, at least one of
whom is from the politically active Blue Hills
neighborhood in the predominantly African American
North End of the city;
-One Puerto Rican candidate who is envisioned as
representing the entire Latino community, regardless
of geographical dispersion;
-One candidate, who heretofore has been white, from
the West End neighborhood--a liberal racially mixed,
but predominantly white professional enclave--viewed
as the "white liberal" of the Council;
-Two South End candidates from what remains of more
traditional white working class areas of the City,
one of whom is usually Italian and the other usually
Irish.
Since the endorsed Democratic slate generally survives
primary challenges, and opposing slates in primary
contests mirror the composition of the endorsed slate, the
"ruling" Democratic caucus on the City Council is built
upon this of equation of territory, race and ethnicity.
Female candidates are able to fill the slots if they also
conform to the racial, ethnic and territorial equation.
Therefore, Hartford periodically has African American and
Puerto Rican women as Councilmembers, as well as women of
Italian, Irish and other national descents.
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Interestingly, ideology is only an explicit factor in the
selection of one of the six candidates, the West End
candidate. The range of ideologies among the Black
members of council have been fairly wide in the past
decade, from the Black business perspective, to overtly
pro-corporate perspectives, to a more redistributive
social service/legal service perspective.
The Democratic Town Committee is organized by State
Assembly districts, of which Hartford has seven. There
are potentially seven local Town Committee elections to
fill the 54 person committee. Each Town Committee
district endorses a candidate for State Representative.
The city has two State Senatorial districts, and the Town
Committee members who reside in these two areas meet to
endorse State Senate candidates.
The composition of the city's delegation to the
Connecticut House of Representatives can also potentially
generate intense contests, but these are localized within
each of the seven districts. For example, from the early
1980's through the November, 1988 election, Hartford sent
to the Capitol a delegation which consisted of 3 Black
representatives, 4 white representatives, one of whom is
known as a West End liberal, and 1 Black State Senator and
1 white State Senator. Puerto Ricans grew more and more
impatient with their lack of represenation, given the fact
that Hartford has one of the largest (in relative terms)
Puerto Rican populations of the continental United States.
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The City of Bridgeport', Connecticut, had been electing a
Puerto Rican representative for several years--the only
Puerto Rican State Representative in Connecticut- -but
Hartford had not. The 1988 elections saw Hartford's
Puerto Rican population organize intensely, resulting in
Puerto Rican candidates winning primaries in two districts
and going on in November to take two of the seven seats.
One of the victories was expected and the other was a
surprise to the entire city. One victorious candidate
replaced a white person and the other replaced a Black
person. So in 1988, the City's delegation included two
Black people, two Puerto Rican people and three whites in
the State House and continued with one Black and one white
State Senator. All are Democrats.
People for Change was the inspiration for the
campaign of one of the victorious Puerto Rican
representatives, Juan Figueroa who represents the City's
Third Assembly District. Figueroa, as an activist in the
Puerto Rican PAC, participated in the 1987 PFC City
Council campaign effort, and spearheaded an effort to take
control of the Third District Town Committee through the
vehicle of "Democrats for Change" (DFC). DFC constituted
itself as the "arm" of PFC that would work formally within
the Democratic Party. Figueroa's campaign was built on
the technical expertise of People for Change and LEAP's
methods of voter registration, targetting, and extensive
telephone and door-to-door canvasing. He successfully
challenged a several term incumbant in the Democratic
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primary, and went on to an easy victory in November.
COMMUNITY ACTIVISM
By the latter 1980's the locus of community activism
in Hartford revolved around constituency-based
neighborhood organizations who derive their models and
techniques from the Alinsky tradition of community
organizing and fit squarely within the neo-Alinsky
framework outlined in Chapters I and 2. Throughout the
60's and 70's various civil rights, local civic and anti-
poverty organizations exerted influence as forces of
activism. However, the formation of the neighborhood
organizations and their subsequent successful development
served to formalize and to some extent institutionalize
neighborhoods as the basis of activism and these
organizations in particular as the vehicles for that
activism within the city.
The oldest of the three organizations, Hartford Area
Rally Together (HART), formed in 1975. It defined its
sphere of activity--its "turf"--as the southern half of
the city, an area which was and remains predominantly
white. However, that area also has a substantial Puerto
Rican population, and in recent years has seen the
settlement of more Blacks and a growing Southeast Asian
population. Original financial backing for HART came from
the Catholic Church's Campaign for Human Development. In
recent years HART and the two other neigborhood
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organizations described below have secured United Way
funding.
The southern half of the city contains a number of
distinct neighborhoods. For planning purposes, the City
of Hartford has designated eight residential and one
commercial/industrial neighborhoods. HART's neighborhood
designations do not match exactly those of the City and it
does not organize in the public housing projects in the
southern part of Hartford. However, six areas are
formally represented in HART's Board of Directors, as well
as an areawide senior citizens organization. In its early
years HART appealed mainly to white homeowners. Later it
attempted to set up an organization under its umbrella
specifically for Hispanics since that population was
greatly increasing within HART's turf. After a
problemmatic history, that organization eventually folded
into HART's neighborhood based organizations.
In the later 1980's, HART began to achieve a much
more integrated membership, including Black and Puerto
Rican leadership. Although it is still predominantly
white in terms of members, leaders and turf, it is a much
different organization than when it was founded,
especially in terms of how it is perceived in the rest of
the community. In its early years, there was curiosity
and some suspicion on the part of other neighborhoods in
Hartford as to what an organized South End would mean for
the distribution of resources, services and. power. Its
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organizing methodology consisted of setting up block clubs
and a dedicated team of organizers was very successful in
establishing over 30 such block clubs in the southern part
of Hartford. Other neighborhoods began to look at HART's
example as something to emulate. Two other organizations
formed in the late 1970's and early 1980's.
Organized North Easterners--Clay Hill and North End,
ONE-CHANE, is the product of a recent merger of two
organizations. Clay Hill and North End, CHANE, has
existed in one of the most impoverished areas of Hartford
from 1979 until 1988 and employed elements of the Alinsky
model utilized by HART, as well as the more traditional
civic association model. Its turf included an area with
severe poverty, large run-down public housing projects,
massive welfare dependency and every poverty-associated
problem of modern America. The population is almost
entirely Black and Puerto Rican. CHANE, itself, grew out
of loosely organized local neighborhood groups who came
together around specific concerns. It received start-up
funds from three insurance companies and later came to
secure United Way and other types of funds. Organized
North Easterners, ONE, operated more as a small scale
community development organization in an adjacent area
with some degree of homeownership, and a few sections of
more middle income level populations. There are also
large public housing projects in the Northeast
neighborhood. The impetus for ONE came from those
residents with relatively higher incomes in this
114
neighborhood who were struggling to hold on to their
homes and maintain a decent standard of living. In 1988
the two organizations merged, forming ONE-CHANE and
attempting to build on both previous organizations'
models.
Neighborhood organizing in ONE-CHANE's turf is some
of the most difficult and challenging in Hartford, or, for
that matter, anywhere else in the country. Families in
some of these neighborhoods have suffered long term
poverty, and many of those who remain in the area have
limited resources and limited opportunities for mobility.
Asylum Hill Organizing Project (AHOP) formed in
1983. Its turf is much more confined than HART's or ONE-
CHANE's, but it operates in a dense, spottily gentrified,
but mainly poor neighborhood. Asylum Hill is one of the
highest crime areas in Hartford, notorious for drug
trafficking, transiency, prostitution and other street
level problems. It is integrated, but mainly African
American and Puerto Rican, and has a significant elderly
population. Absentee slumlords have been a major problem
in the neighborhood and this area has also suffered more
condominium conversions than other areas in Hartford.
Asylum Hill is also home to Aetna Life and Casualty
Insurance Company, Connecticut Mutual Insurance Company,
St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center, St. Joseph's
Cathedral (Hartford's only Catholic cathedral) and a
number of other old established churches. The churches
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assisted in AHOP's early development.
The Asylum Hill neighborhood has an interesting
history. During his residency in Hartford, Samuel Clemens
lived in this area which at the time was an artistic and
literary enclave, and his former residence, now known as
the Mark Twain House, is one of Hartford's major tourist
attractions. Today, the presence of two major insurance
companies, and Aetna in particular, gives the neighborhood
a strategic importance which AHOP takes advantage of in
its work.
Since 1983, AHOP's work has incorporated tenant
organizing, building block clubs, development of
neighborhood-wide coalitions on crime and other issues,
work with local youth and seniors, and a host of other
issues. AHOP absorbed a social service center into its
control -and launched a housing development arm.
Other smaller neighborhood based organizations exist
in Hartford, but the "Big Three" have the most stable
resource bases, larger staffs and greater recognition and
track records than any of the others. HART, AHOP and ONE-
CHANE are all members of a statewide network of
neighborhood groups, United Connecticut Action for
Neighborhoods (UCAN), and also participate nationally in
the National People's Action (NPA), one of several
national organizing networks. UCAN also provides
technical assistance and in some instances supervision of
organizing staff for its member organizations.
There is also an affiliate of the national Citizen
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Action network in Connecticut with a presence in Hartford,
the Connecticut Citizens Action Group, CCAG. For a period
of time CCAG worked to establish local neighborhood based
chapters and one existed in Hartford in the Blue Hills
neighborhood during the early 1980's. It ceased
functioning within several years and CCAG adopted a
different organizing model with more of a statewide focus.
The three neighborhood organizations do command a
presence in the city in terms of public decision-making
and in some cases have been able to negotiate with private
corporations over the impact of their policies or plans
for the neighborhoods. These three groups are certainly
the most grassroots based of any major local organizations
and among the best organized. In Chapter 7, we will
examine in some detail various aspects of their
methodologies, how they attempt to amass and wield power,
and also analyze the outcome of several of their campaigns
and other efforts.
THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN HARTFORD
Hartford has a tradition of active labor unions,
although the decline in union membership nationally is
reflected in the city. Still, close to 90 different union
locals are currently affiliated with the Greater Hartford
Central Labor Council, the local AFL-CIO body,
representing between 25,000 to 28,000 workers in the
Hartford region. Since Connecticut is geographically
small and the unions involved in Hartford and the
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surrounding area operate on a statewide basis, it is
useful to describe some of the larger unions in the state
to better understand the context for the Hartford area
labor movement.
The Connecticut State AFL-CIO consists of
approximately 650 union locals and 170,000 members (Remez,
1990). Two of the internationals with the largest
statewide memberships include the International
Association of Machinists (IAM) which represents workers
at the four United Technologies Pratt & Whitney Division
plants in the state, UTC's Hamilton Standard Division and
at several other employers in the state, and the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) which represents a significant number of public
employees, of whom a large portion are employed by the
State of Connecticut. The United Auto Workers (UAW) has
represented thousands of workers in a variety of concerns
in the state since the 1950's, but in recent years has
experienced a significant decline from 28,000 in the early
1970's to less than half that number today through plant
closings and layoffs. Although affiliated nationally with
the AFL-CIO, the UAW in Connecticut was not affiliated
with the State Central Labor Council or the local labor
councils until 1990, after several decades of independent
status. Several other unions are not affiliated with the
State AFL-CIO body: the largest are the Teamsters locals
in the state. In the Hartford area, a reform minded
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leadership has taken over one of the more sizeable
Teamster locals in the state.
Two service sector unions are among the most active
in organizing new members: Hotel and Restaurant Employees
(HERE) and the New England Health Care Employees Union-
District 1199-SEIU. Aggressive, dedicated staffs of these
unions possess a missionary zeal for their work and impart
a militancy to the entire labor in the state, yet receive
substantially lower salaries than the staffmembers of
other unions. 1199 has over 15,000 members in
Connecticut, approximately 9,000 of whom are employed by
the State of Connecticut. It also represents the largely
minority and women workforces at a number of nursing
homes, community based mental health clinics and local
hospitals throughout Connecticut. In the early 1980's,
1199 made headline news by striking over 15 nursing homes
at once, using protest tactics and garnering support from
elected officials and civil rights organizations in the
effort. In 1986 it waged a 4 month strike at Waterbury
Hospital. HERE has led several major strikes at hotels,
the most recent a three month struggle in 1988 at the
Hartford Sheraton, and has also used protest tactics and
large support rallies to call public attention to the
plight of its members.
One of the most significant issues in recent years
for the labor movement in Hartford and in Connecticut,
more generally, was a strike of over four years duration
at Colt Firearms with plants in Hartford and West
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Hartford. In January, 1986, over 1000 workers walked off
the job after working 10 months without a contract. They
are members of UAW Local 376, an amalgamated local which
is one of the largest UAW locals in Connecticut and which
represents workers at over 20 different shops. The Colt
membership is the largest block of members in Local 376.
Shortly after the strike began the union leadership met
with the President of the Greater Hartford Labor Council
and launched a strike support effort, the Community Labor
Alliance. The Alliance continues to this day--having
organized periodic rallies, having sponsored fundraising
activities, having met with elected officials and other
strike support related activities during the Colt strike..
Other strikes in the area have also been assisted by the
Alliance. This strike and the strike support effort will
be analyzed in more detail in later chapters of this
dissertation, but clearly for labor in Connecticut and for
other sympathetic forces, the Colt strike is a symbol
of the harshest corporate treatment of workers in the era
of economic restructuring.
Many of the 1199 and HERE members and former Colt
strikers live in the very neighborhoods that are the turfs
of AHOP, HART and ONE-CHANE. 1199 has hundreds of West
Indian and African American members, mainly women, who
live in the North End of Hartford. Every street in the
Blue Hills neighborhood has 1199 members residing on it.
HERE members, as well, are the people who fill many of the
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service jobs in the restaurants and hotels in the thriving
downtown, but who could not afford an overnight stay in
the rooms they tend. They too live in Hartford's
neighborhoods and are in large numbers Black and Latino
residents. The former Colt strikers are a diverse group,
but they do include Black and Latino Hartford residents.
In fact, some former Colt strikers (now back working at
Colt) are Black workers with as much as 35 to 40 years
seniority--some of longest held and heretofore most
lucrative factory jobs for African Americans in Hartford.
There are Puerto Rican former Colt strikers with 15 to 20
years seniority. There are Black former strikers who
previously worked at Underwood or Royal, and then went to
Colt when these factories closed.
While one could expect to find the membership of
many other area unions living in Hartford's neighborhoods,
these three unions have been selected for inclusion into
this project for several key reasons. First, they were
open to the work, they were familiar and accessible to
the author, and they are concerned with analyzing their
struggles. Second, as illustrated above, they represent
workers who live in the neighborhoods in which the neo-
Alinsky organizations operate and in some cases their
members are active in HART, AHOP or ONE-CHANE. Third,
they each face different aspects of the phenomenon of
economic restructuring and are required to fashion
responses to the problems they encounter. In their
various ways, all three unions are known in the area as
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aggressive defenders of their members' interests.
However, there are distinct variations among the three and
these different patterns are useful to understand if one
attempts to ascertain just what are the different
responses to economic restructuring.
RECENT ANALYTICAL WORK ON HARTFORD
Two recent analyses of Hartford are useful to review
in setting the stage for this project. Hartford is one of
four cities analyzed in Clavel's Progressive City (1986)
which examines progressive policy initiatives and
progressive policy leaders in the municipal arena in the
U.S. Neubeck and Ratcliff (1988) analyze the balance of
forces in the relationship between the corporate
development sector and community groups within Hartford
in struggles over the course of local development.
Clavel's work on Hartford centers on the policy
initiatives of former Deputy Mayor Nicholas Carbone as an
example of progressive activism within municipal
government. Clavel's focus is somewhat different than the
concerns of this project. However, since his work has
become fairly widely known, several comments are worth
offering both as an alternative to Clavel's depiction of
Carbone and the socio-economic context of Carbone's
"progressive" innovations, and to help further explain
the context for the emergence of the neighborhood
movements in Hartford.
While there is no question that as a political
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entrepreneur Carbone was incredibly resourceful and worked
tirelessly to carve a path for Hartford which would lead
to economic revitalization, there are two questions which
must be asked to gain a fuller picture. First, and most
obviously, why was he defeated in 1979? Second, who
really gained from the type of innovations he initiated?
One can offer an alternative argument to Clavel's that the
pattern begun under Carbone of resting Hartford's future
on the fate of its downtown is precisely what created the
grievances and conditions to strengthen the development of
the neighborhood organizations.
Clavel explains Carbone's defeat in terms of the
perception in the electorate of Carbone as a "benevolent
dictator"--a person with a misunderstood vision--too
confrontational to the suburbs, too dictatorial in the
policy-making arena, not fully trusted by the emerging
neighborhood forces nor by the corporate community in the
city. While all of these are plausible, there is another
substantial factor which Clavel largely ignores that,
having lived through and participated in the election in
which Carbone was defeated, I feel best explains the
defeat of Carbone. That factor is the politics of race,
and it involves the emerging leadership within both the
Black and Puerto Rican communities, but at that time more
particularly in the Black community, and the way in which
Carbone dealt with this community in the his capacity as
the head of the Democratic Party machine in Hartford.
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If Carbone was perceived as dictatorial, I would
argue that this perception was most damaging to him within
the Black community where there was a widespread
impression that only Carbone's hand-picked candidates--
individuals whom he could control--would surface as
nominees of the Democratic Party.- Black leadership with
independent bases of support found it difficult- to-
impossible to obtain party endorsements and had to resort
to primary battles. Carbone-picked incumbants might win
by less than 50 votes in primaries, but if they won
nonetheless, they were tied to Carbone and his machine.
As Black political strength developed, primaries for the
State Representative posts in particular became hotly
contested races between those Black politicians tied to
Carbone and those who were more independent. Given the
geographical and racial-ethnic schisms existing in the
city, Carbone's geographical base in the city's South End
was in and of itself enough to raise suspicions on the
part of North End residents, and his resistance to the
more indigenous leadership deepened a sense of resentment
in large segments of the African American community. This
resentment was successfully exploited in the 1979 primary
election and although he lost throughout the city, it was
in the North End where the margin of Carbone's defeat was
greatest.
For purposes of this project, what is relevant is
that Carbone's defeat opened up a different era of
politics in Hartford in which there was no single strong
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policy advocate with the staying power of Carbone. The
development arena grew to have a type of self--propulsion
of which neither the Council members nor the neighborhood
groups could grab control. City Councilmembers in
subsequent years sometimes endorsed neighborhood demands,
sometimes renegged on promises, sometimes were openly
hostile to neighborhood organizations and shifted
positions with the shifting political sands. Given a lack
of strong leadership and the changing commitment to issues
on the part of city politicians, a greater role could
develop for the neighborhood organizations, both as a
counter influence to the political machine and as a
mechanism for asserting neighborhood claims.
Besides Carbone's behavior within the Democratic
Party, questions emerged as to who exactly would benefit
from the downtown revitalization that Carbone was
attempting to orchestrate. In the mid to late 1970's no
one in Hartford envisioned the volume of development that
would occur in the next decade, but even then some of the
plans celebrated by Carbone generated opposition: Clavel
describes the furor created by the proposal for a
"skywalk" which would link the Civic Center to nearby
office buildings and retail outlets with enclosed elevated
walkways. City residents found this plan offensive--a
tangible example of the contempt and the fear on the part
the commuters for the city residents who could necessarily
be avoided by the skywalk. The downtown development
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proposals also involved tax abatements and deferrals for
developers, another source of anger in the neighborhoods
who were already burdened with the highest property tax
rates in the entire State. Carbone's defense of such
strategies was that developers needed some enticement to
develop in the city and when the tax breaks expired, new
sources of revenue would be added to the city's grand
list.
These issues reverberated in Hartford city politics
well beyond Carbone's tenure and indeed were the very
issues which gave rise to the linkage struggle and the
eventual formation of the People for Change political
party. The new era of development heralded by Carbone as
the means to solve the city's problems has only created
more problems in the minds of community activists: a
squeeze on available affordable housing, displacement of
poor people through gentrification, conversion of housing
to office space and outright demolition of housing, as
well as traffic and congestion never before experienced in
Hartford.
Carbone can hardly be held personnally responsible
for all of the consequences of development so odious to
Hartford residents. The majority of development described
earlier in this chapter occurred well after he left office
and the scope of the 1980's projects, uninvisionable
during Carbone's tenure, far surpasses any of the
discussions and planning of the 1970's. However, the very
dynamics he helped to set in motion remain a major source
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of tension in Hartford politics today. It is interesting
that after his political defeat he, himself, eventually
became a developer (some in Hartford have said of him that
from being a "part of the solution" he switched to a "part
of the problem"), having to appear before the City Council
for approval of plans, modifications, etc. Were he still
on that Council, he might be taking some of the stands
advocated by the community forces attempting to influence
the nature of development. The major question to Clavel,
then, remains that of what constitutes a "progressive
city", and if the subsequent developments within a city
might help to retrospectively analyze whether or not an
actor such as Carbone really championed progressive
alternatives or not. Hartford's population is poorer in
the late 1980's than during Carbone's era. The
development boom he helped to initiate has not solved the
city's problems.
Neubeck and Ratcliff's interests coincide much more
directly with some of the questions of this dissertation.
Their case study of Hartford is included in an anthology
edited by Scott Cummings, Business Elites and Urban
Development (1988). They analyze the roles of the various
actors in the development arena and a number of issues
which have surfaced in in recent years relating to
development and the distribution of city resources. They
attempt to show how the corporations and specific
corporate leaders involved themselves in the reshaping of
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Hartford and to what extent neighborhood forces could
exert pressure to influence outcomes.
As they began their research, I was involved in
preliminary discussions and shared materials with them to
help identify recurring themes and issues. One issue that
I feel is quite instructive which both they and Clavel
focus on is the history of a corporate sponsored "think-
tank", Hartford Process. Hartford Process existed in the
1970's under several different organizational personality
incarnations as a private sector planning organization
which undertook several controversial projects. Nicholas
Carbone interacted with Hartford Process, sometimes
agreeing, sometimes in vehement disagreement, and, as
Clavel described, he used it as his own educational
instrument.
Neubeck and Ratcliff recount the history of Hartford
Process's plans for a Rouse-inspired new community in
rural eastern Connecticut which would house the Hartford
residents to be displaced by new development in the
central city. None of these plans were acted upon by city
planning bodies, the City Council, or any municipal
authority. When reaction to the plan both in the rural
community which would be the site of the new development
and in Hartford's North End was overwhelmingly
unfavorable, the scheme was abandoned and Hartford Process
set its sights on less grandiose projects.
At one point a "confidential memo" offered by a
Process staffmember to its board of directors was leaked
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to the public and another huge outcry occurred. The memo
detailed a set of plans for downtown development
"predicated on a geo-political strategy" which included
managed population mix of racial and ethnic groups,
curtailing of Puerto Rican migration to Hartford,
gentrification and marshalling of resources to protect
remaining middle class neighborhoods in Hartford. The
city's Puerto Rican community was particularly offended by
the memo and held a demonstration that formed a human
chain around the Civic Center during its first months of
operation.
Hartford Process is one example of elite behavior in
Hartford. Neubeck and Ratcliff chronicle a number of
other examples of the high level of activity on the part
of the insurance companies and major banks to maintain
their dominance in the development arena. The ability of
the neighborhood forces to influence such events is
somewhat varied, according to the authors. They argue
that the neighborhood forces can at best check the most
offensive consequences of development (the skywalk), but
cannot harnass the requisite power to substantially impact
the course of development. Only minimal concessions are
occassionally granted to community organizations, and when
the battle lines are really drawn, as' in the linkage
issue, the corporations have the ability to "circle the
wagons" and hold out for their position.
Neubeck and Ratcliff offer little cause for optimism
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that the neighborhood organizations will be able to
counter the adverse effects of recent development in the
city. Although I greatly admire the quality and insights
of their study, it does not include any focus on the role
of organized labor in the development arena or with
respect to how corporate elites react to the demands of
labor. For that matter, Clavel never mentions organized
labor and what type of relation Carbone had with the
unions in Hartford. Perhaps because the city's largest
employers in this period, the insurance companies, remain
totally unorganized, labor does not seem an important part
of the equation.
In terms of this research project, I would suggest
that since labor as an organized force is one of the most
obvious casualties of the era of economic restructuring,
since unions in Hartford have historically maintained a
presence in city affairs, and, moreover, since unions are
integrally involved in many of the important coalitions in
local politics, they must be included in a full analysis
of responses to economic restructuring. Even in their
relatively weakened state in Hartford, they are still an
important part of the equation.
My purpose is also somewhat different from that of
Neubeck and Ratcliff. It is not that I substantially
question their conclusions--I ask different questions. My
purpose is to go into the organizations and find out how
they evaluate events and make decisions in this era of
restructuring, rather than to analyze recent patterns of
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development and the roles of elites.
These two works do substantiate that events and
developments in Hartford merit attention and analysis.
The stories of the organizations who help shape these
phenomena likewise merit such attention.
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ALLIANCES, COALITIONS AND ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES
Coalitions and electoral activities locally in
Hartford and statewide in Connecticut are engaging scores
of organizations in an array of agenda and activities.
Indeed, the issue coalitions and electoral alliances in
Connecticut are attracting national attention in activist
circles and among analysts of progressive social movements
(see Shapiro, 1986, and Brecher and Costello, 1988a, 1988b
and 1990). Coalition work represents a merging of of
resources of different organizations, and issue and
electoral coalitions are one set of responses to changing
social and economic conditions faced by the organizations.
In some instances these are new types of activity for
organizations and in other instances engaging in
coalitions represents a shift in emphasis within an
organization.
All of the organizations upon which this research is
focused work with numerous other organizations and engage
in various forms of alliances and coalitions. However,
the purposes and methods of engagement are different for
each organization. They likewise have varying involvement
in the arena of electoral politics, both as individual
organizations and within electoral coalitions. Once
involved in functioning coalitions, each organization's
representative then confronts styles and methods different
from his/her own and must decide how to work with others.
The outcome of this type of work produces varying results,
some of which are lasting and some more ephemeral. After
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a brief overview of recent coalition efforts in Hartford,
three features of the coalitions will be analyzed in this
chapter: rationales for involvement, experiences of
working in coalitions and outcomes of the work. This
analysis is based on interviews with organizational
leaders, observation and participation in several of the
coalitions.
RECENT COALITION EFFORTS IN HARTFORD
A variety of coalitions have emerged in Hartford in
recent years ranging in focus from single issues to strike
support to electoral initiatives to information-sharing in
character. They have a quality of building upon and
reinforcing each other in the sense that as members of
different organizations become more familiar with each
other and the work of the different organizations, they
are more able to call upon each other for various types of
support and assistance. A sampling of coalition
activities is listed below. These specific examples
include issue-oriented and electoral coalitions in which
elements of both the neighborhood organizations and unions
are either directly or indirectly involved.
Issue Coalitions include:
The Linkage Coalition: Initiated by the neighborhood
groups after several years of work in a larger
committee, and achieving support from several
unions, this coalition lobbied the Hartford City
Council to adopt a policy of taxing downtown
development projects in order to generate funds for
housing and job development. The issue came to a
head in 1986 and even though the Democratic majority
on the Council at the time had run for office on a
pro-linkage platform, they voted down the measure.
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Along with financial and business interests, the
building trade unions lobbied heavily to oppose the
effort, causing tremendous alienation on the part of
the neighborhood organizations toward labor.
The Community Labor Alliance (for Strike
Support)(CLA): In January, 1986, when 1000 members
of UAW Local 376 struck Colt Firearms in Hartford,
the union and the Greater Hartford Labor Council
initiated this effort. Neighborhood organizations
and other unions, as well as political leaders,
segments of local clergy and other activists
participated in scores of CLA-sponsored activities
throughout the lengthy strike. Other unions have
come to the CLA for strike support and other forms
of assistance.
Anti-Crime Coalitions: Each of the neighborhood
groups expends huge efforts demanding increased
police protection to deal with ever-rising crime
rates. For the first year of the Colt strike,
police resources were deployed in force to the
picket line. The union local, the Community-Labor
Alliance, several neighborhood organizations and
other community organizations came together to
demand reduced police deployment at the strike and
redeployment into the neighborhoods. The effort was
partially successful in reducing the number of
police at the Colt gate, but the neighborhood demand
for better police protection continued. More
recently, in 1988 and 1989, the neighborhood
organizations have formed a coalition demanding the
assignment of police foot patrols to neighborhood
beats in Hartford. They formed the coalition
specifically to counter the Police Department's
strategy of pitting one group against the other as
they all simultaneously made similar demands.
Grassroots-Labor Forum: In 1987, the President of
the Greater Hartford Labor Council initiated monthly
meetings with the neighborhood organizations to
share information on respective activities. The
effort was undertaken to open lines of.communication
after the divisive linkage battle.
Two examples of electoral coalitions include:
Legislative Electoral Action Program (LEAP): LEAP
was initiated in 1980 as a statewide progressive
electoral coalition comprised of political action
committee representatives from over 20 different
unions, consumer, women's, environmental, civil
rights and community organizations. LEAP has a full
time staff, makes political endorsements, trains
campaign works and marshalls resources to assist
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candidates. It has an impressive track record of
developing successful campaigns for Connecticut
State Legislative officeseekers. LEAP-backed State
Senators and State Representatives have formed the
Progressive Caucus in the State Legislature and
attempt to coordinate the promotion of a progressive
agenda within the Legislature. Region 9A of the UAW
hired its first director to help develop similar
coalitions in other states in the Northeast and the
model is being successfully implemented in New
England and elsewhere.
People For Change (PFC): As described in the
previous chapter on Hartford, PFC emerged out of
dissatisfaction with the Hartford City Council both
on the linkage issue and its response to the Colt
strike, as well as generally perceived ineptitude.
PFC constituted itself as a third party and ran a
slate of 3 candidates in the 1987 race for city
council. It sought to replace the three Republicans
on the the 9-member at-large council whose election
has been guaranteed by a state statute prohibiting
political parties from nominating slates to fill
more than 2/3 of the seats on at-large bodies. PFC
secured resources from LEAP in its 1987 campaign.
In 1988, PFC activists formed Democrats for Change
(DFC) and worked within the local Democratic Party
structure to achieve a more reform oriented Town
Committee. PFC ran a second 3-person slate in
1989. In both elections two of the three candidates
won election to office.
One additional example of coalition activity is important
to include:
UAW Region 9A-sponsored "Working Together and
Winning--A Progressive Policy and Coalition Strategy
Conference" held at the Walter and May Reuther
Family Education Center at Black Lake, Michigan from
September 13 to 18, 1987. The regional leadership
of the UAW in New England chose to use their bi-
annual week-long training session at the Black Lake
facility to hold this conference for both UAW
members and invited guests from other unions,
community groups, women's and peace organizations
and progressive elected officials from throughout
New England, parts of New York and Puerto Rico.
The UAW paid lodging and travel expenses for all of
the several hundred participants. Another similar
conference was held in November, 1989.
There are other coalitions in Hartford which have
brought to together even more diverse groupings than those
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listed above, and in some cases one or more of the six
organizations upon which this research is focused
participate. Examples include Jesse Jackson's presidential
campaign in 1988, a coalition supporting a school
desegregation lawsuit in Connecticut, a campaign to extend
health insurance to uninsured, senior citizen issue
coalitions and other coalitions currently or previously in
existence.
Within the activities of the coalitions described
above, the models and practices of unions and the
constituency based neighborhood organizations have
confronted each other in both obvious and subtle ways.
These experiences are analyzed below, drawing heavily on
the Community Labor Alliance and the People For Change
examples, beginning with the respective rationales for
involvement in coalitions.
RATIONALES FOR INVOLVEMENT
Although there are many different forms of
coalitions and alliances, generally an organization enters
such an effort because on its own it cannot achieve a
particular goal. Therefore, a coalition effort is a tacit
recognition of the limits of each organization's
individual capacity. Coalitions may also serve to mediate
potential conflicts among members, i.e., they can be a
forum for working out competing interests and claims. For
example, among other activities, the AFL-CIO--the largest
coalition of labor unions in the countxy--serves both to
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marshall the collective resources of its member unions in
such areas political action and to mediate disputes
between unions. Through its highly formal organizational
structure, it mediates. jurisdictional contests in the
areas of organizing new members and it sanctions
violators. When unions affiliate with the AFL-CIO, they
simultaneously strengthen the collective voice of labor,
gain certain benefits they cannot achievable individually,
and agree to abide by various rules and procedures.
For many unions, participation in the AFL-CIO is
their major coalition activity. The AFL-CIO operates on
national, state and local levels with varieties of
activities at each level. Throughout the post World War
II period up to the mid 1970's, many unions found this
form of coalition activity sufficient. Segments of the
labor movement participated in the civil rights movement
and the anti-Viet Nam war movement, and several unions
framed their organizing drives as extensions of the civil
rights movement (significant examples include the United
Farmworkers and the Hospital Workers Union-Local 1199--see
Fink and Greenberg, 1989). As a whole, the labor movement
did not often reach out beyond its own ranks, however.
Periodically lobbying coalitions or strike support
coalitions drew labor participation, but generally these
activities were within the realm of routine union activity
and did not generate controversy either within or outside
of the labor movement. But as the framework of
industrial relations began to change in the 1970's some
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unions began to look outside of labor's ranks for
assistance (see Brecher and Costello, 1988a, 1988b, 1990).
In Hartford, this general pattern also obtained and the
coalition work of recent years represents new directions
for the segments of the labor movement involved.
Since the onset of the Reagan era and particularly
in recent years, coalition work is becoming recognized as
much more important for labor's agenda. Perhaps the
massive mobilization in September, 1981 for the Solidarity
Day demonstration in Washington, D.C. can be seen as the
beginning of the new era--the exact date or year may be
arguable--but the 1980's witnessed a new pattern of
coalition-building across the entire country (Brecher and
Costello, 1990). In the Hartford area for example, Region
9A of the UAW has experienced a severe decline in
membership due to plant closings. When the Colt strike
began in 1986, it immediately decided to call for a strike
support coalition, realizing that without community
support, the strike effort would be nearly impossible. In
concert with the Greater Hartford Labor Council, whose
president wanted to both support the strike effort and
develop stronger ties with community organizations, the
Community Labor Alliance was launched.
Some of the first groups sought for particiation
were the three constituency-based neighborhood
organizations, AHOP, HART and ONE-CHANE. The labor
leaders were impressed with the organizing abilities of
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the neighborhood groups and recognized their grassroots
base in the community. The labor council president also
realized that the posture of the building trades unions in
the linkage issue created an immense public relations
problem for labor. Potentially this negative image could
impede new organizing drives and create a pool of
replacement workers in strike situations: neighborhood
residents who had never been union members and who would
harbor resentment against unions. Moreover, both numbers
of Colt strikers and, as it turned out, replacement
workers lived in the neighborhoods that the three
organizations claimed as their "turfs".
So for unions in certain situations, organizational
interests translate into forming alliances and coalitions.
Unions who may be vulnerable to plant closings,
concessionary bargaining which forces difficult strikes
and a general climate of union-busting often choose to
look outside their ranks for support. However,
neighborhood organizations may not feel that same degree
of vulnerability and, in Hartford they tend to approach
coalition efforts more instrumentally in terms of specific
tactical choices rather than as a larger strategy for
survival. Being younger as organizations, not having felt
the same type of assault in recent years as unions have,
and having very different bases of membership all creates
a different sense of the importance of coalitions on the
part of the neighborhood groups. These organizations face
the constant challenge of issue by issue organizing and
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mobilizing. They have no equivalent of a "union shop" and
any issue may draw new constituents into the work of the
organization. However, since the terms of membership are
completely voluntary, a major amount of organizational
resources are devoted to these base-building activities.
Coalition work may dilute an already tenuous base and
drain resources and loyalties.
The neighborhood groups are also drawing on a much
shorter history of experiences and traditions. Whereas in
the labor movement, the concept of "union solidarity"
exists and despite many obvious inter-union rivalries
is a value orientation that is used to mobilize support
activities, the neighborhood organizations have a much
less defined and historically developed sense of mutual
support. By nature and definition they are turf oriented
and center their activities around a localized
geographical area. This concept of "localism" (Fisher,
1984) as a value or organizing principle can also
contribute to a more limited value being placed on
coalitions, except in situations when other neighborhood
organizations are working simultaneously on similar
issues.
The other unions in this study attribute a different
meaning and significance to coalition endeavors than the
UAW does and echo some of the same kinds of concerns as
the neighborhood groups in relation to coalitions. Both
1199 and HERE engage in coalitions and utilize outside
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supporters in strikes and organizing drives, but they
place more emphasis on their respective internal
strengths and capacities to win on issues. Leadership
of both HERE and 1199 feel that the major function of
their organizations is to develop their capacities in the
workplace to empower workers to take on employers and
that coalition work is somewhat secondary. 1199
leadership attributes a great deal of importance to the
work of various coalitions because of the low level of
unionization in this country and the need to join with
other organizations to achieve various goals. But their
president also posits that the further away the union goes
from "shop floor" issues, the more potential there is for
division among the membership. HERE leadership would
rather see union members active in union activities than
in broader coalitions for many of the same reasons that
the staff of the neighborhood organizations articulate.
In its history, 1199 has made extensive use of
community allies, framing many of its organizing campaigns
in the 1960's and 1970's as extending the civil rights
movement into the economic arena, particularly as it
organized health care settings where large numbers of
Blacks and other minorities were employed. When it began
to organize in areas of the country outside of its
original New York City base, it often relied on coalitions
to buttress its campaigns. Currently in Connecticut,
1199's organizational capacities and its militant
reputation afford it the ability to choose more
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selectively the coalitions in which it will involve
itself.
While both 1199 and HERE generally do not face the
problems of capital flight (a hospital doesn't relocate to
Taiwan and hotel sites are selected because of expected
levels of business), they do face the problems of
representing workers in industries that are subject to
complicated and fluctuating financial problems. The
crisis state of the U.S. health care system places a
particularly difficult burden on a union which has many
members in the lower paid jobs of the industry. Hotels
and especially restaurants change owners and managers
frequently. And neither union possesses enough power in
their respective industries to shut down significant
portions of the industries, as for example the UAW has
with domestic auto producers. In the healthcare sector,
public opinion backlash is also a factor when 1199
considers strategies. Therefore, even though they are
more selective about their involvements, allies and
coalition efforts do occupy important places in the
struggles of 1199 and HERE.
One of the differences between their approaches and
the UAW's is the use that is made of coalitions like the
CLA. When HERE members struck the Hartford Sheraton in
1987, the union did come to the CLA for support and
assistance. However, they came to the meetings with more
or less set plans for rallies and other support
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activities, rather than to develop such plans. The CLA
was not the place where they engaged in planning, rather
it served as a ready-made network of union and community
activists. In this sense, HERE made quite different use
of the CLA than did the UAW.
The rationales for political involvement are
likewise quite different for the different organizations.
Unions in Hartford have historically participated
fairly routinely in electoral activities, generally within
the Democratic Party, although occassionally some unions
have endorsed Republican candidates. Both the UAW and
1199 are extremely active in politics, especially in LEAP
which is attempting to develop a progressive presence and
direction within the Democratic Party. In the case of
1199 which represents state healthcare workers as well as
workers in state-regulated health care settings
(hospitals, nursing homes and private non-profit
subcontractors with the State of Connecticut), political
involvement in state legislative contests is seen as L
critical to potentially winning better contracts and
working conditions. Political campaigns generate more
enthusiasm among the 1199 membership than other forms of
coalition work, according to the leadership, because
members see quite clearly the connection between who is
elected to office and policies that affect them on the
job. 1199 also participates vigorously in elections for
the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives and was the
major force among labor for Jesse Jackson's 1988
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presidential campaign in the Hartford area.
Through its Community Action Program (CAP) Councils,
the UAW's involvement is local, statewide and national in
scope since they are highly affected by policies
formulated at all levels of government. The immediate past
Regional Director of Region 9A which includes New England,
parts of New York and Puerto Rico was a member of the
Democratic National Committee for many years as well as
the President of LEAP, and the UAW in the area has a
strong tradition of activism within the Democratic Party.
Their leadership feels that political involvement is
essential to the goals of their union.
HERE's political involvement again seems to
resemble the neighborhood organizations in that they tend
to not get heavily involved in elections, but do maintain
access to officeholders and politicians. As with other
forms of coalition activity, they attach more importance
to their internal capacities and issues than to deep
involvement in electoral campaigns. While they do issue
endorsements, they do not participate in LEAP or PFC on an
on-going basis due to resource and financial limitations.
They did decide to launch a voter registration drive in
1989 and believe that at points in the future they may
become more involved in electoral activities if they
clearly feel that their interests would be served.
Neighborhood organizations, as organizations, are
not involved in electoral politics because much of their
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funding depends upon' their non-profit, non-partisan
status. Entering the arena of electoral politics would
jeoparidze this important resource base. The three
neighborhood groups in Hartford have secured funding from
the United Way of the Capitol Region, an unusual
accomplishment for Alinksy-style organizations. However,
there is another important element of their lack of
participation in electoral politics. Many of the fulltime
staff of these organizations are committed to an anti-
electoral stance for their organizations. They feel and
explicitly articulate as a principle of their methodology,
that neighborhood organizations are more effective if they
remain outside the electoral arena, holding public
officials accountable from an independent base. They do
not want their organizations to be viewed as partisan or
as a political stepping stone for political aspirants.
Moreover, they want to avoid the internal tensions that
might result from engagement in electoral politics,
especially at the local level. Races for municipal office
can come to resemble hand-to-hand combat, with candidates
devoting huge amounts of time to canvassing neighborhoods
on a house by house basis. Divisions within a specific
neighborhood over who to support would potentially
translate into divisions within the neighborhood
organization.
The neighborhood organizations can produce a climate
where officeseekers emerge who seek to represent the views
of the neighborhood organizations, as was the case in the
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People for Change experience. What is done once this
political climate is created is quite beyond their direct
control: they may or may not agree with the directions
pursued by political groupings who attempt to articulate
their issues within political campaigns. Moreover, the
existence of a political organization like PFC tends to
dilute their raison d'etre: now there are politicians,
from the ranks of neighborhood organizations, attempting
to work through a political party to achieve the same ends
as the neighborhood organizations. However, the Hartford
neighborhood groups are moving toward developing methods
of exploiting PFC officeholders for their own ends,
without having to cede any organizational ground to the
PFC political organization or participate directly in it.
EXPERIENCES IN COALITIONS
Coalitions indeed produce environments in which the
different styles and processes of the two types of
organizations confront each other, and differences in the
nature of the respective issues in each arena become
apparent. Both in the Colt strike support effort through
the Community Labor Alliance (CLA) and the electoral
experiences of People for Change (PFC) several of these
differences led to certain tensions in the functioning of
the coalitions. Some of the issues surfaced in only one of
the coalitions and others surfaced in both coalitions.
The problem areas tend to be inter-related and, taken in
combination they represent some of the more obvious
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difficulties which result from attempts to combine the
different methods employed by the respective
organizations. They are described below in detail, the
Community Labor Alliance first, and then People for
Change.
The Community-Labor Alliance and the Colt Strike
In the CLA, during the initial months of the strike,
meetings were held on a weekly basis with as many as 30 to
40 people attending. Members of several unions, community
organizations and the three neighborhood organizations
attended. Initially the participation of the neighborhood
groups was constant, then became sporadic and eventually
ceased, although they remained available for specific
strike support activities. Conversations with
neighborhood organizers revealed a number of issues which
probably contributed to the declining participation of the
neighborhood organizations in the CLA. These have to do
with agenda formation, decision-making processes,
leadership roles and definition, relationships to legal
processes, models of how to apply pressure and exert
power, and the question of "ownership" or stake-holding in
an issue.
Agenda Formation and Decision-Making Processes:
When neighborhood organizations decide to organize
themselves into coalitions, as was the case in the Linkage
Coalition, a set of steps is usually followed in which the
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first actual meeting is preceded by careful negotiations
to insure the equal participation of all organizations.
No single organization can dominate: meeting sites and
chairpersons are rotated. Agenda items involve concrete
planning and task assignments. Decisions are arrived at
through a process of concensus development--a gradual
unfolding of agreement through discussion without the use
of voting on issues through parliamentary procedure.
These issues of process are as important as the
substantive issues which necessitate the coalition's
formation. This task-orientation and consensus
development method is quite different than the way in
which the CLA operated and continues to operate.
Within the CLA a tacit understanding developed that
the UAW had the ultimate authority in decision-making on
issues related to the Colt strike. During the strike the
UAW leadership was quite receptive to suggestions and
planning from non-UAW members, but if the union leadership
felt that a particular suggestion conflicted with its
overall approach, that plan would not be adopted. Other
unions who have come to the CLA for support in strike
situations likewise hold "veto power" over suggestions or
plans developed in the meetings. The decision-making is
somewhat informal and consensual and, as is the case with
the neighborhood organizations' coalitions, does not
involve formal voting. However, the specific union whose
strike or issue is being discussed must be supportive of
any plans undertaken with respect to its issue.
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The major portion of the agenda of the CLA revolved
around the Colt strike during its 4 year duration. In the
first year of the strike, there was a sense of urgency
about carrying out plans. However, as time passed, a
sense developed among the participants in the CLA that
meetings would go on for the indefinite future and the
sense of urgency to accomplish tasks within a short
timeframe diminished. Some plans were never thoroughly
followed through to conclusion. This indeterminancy
likely frustrated the neighborhood organizations who
engage in coalitions with a much more immediate and
instrumental orientation.
Definition and Role of Leadership: One major
difference between the two types of organizations is the
definition and use of leadership within each type of
organization. Elected union officers are generally the
full-time functionaries of the union and are
constitutionally vested with the authority to make and
execute many types of decisions. The actual titles may
vary-- president, business agent, secretary-treasurer--and
the internal structures of different unions vary, but
there are clearly elected, full-time union officials.
Even rank-and-file groups who might be opposed to existing
leadership work within this framework. However, the full -
time staff of neighborhood organizations are not the
elected leaders--they are usually hired by the
organization's board of directors which consists of
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volunteer citizen leaders. Citizen leaders from the
respective neighborhoods are elected to the positions of
president and other offices at annual neighborhood
congresses, but they often are employed full-time
elsewhere and participate in the neighborhood
organizations as volunteers in their leisure time. So
when the full-time staff of these organizations are
contacted about specific plans or actions, they generally
check with the elected citizen leaders and work through
planning committees to make decisions. The leadership of
the neighborhood groups can therefore be described as
shared to a great extent between the staff and elected
leaders. Within the CLA experience, this situation led to
some frustration on the part of the labor participants
when they attempted to involve the neighborhood
organizations and were not able to get ready responses to
requests for assistance or participation.
Relationships to Legal Processes: A critical
difference between the two types of organizations that
impacts coalitions is their respective relationships to
legal processes and attorneys. Much of modern labor
relations is bound by laws, precedents and .legal
interpretations. In the Colt strike, the UAW pursued a
legal strategy in which they sought to have the strike
designated as an unfair labor practices strike by the
NLRB. This strategy involved the union filing charges
with the NLRB alleging unfair labor practices on the part
of the company, the NLRB conducting a trial before an
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administrative law judge on the merits of the charges, and
if the union prevailed, the NLRB would order reinstatement
and backpay for the strikers. The point of this strategy
is to prove that the company caused and/or prolonged the
strike by their illegal actions. An unfair labor
practices strike is afforded a different legal status than
an economic strike. In an economic strike, one in which
workers strike over wages and/or working conditions
without formally alleging unfair labor practices on the
part of the employer, there is no legal guarantee of
reinstatement. Replacement workers who are hired during
the strike may be retained by the company once the strike
is over, unless a settlement mandates otherwise. But in
an unfair labor practices strike, the NLRB may mandate
reinstatement and backpay for the strikers.
This brief outline of the unfair labor practice
strike strategy does not begin to describe the legal
complexities, the lengthiness of the process and the ways
in which employers can and do respond. In the Colt strike
the company hired replacement workers, offering them
permanent jobs--a strategy that polarized the situation
and complicated their position in the NLRB trial,
particularly in the event of a union victory and a mandate
from the Board to reinstate the strikers. It had also
filed unfair labor practices against the union, alleging
picket line misconduct. Although in 1989 Colt Industries
decided to sell the Firearms Division, it was still liable
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for backpay if the UAW won the trial and this liability
figured significantly in the final sale of the company.
The way in which this all affected the activities of
the CLA was that the UAW leadership did not want to pursue
any strategy which would jeopardize their ability to win
the case at the NLRB. Therefore, in many instances, they
opted to check with legal counsel before pursuing
particular strategies. If a -demonstration at the home of
the president of Colt Firearms was planned or if civil
disobediance was discussed, the specific implications of
the plans were checked with attorneys. And even in
situations where labor law itself was not specifically
involved, such as demonstrating in front of the home of
the president of the Firearms Division in suburban Vernon,
Connecticut, lawyers were utilized in finalizing plans.
The union leadership was not opposed to militant or
innovative tactics, but only if these tactics did not
jeopardize their larger "game plan".
Neighborhood organization members and staff have a
real aversion to such reliance on lawyers: they are much
more able to create their own rules, and their activities
are not circumscribed by laws and legal procedures in the
same ways that unions' activities are. They try at all
costs to avoid ceding any degree of control to such an
outside force as a court, except where absolutely
necessary as in the case of rent strikes and certain
tenants' issues. They experienced frustration at the
UAW's reliance on the opinions of attorneys.
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Applying Pressure and Exercising Power: One
interesting example of the ways in which the logics of the
two types of organizing confront eachother developed in
the CLA around several demonstrations at the home of the
former president of Colt Firearms Division, Gary French,
in 1986 and 1987. The first demonstration took place in
July, 1986, and was organized as a children's vigil with
children of the strikers and supporters delivering pleas
to French to settle the strike. Several subsequent
demonstrations during that summer focused on the plight of
the strikers and urged French to intervene to settle the
strike. French, himself, did not participate in
negotiations. Instead, -the Vice President for Labor
Relations represented the company in formal negotiations
and until the publicity surrounding the demonstrations at
his home, French was not featured in press accounts of the
strike.
The plans for the demonstrations were formulated
within the CLA. Consensus developed within the group to
take the strike beyond the picket line and negotiations to
the home of Colt's president for obvious symbolic reasons
and in order to refocus the situation in more personal
terms on one individual, Gary French. The object was to
make French the target and the tactics borrowed heavily
from Alinsky-style methodologies typically used against
slumlords.
The intentions of the CLA were to hold a nuniber of
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activities at French's residence and elsewhere in his
local community. However, these intentions were
interrupted in the Fall of 1986 when French went to court
to invoke a 1947 Connecticut Statute which barred
picketing at company officials' residences during labor
disputes, unless the residences were adjacent to
worksites. The CLA had been aware of the statute but
characterized the demonstrations as vigils rather than
picketing, and the UAW was prepared in any event to
challenge the constitutionality of the law. In October,
1986, an injunction was issued barring demonstrations at
French's home. The UAW engaged legal counsel to appeal
the injunction to the Connecticut Supreme Court and in
May, 1987, the statute was declared unconstitutional.
Between September, 1986 and June, 1987, all plans for
similar demonstrations were put on hold. After the
Supreme Court decision, French served notice that he was
going back to court to obtain punitive damages and an
injunction barring demonstrations at his residence, this
time basing his actions on invasion of privacy.
During the interim between the May, 1987 Supreme
Court decision and the court date for the second
injunction, late July, 1987, the CLA and the UAW
considered various alternatives. Since during that
approximate 2-1/2 month period no injunction was in effect
barring demonstrations, they were free to hold one. The
UAW entered into a series of meetings with the Vernon
Police Department to work out a set of guidelines for
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demonstrations. A draft agreement between the UAW and the
Vernon Police Department was shared with the CLA on June
10, 1987. The discussions at that meeting and at the
subsequent CLA meeting of June 17, 1987, illustrate some
of the divergent models and logics between the union
leaders and neighborhood organizers.
The neighborhood organizing viewpoint emphasized the
tactics of keeping the target (French) guessing as to the
next actions, not playing into the hands of the company
or French by holding the expected demonstration, and also
not submitting to externally determined rules (the UAW-
Vernon PD agreement). Other types of actions aimed at
French were suggested. The discussion at the June 10,
1987 meeting emphasized that by submitting to an agreement
with the police, other organizations in the future may be
forced into similar agreements against their wishes.
Moreover, the argument went, such an agreement ceded power
and control over to an outside force. The point was to
keep control of the situation within the CLA and to keep
French off-balance. Several unionists outside UAW 376, and
one UAW 376 staff member agreed with this viewpoint.
Another UAW 376 staff member, himself an attorney and
party to the negotiations with the Vernon PD, argued that
the draft agreement actually stretched conventional
legally defined conditions of demonstrating in residential
areas. Still others argued that since the effort had been
made to overturn an unconstitutional law, the group should
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exercise its hard won right to demonstrate. The majority
of the UAW leadership at the meeting took the position
that holding demonstrations at French's house would show
the union's strength against the company and boost the
morale of the strikers. Since the UAW was in the process
of preparing for the NLRB trial, the leadership was both
eager to take advantage of the victory, but cautious about
pursuing any strategies or tactics which might damage its
credibility with the NLRB.
At the June 17th meeting of the CLA, a lengthy plan
was presented for a campaign to pressure Gary French with
the premises that he could make the decision to settle the
strike and that with enough pressure on him as an
individual, he would make that decision. While the general
contours of the plan were accepted by the group,
acceptance by some participants was based on the view that
any publicity would be helpful in swaying public opinion
in favor of the strikers and that such activities would
boost sagging morale of the strikers after 18 months on
the picket line. Community organizer Rick Kozin and labor
organizer Steve Thornton (who also had extensive community
organizing experience), both of whom fashioned the plan,
believed that this strategy could ultimately win the
strike.
These discussions underscore the differences in the
styles and logics of organizing in the two arenas. The UAW
in the Colt strike was pursuing a legal strategy from the
outset, conducting this strike within the context of the
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legal parameters defined by labor law. The UAW leadership
felt that by carefully building a compelling case, the
NLRB would have no choice but to find in favor of the
union. The UAW was playing by rules--the conventions of
American labor law system--to which it felt there were no
alternatives. Faced with the opportunty to hold the
Vernon demonstration, there was an inclination to enter
into negotiations with the police department over the
terms and conditions of such a demonstration. The
experience of the union and the manner in which it
conducted its business lent itself to such a method of
problem-solving.
In contrast, the neighborhood organizing model is
not dependent upon legally defined methods of resolving
disputes as was the UAW's in this situation. Neighborhood
organizers do not have faith in legal strategies as means
to ultimate victory and caution members about relying on
such strategies. Moreover, since the targets of these
groups often are individuals, strategies can be built
upon the premise that pressure upon one individual can be
sufficient to achieve success. The plan to pressure
French did not conform to any externally created rules,
and control of the situation rested with the CLA and UAW.
If it could be successful, the strategy would be an
innovative way to approach a strike. However, the locus
of activity would be moved away from the industrial
setting and into the larger community.
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The UAW was receptive to the plan presented on June
17, 1987, even though its overall strategy was clearly
bound to labor law. Several factors might explain this
receptivity. First, the UAW recognized in the beginning
of the strike that it would be lengthy and require the
imaginations and resources of forces beyond its usual base
to maintain the effort. It also saw this strike as part
of the nation-wide effort to bust unions and believed that
other unions and community groups would realize the stakes
involved and could be rallied to its cause. It was open
to innovative strategies, as long as final decisions
rested within the UAW.
Second, in pursuing a legal strategy, the UAW had to
hold back its members on the picket line from directly
physically attacking the strikebreakers. Should its
members engage in overt violence, the NLRB case would be
jeopardized. However, the animosity toward the company
and especially the strikebreakers had to find expression
and the president of the company made a perfect target.
Pursuing French could offer a means of venting anger for
the strikers. Some of the tactics could actually be fun
for the strikers and afford a little comic relief.
Third, this could provide an opportunity for
publicity. The human terms of the strike as expressed in
the original children's vigil created negative publicity
for the company and sympathy for the strikers. If
carefully planned and executed, the campaign to pressure
Gary French would not necessarily endanger the other
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strategies the union was pursuing.
In this situation, the union's agenda and the
neighborhood organizing methods could converge, despite
the very different ways in which each type of organization
perceived the opportunities and had typically operated
previously. For the union, this would be one more method
of attempting to win a very difficult strike.
Ultimately, very little of the Gary French campaign
was actually implemented. As other issues arose and as
the work required to implement the plan appeared too
complex and time consuming, enthusiasm for it dwindled.
However, a demonstration was held at the home of Gary
French before the July 1987 court date. It was orderly,
the union cooperated with the police, and French's second
attempt at an injunction and punitive damages failed.
During the summer of 1988 yet another demonstration at
French's home took place upon the conclusion of the
lengthy NLRB trial.
Ownership of Issues and Stake-Holding: One final,
very important aspect of the CLA experience and the
participation of the neighborhood organizations in the
effort has to do with the sense of "ownership" of an
issue. While understanding to a certain extent the
importance of the strike, the neighborhood groups
perceived the strike as the UAW's issue or labor's issue--
an important issue, but not their issue in the sense that
they embraced the linkage struggle as their issue. They
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did not embrace the strike as a cormunity-wide issue
with implications for the entire area, as did other unions
in the region. Since the backgrounds of their staff have
little familiarity or involvement with unions and most of
the citizen leaders have limited experience with unions,
the implications of a strike are not readily apparent to
neighborhood organization activists. Over the course of
the Colt strike, many began to see commonalities between
their neighborhood work and labor's mission in the
workplace, but they found it difficult to devote scarce
resources, particularly human resources, to the strike
support effort.
People For Change
Different issues surfaced in the launching and
subsequent development of People for Change (PFC) in terms
of neighborhood and labor forces coalescing. In this
case, the decision-making issue arose, but almost in
reverse from the CLA. Additionally, the lack of ability
of neighborhood organizations to participate contributed
to certain difficulties. Differences in perception of the
purpose of PFC, and differences in the type of
participation on the part of organizations also make for
complications in building a long term agenda. These
issues are analyzed in more detail next.
Decision-Making Processes Revisited: The initial
convenors of PFC in early 1987 included the immediate
past-president of one of the neighborhood organizations,
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other individuals who had been active in the linkage
issue, as well as several labor leaders and activists in
other arenas. They initially met to discuss participation
in the upcoming City Council election that year (1987).
The first meeting produced no conclusions or strategies
except to continue to meet and to expand the number of
participants. For several months meetings took place
which considered and debated different strategies, all the
while with new participants entering the process.
Debate focused on whether to work within the
Democratic Party and primary the incumbant Democratic
Councilmembers or to run a slate of independent third
party candidates, and on how many candidates should run.
This was a very lengthy and tedious process. Eventually
the group settled on the third party strategy, but it was
uncharted territory for everyone involved. Noone wanted to
move too quickly and risk alienating a segment of the
evolving coalition. So rather than putting many matters
to a vote early on and generating polarized voting blocs,
the discusssion and the process dragged on.
Union leaders experienced some frustration with the
indecision and constant rehashing of issues: they were
used to being able to come to a decision, vote and move
forward with a plan of action. While the convening
chairperson drew upon the consensus model of conducting
meetings (which is also used by women's organizations and
other groups as well as by neighborhood groups), the large
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amount of attention devoted to process issues did not make
for efficient use of time or resources. Once the group
came to a decision and the slate of candidates was
selected, then process issues ceased to be very important
and a campaign mode of operation took over.
PFC's electoral campaign was managed by an
experienced campaign manager from the LEAP staff. Precise
voter targetting, voter registration campaigns, extensive
telephone and door-to-door canvasing, constant fundraising
activities and large numbers of volunteers devoting
hundreds of hours all were coordinated by a team of LEAP-
trained activists and/or staffmembers. The campaign mode
resembled more of a command structure than the
participatory, loosely coordinated coalition of the
previous six months and some resentment developed among
the several PFC convenors at the terseness and
technocratic nature that prevailed in the campaign office.
The organization had gone almost from one extreme to
another.
When the campaign was over and PFC had won two of
the three seats it sought, it had to accomplish several
tasks simultaneously: putting in place a mechanism to work
with the two Councilmembers, developing its own structure,
and furthering its political goal of electing
progressives to local office. These tasks revealed
several other problematic issues discussed next.
Perceptions of the Purpose of the Coalition and
Types of Participation: After the election, to deal with
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the issues of process and structure, the previously
loosely organized coalition constituted a Steering
Committee with representatives from participating unions
and other organizations who had been active in the
coalition, and from geographical areas in the city
corresponding to State House of Representatives districts.
This structure helped to formalize and define the
organization. Moreover, since the three neighborhood
organizations could not formally participate, the
geographical represenatives would hopefully be able to
bring to PFC some of the localized issues and sentiments
that the neighborhood groups were pursuing. Steering
committee meetings were open to anyone to attend, but only
formally elected or designated representatives could vote.
When the group coalesced in 1987, even though it
decided to go forward with a third party effort for the
Council seats, there was also sentiment to work within the
Democratic Party to attempt to change the nature of the
Democratic Town Committee, thereby creating opportunities
for more progressive candidates to win endorsement for
slots on Democratic tickets. The leadership of PFC, i.e.
the Chairperson and Co-Vice Chairpersons, attempted to
define an organizational path of development which
included three aspects of work for the group: as a
coalition, as a third party and as activists within the
Democratic Party. The balance between these three roles
was delicate and lent itself to different interpretations.
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Some elements saw the PFC effort mainly as a means
of changing the balance of forces within the Democratic
Party, particularly through attempting to change the Town
Committee, and viewed the third party route as a more
temporary tactic. For example, the UAW participant (now
the Regional Director for Region 9A) saw this direction of
work as extremely important and thought that the third
party effort should eventually assume less importance.
Since he and his union devoted a great deal of its
political action apparatus to Democratic Party work and
the UAW leadership was quite committed to maintaining a
role in the Democratic Party, the third party option was
less important. Once PFC activists constituting
themselves as Democrats for Change ran a slate in a Town
Committee district, won the district and went on to play a
key role in unseating the incumbant Town Committee
Chairperson, the UAW had a sense of "mission accomplished"
and was less concerned with the development of a strong
third party apparatus.
Other participants in PFC placed more emphasis on
developing a permanent, left-progressive third party both
because they felt the need for such a political .party
exists and because they wanted to establish a more
permanent force which would redefine debate within
Hartford and pull the city's Democrats to the left.
People with this view included several labor activists,
Puerto Rican Political Action Committee members and other
more left-oriented community activists.
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1199's continued participation presented different
issues. Their president maintained that 1199 endorsed the
PFC slate in the 1987 election, but that did not mean that
it had "signed on" to the organizational work of PFC
permanently. Staff members and a number of rank-and-file
members were very active in the campaign, performing many
hours of volunteer campaigning. The 1199 office was used
as election day headquarters of the group and many
subsequent meetings took place there, but unless there was
rank-and-file support for formally signing on, 1199'ers
who participated would be participating as individuals,
not on behalf of the union. A formal resolution on the
part of the union's Executive Board to participate as a
member organization was never brought up for a vote.
This position is quite consistent with 1199
President Jerry Brown's views on coalition work, that is,
that elections rather than coalitions generate more
enthusiasm among members. 1199's interests may be better
served by its more active participation in LEAP since LEAP
has a statewide focus, consistent with 1199's
organizational breadth, and the specific local politics of
Hartford are generally less important to the specific
needs of the union.
Other union activists participate in PFC as
representatives of their unions, with varying degrees of
interest in the affairs of PFC on the part of those
unions. The neighborhood organizations, as detailed
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above, do not formally participate, and over the short
history of PFC many of the activists from their ranks have
become less active in the group. While the two members of
the City Council attempt to represent the interests of the
neighborhood organizations, PFC-sponsored initiatives at
the Council do not rally the neighborhood groups. All of
these developments have served to redefine PFC. The
different degrees of participation on the part of the
organizations who initially had been involved and the
issues which commanded PFC's attention have focused its
energies in the direction of continually reasserting its
political presence and of contending with its minority
party status. For some organizations with pressing
agendas of their own, it has become less of a priority.
The 1989 Council elections presented even more challenges
to PFC which will not be elaborated here, except to state
that one of the two PFC Councilmembers, Marie Kirkley-Bey,
decided to run with the Democratic Party slate prompting
even more discussion and redefinition within PFC. In 1989
as in 1987, two of the three members of the PFC slate won
election--an African-American woman and the incumbant
Puerto Rican male PFC Councilmember.
OUTCOMES OF COALITION EFFORTS
The CLA, PFC and several other coalitions described
in the list at the beginning of this chapter in numerous
ways are rededining issues, creating new demands on local
government and certainly redefining politics in Hartford.
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Looking at the Colt situation provides one example.
Without the CLA, much of the support for the strikers
might not have been cultivated. Moreover, the strike
experience contributed to the impetus for PFC.
Despite all of the problems analyzed earlier, the
UAW leadership and strikers were extremely gratified with
the degree of support for the strike achieved by the work
of the CLA. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were raised
for the strikers' hardship funds. Political leaders were
forced to take positions on the strike. Dozens of
rallies, mass pickets and a civil disobedience action of
45 union, political, community and religious leaders (the
"Colt 45") kept the strike in the public focus. Police
brutality on the picket line in the early months of the
strike prompted marches to City Hall. While during the
latter part of the 50 month long strike there was less
activity than in the first year, CLA meetings continued
taking place several times a month. Even after the strike
ended once the union and other investors participated in a
purchase of the company, the UAW and other organizations
continue to meet and support other strikes in the area.
Redefinition of Public Issues
Besides providing material and moral support for the
strikers, one of the major functions of the CLA was to
place the issue in the public arena by calling for
different forms of government intervention in the
situation and for different organizations to take' public
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actions and stances to support the strike. After the AFL-
CIO launched a national boycott of Colt Firearms products,
several state and local governments passed resolutions
pledging not to buy any Colt Firearms products until the
strike was settled. In Connecticut, the State Legislature
passed a resolution on the second anniversary of the
strike calling for a negotiated settlement and curtailment
of military contracts for Colt until a settlement was
reached. The debate in the State Capitol focused precisely
on whether the State should intervene or take a position
in a "private" labor dispute. The campaign to halt
Pentagon contracts for the M16 rifle with Colt gained
support in different parts of the country and the union
maintains that this campaign indeed caused Colt to lose
its lucrative M16 contract and ultimately put the Firearms
Division up for sale.
Shifting the matter of the strike into the public
arena for public action also eased the way for the UAW to
contribute to the launching of PFC. The UAW leadership
expected support from the Democratic Party both in
Hartford and statewide in its battle with Colt.
Particularly when the Democratically-controlled city
government in Hartford did not embrace the strike as a
critical issue and did not take supportive actions in such
areas as complaints of police abuse, the UAW leadership
became eager to take on those politicians. And in concert
with other groups who also had strong grievances with
local Democratic officeholders, the UAW's concerns would
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become part of a new political agenda which placed issues
previously deemed private affairs into the public domain.
This redefinition of issues for public attention is
one consequence of organizations' responses to economic
restructuring. And the process of redefinition, itself,
generates controversy, as experienced in the debate within
Connecticut State Legislature. However, many politicians
do respond and do embrace issues such as the Colt strike
as important to the general welfare. The civil
disobedience action, the "Colt 45" sit-in in May, 1986,
included three Democratic State Representatives and a
Republican City Councilwoman. One of the three State
Representatives, Carrie Saxon Perry, later became Mayor of
Hartford (the city's first Black woman mayor, as described
in the chapter on Hartford earlier), and continued
attending strike support functions and adding her name to
various appeals on behalf of the strikers. During her
first term in office, another lengthy strike began by the
professional jai alai players in Hartford and at 14 other
frontons across the country (two others in Connecticut,
one in Rhode Island and 11 in Florida). Mayor Perry
responded to the situation by meeting with the players and
their families early in the strike and offering to help in
whatever way should could. She has been involved in
rallies, meetings with other government officials and
other activities on behalf of the jai alai strikers and in
1990 came to 1199's assistance in a bitter strike at an
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area nuirs ing home.
The Linkage Coalition whose work culminated in 1986
with the defeat of ordinances that would have established
a linkage policy in Hartford also served to redefine the
public agenda, and like the inaction in the Colt
situation, anger over that defeat fueled the People for
Change effort. The demands of the Linkage Coalition--an
exaction fee on downtown development which would be used
to create affordable housing and provide job training--
generated resistance along the same lines of argument as
the Colt resolution generated in the General Assembly,
that is, that intervention in the private market was not
an appropriate role for government and would create a bad
business climate. The Linkage Coalition, the CLA, PFC and
other coalitions, among other functions, all attempt to
redefine the public agenda and hence, redefine what is
appropriate for government action and intervention.
Creation of Demands on Local Government
Besides attempting to redefine what is an
appropriate political agenda, developments like the CLA,
PFC and other coalitions serve to aggregate and articulate
the claims of groups and individuals who are affected by
economic restructuring to local government. In other
words, municipal government and state government are
called upon to mediate the effects of economic
restructuring. Local government is more accessible to
individuals than other levels of government, even though
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it has the least power to intervene in the economy and
change or mediate economic trends. However, local people
tend to know the individuals know who sit on the City
Council and the small number of City Councilpeople in
Hartford provides a very personal and familiar environment
for local politics. (In fact, one informal measure of
success of an activity on the part of any neighborhood
groups is the number of Councilmembers who attend the
activity. One to four in attendance is only moderately
successful, but five or more means that the Council is
really listening). Within this personalized environment,
local residents attempt to exert demands upon the
government. The presence of the neighborhood groups
the coalitions gives organization to such demands.
Several specific examples of the creation of new
demands on municipal government are illustrated by PFC's
work at the City Council. Every year the Council fashions
a budget for the City. The process involves the City
Manager presenting a detailed budget proposal to the
Council, the Council deliberating and making adjustments
to this proposal, the Council then voting on these
adjustments, the Mayor reviewing the budget with the power
to either veto or accept the Council's version, and then
formal adoption by the Council. The deliberations of the
Council take place within party caucuses. Not
suprisingly, the decisions of the Democratic Caucus are
generally adopted since the Democrats' six vote bloc
prevails. Whatever debates go on among Democrats are
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and
within the private caucus and they emerge as a "united
front".
PFC's first city budget experience in 1988 included
a detailed review of the budget with the two
Councilmembers and PFC activists,~ and the fashioning of a
series of proposals to modify the budget. In both years
of PFC Councilmembers' first term, the city faced the
problems of declining state and federal aid, rising costs
and the possibility of raising property taxes in order to
pass a balanced budget--or cutting the City Manager's
budget proposal in order to achieve a balanced budget. In
1988, PFC presented alternatives which would not cut
essential services or cause municipal layoffs and would
come very close to a balanced budget. PFC members knew
that their proposals would not receive serious attention
by the Democrats, but decided to take the process
seriously and be on record as having presented a sound
alternative. Several measures they suggested that were
not passed during the budget process were later adopted,
since the manager and other Democratic councilmembers
found them to be attractive and sensible. One such
proposal was the creation of an "infrastructure disruption
fee" assessed upon firms whose construction projects
disrupt traffic and other city functions.
In 1989, PFC decided to take a different approach to
the budget process. Realizing that many hours had been
expended in the 1988 process with no immediate returns,
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PFC activists decided to launch a campaign known as the
Neighborhood Power Campaign several months prior to the
budget process which would culminate in an alternative
budget proposal. This budget alternative would not be
based on line-by-line review, but upon a set of political
priorities articulated through a series of community
meetings under the auspicies of the Neighborhood Power
Campaign. Specific proposals would be based broadly on
the concept of linkage in different forms, all aimed at
exacting new taxes and fees from corporations and
developers.
The above ideas were presented and discussed at the
community meetings. PFC activists expected that most of
these proposals would not be passed by the Council, but
would provide the basis of the 1989 campaign. Within the
package of 24 budget resolutions were 5 which specifically
dealt with concerns of labor, four of which revolved
around issues that sur-faced in the Colt strike and the
jai alai strike. These included:
-a resolution to bill Colt Firearms and the jai alai
fronton owner for the cost of police services at the
picket line;
-a resolution to bill any firm involved in a strike
75% of the cost of police services at the strike;
-a resolution to recoup the costs of police services
at the Colt strike from Colt Industries upon the
sale of the company;
-a resolution requiring replacement workers in
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strikes to obtain licenses from the city at the cost
of $99, renewable annually;
-a resolution establishing a code of conduct for
firms who enter agreements with the City for
development and commerce in which the firms must
remain neutral in union organizing drives.
None of these resolutions were passed. What is
interesting is that the same council previously passed
several resolutions billing Colt for the cost of police
services, but Colt ignored them. Many of the Democrats on
the Council had enjoyed labor's support and endorsements
in prior campaigns.
These defeated resolutions were attempts on the part
of PFC to inject issues into municipal government policy
which would help to defend labor's interests. The
resolutions attempted to embody solutions to the problem
of union-busting as it manifested in Hartford during the
Colt strike. During their first term, PFC Councilmembers
also introduced other resolutions which assisted unions,
several specifically focused on municipal unions, without
success. PFC used this record during the 1989 campaign to
generate support within the labor movement and was
successful in obtaining endorsements and volunteers from a
number of unions, some who had not been very involved in
PFC's 1987 campaign. However, these new types of claims
on city government flow from the conditions in which labor
finds itself as a result of economic restructuring,
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conditions that concern the activists of PFC.
Emergent Forms of Political Alignment
PFC can be seen as a direct result of the political
inaction on the part of local Democrats in areas which
deeply concern and affect local people both in the
workplace and in their neighborhoods. It is an attempt,
however difficult and however effectual, to create a new
alignment in local politics in Hartford.
In one sense PFC's greatest accomplishment is that
it has forced the Democratic Party in the city to refocus
direction. PFC is responsible for shifting the debate in
the City Council and in city politics more generally,
unseating a powerful incumbant Democratic Town Committee
Chairperson, providing an opening for new forms of
political participation on the part of the city's large
Puerto Rican population, and providing crucial resources
in the election of a progressive Puerto Rican state
legislator. It also is providing a vehicle for
incorporation of specific demands of labor, the demands of
the gay rights movement and is attempting to develop new
African American political leaders. While its success in
winning votes at the City Council is perhaps its least
stellar accomplishment, the climate of politics in
Hartford has been changed considerably by its presence.
Another important example of the changing political
alignments in this socio-economic environment is that of
LEAP. Although it operates on a statewide basis in
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Connecticut, LEAP also has considerable impact in
Hartford. A number of large and influential unions
particiate in LEAP as a means of furthering their
political goals and in the course of their participation
are drawn into issues beyond the usual agenda of labor.
These unions also have a presence in Hartford and many of
them are involved in PFC. LEAP's assistance to PFC in the
1987 campaign was essential to the successful election' of
two PFC candidates.
As with PFC, the reaction to LEAP on the part of the
more traditional Democrats is a measure of its success.
LEAP earned the enmity of the state's governor, William
O'Neil, through its association with O'Neil's Democratic
challengers in past gubenatorial races. It has provided a
highly competent independent base of resources and
personnel for many of the most progressive Democrats in
the State Legislature and has forced the Democratic Party
statewide to accommodate a large progressive bloc. LEAP-
backed legislators helped to pass the Colt Resolution in
1987 at the legislature. They waged an extremely complex
and difficult battle in the 1989 session to avoid massive
cuts in State services, in spite of a serious budget
crisis. And, through the UAW, the LEAP model is being
"exported" to other states in New England and beyond.
Besides animosity and suspicion on the part of the
mainstream Democratic Party machine, LEAP also became a
source of controversy within the top leadership levels of
the AFL-CIO. Elements of the Connecticut AFL-CIO who were
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tied into the State Democratic Party attempted to bring
pressure from national AFL-CIO leadership to bar
participation of local labor councils in LEAP. They
attempted to portray LEAP as under "Communist influence",
a McCarthyite tactic that was no longer convincing. When
local labor council presidents refused to succumb to the
AFL-CIO's pressure, the national leadership abandoned
their attempts to bar participation in such organizations
(see Brecher and Costello, 1990).
CONCLUSIONS
Coalition work is producing results and achieving
new significance in the repertoires of the organizations
in this research. Yet the importance attributed to this
work varies greatly from organization to organization, and
the neighborhood groups generally seem to come to such
work rather reticently. For the unions, the theme and
value of solidarity opens a door in the direction of
participation in coalitions, despite suspicion from
conservative state and national leadership elements about
specific coalition formations. But among the neighborhood
groups, their inherent turf orientation and the human
resource demands of other types of issues seem to
contribute to an inability to fully embrace coalitions,
even though some staffmembers realize the intrinsic value
of coalitions. However, all of these organizations do
engage in coalitions, sometimes with grand results,
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sometimes with minimal results.
Perhaps the process of working together, both
casually and occassionally or more intensely, does help to
break down barriers. Awareness of eachother's respective
organizational agendas and priorities helps to create new
ways of thinking and behaving. To be specific, in the
summer of 1989, HART members became concerned about high
density residential development in neighborhoods of the
southern part of the city which featured one, two and
three family dwellings. Developers began to buy parcels
of land in the middle of these quiet residential blocks
and erect large multi-unit condominium projects. HART
members issued a call for a moritorium on all development
in several specific residential zones for 120 days in
order to have the city government conduct impact studies
and to allow HART more time to develop this issue into a
larger campaign. In the past in Hartford, opposition to
such a call could be expected from the Building Trade
Unions (a significant grouping within the Greater Hartford
Labor Council) who previously had taken positions that ran
counter to neighborhood organizations' demands. However
in this instance, the President of the Labor Council who
had been meeting monthly with neighborhood organizations
for close to two years in the Grassroots-Labor Forum
listed in the beginning of the chapter, came to a HART
meeting on June 7, 1989, to say that since the proposed
moratorium did not impact construction projects which
employed union labor, the central labor council would
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remain neutral on the issue and not speak in opposition to
such a construction moratorium. The significance of this
action was probably lost on most of the HART members in
attendance, but it did represent a relatively new type of
relationship between labor and community forces.
Recognition of the validity of the neighborhood
organization's agenda meant in this instance that
elements in the local labor council felt that it was
important to be supportive of and not to alienate a
neighborhood organization such as HART. They were
beginning to see beyond a narrow version of self-interest
that is often attributed to labor.
One important difference between the two types of
organizations that can be somewhat problematic in terms
of the mutual understanding required in coalition work is
that of the difference in the nature of the targets of the
respective organizational campaigns. Both labor and
neighborhood organizations present claims and demands
against corporate interests, but these corporate interests
are involved in different sectors of the economy and
derive profits in very different ways; manufacturing,
service industries or real estate involve quite distinct
profit mechanisms.
The trend of investment moving away from
manufacturing and into speculative urban real estate
development is part of the phenomenon that Harrison and
Bluestone (1988) describe as the Casino Society and it
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means that labor and neighborhood organizations are
involved in different social and economic processes.
Sometimes their targets may overlap--a downtown
development project involving a new hotel may bring
together neighborhood organizations demanding jobs during
construction and in the finished project with a labor
union such as HERE that is interested in organizing the
workers in the completed hotel. Something similar to this
scenario has developed in New Haven, Connecticut, and
potential for such a situation exists in Hartford. Often
plant closing threats in a community can bring labor and
neighborhood forces together, but such a scenario has not
developed in Hartford. It seems that until the targets of
a particular union and a particular neighborhood group
exactly overlap, the opportunities presented by the other
methods of organizing will not be fully understood or
utilized by either type of group.
The experiences described in this chapter show how
the some of the assumptions in neighborhood organizing and
in the labor movement confront eachother in coalition
activities. Different logics are employed and strategies
and tactics are built upon different premises. However,
as different as the organizations are, the differences are
not insurmountable if both sides desire to work in
coalitions and can engage in the art of compromise. Much
depends upon how any single organization assesses its
individual capacity to achieve a particular goal--if it
knows it cannot "go it alone" then it attempts to work
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through coalitions.
Coalitions, specifically electoral coalitions, can
become mired in the "trenches" of urban problems as
Katznelson (1981) illustrates--in-fighting, ethnic and
racial rivalries, and turf-oriented sparring. PFC is
still too young for a comprehensive evaluation of whether
or not it will suffer such a fate, but LEAP has a very
successful record of defining an agenda and not succumbing
to a great deal of organizational in-fighting. Its
staffmembers have devoted extraordinary attention to
insuring that LEAP does not become mired in such problems
and it will only take on major projects agreeable to all
participants. LEAP has certain weaknesses (in the
estimation of LEAP activists) with respect to minority
participation, but in general its member organizations
have come to agreement in terms of working together for
commonly defined goals.
Two of the unions of this project, the UAW and 1199,
have a very airect attachment to electoral politics and
participate in a myriad of political activities. The
other, HERE, has had minimal participation up to this
point, but is gradually moving in the direction of more
involvement. When the governor is the "boss", as is the
case with 1199, the union must engage in an interesting
balancing act counterposing the need for access to
political officials through formal and informal means with
the need to demonstrate strength through militant' tactics
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and be taken seriously by the same officials. Therefore
political involvement on the part of 1199 is considered
very important by the union leadership. The UAW's
inherited tradition of political involvement and the
individual involvement of many of its leaders in the
Democratic Party focus that union's efforts into many
forms of political action.
All of these political involvements delineate the
deepest distinctions between the neighborhood
organizations and the unions. The union with the most
experience in coalitions with the neighborhood
organizations, the UAW, has the greatest difficulty
countenancing this distinction and cannot understand the
lack of even desiring political involvement by
neighborhood group leaderships. The neighborhood
organizations have very little recourse at this stage in
their development to pursue political action, even if
their leadership wished to. This gulf is one of the more
serious barriers for more permanent alliances between the
two types of organizations, given their -present
understanding of each other and the philosophies of their
respective leaders.
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LABOR ORGANIZING
In the late 1980's one of the most important events
for the labor movement in Hartford was undoubtedly the
Colt strike. Simultaneously as a highly publicized issue,
a rallying cry and ultimate victory for the labor movement
and community allies, a point of comparison for other
unions, or an example of the meaning unions still have and
the sacrifices individuals are still willing to endure--at
least in the case of the 800 strikers involved--the Colt
strike took on very public and important proportions in
the Hartford area. Just as analyzing the experience of
the strike in terms of examples of coalition-building in
the previous chapter yields some insights into the
problems of unions and community groups attempting to
define a commons agenda, the strike can also serve as a
departure point for examining labor's own practices in
more detail.
In this chapter, we will analyze how unions,
specifically those upon which this research is focused,
are adapting their practices to cope with a very difficult
environment for their continued growth and survival. Given
that the Colt strike in many ways represents a true clash
of the "old" labor relations with the "new climate", a
number of questions are suggested which will be
incorporated into this section. For example, what types
of assumptions, if any, were involved in the strategy of
the UAW as it entered and sustained this strike? Do
unions generally need to be able to amass resources
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sufficient to withstand a strike of several years duration
in order to preserve past achievements? What types of
alternative strategies might exist to the unfair labor
practice strike pursued by the UAW and under what
conditions can alternative strategies be successful?
Given that the organized workforce has shrunk considerably
and "staying unionized" is increasingly more difficult,
what types of strategies guide new organizing drives and
the work with existing memberships?
For purposes of organizing and focusing the
research, we attempted to think about the work of unions
in terms of three segments or phases: organizing (new
members), mobilizing (or working with existing members on
issues pertaining to their particular situations and
needs) and organizational maintenance issues. Within
these three phases certain issues undoubtedly overlap,
however the distinctions are useful as a starting point in
stxucturing the discussion. The analysis presented here
is based on several types of sources: interviews with
union leaders and other staff members of the UAW, HERE
Local 217 and 1199 New England-SEIU; observation of a
variety of union meetings, rallies, other events and home
visits to workers; printed and written materials published
by the unions, and accounts and/or coverage in books,
periodicals and newspapers; numerous informal discussions
with union members and staff.
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ORGANIZING NEW MEMBERS
Several aspects of organizing new members are being
both refined and redefined in the environment of
restructuring. We will examine these developments by
looking at five aspects of organizing: first a brief
overview of who these unions organize; then a new model
of organizing developed by one of the unions--the Blitz;
next the organizing campaign process; the issue of
recognition strikes; and lastly at the place of organizing
within the overall framework of the union.
The Pool of New Members
One question to consider regarding organizing new
members is who is being organized. For the UAW,
organizing is wide open in the Hartford area in terms of
the industries and types of workers they attempt to
organize. Since very little of the auto industry exists
in Connecticut, historically the UAW has organized
manufacturing concerns in other industrial sectors in the
area--precisely the industries who have moved operations
out of the region. In fact, the UAW leadership estimates
that the union has lost at least half of its membership in
the region since the early 1970's. Currently, the UAW
organizes in virtually any industry from which interested
workers approach the union. Within the New England states
included Region 9A, recently organized workers include
public employees on Cape Cod, maintenance workers at the
University of Hartford and cafeteria workers in East Lyme,
Connecticut's school system who are employed by the
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Marriott Corporation. This is in contrast to HERE and
1199, both of whom continue to organize generally within
the industries which their respective names suggest:
hotels/restaurants, including cafeteria workers in public
institutions and colleges; and the entire health care
industry from mental health and retardation group homes to
public employees in the health fields.
New organizing is taking place, however, within the
context of erosion of existing membership bases for many
unions. While the UAW experiences economic restructuring
through the phenomenon of capital flight in the
manufacturing sector, the other unions are not immune from
analagous problems in their industries. HERE faces the
issues of restaurant and hotel closures and "downsizing".
During the time in which this research was underway, two
of Hartford's major hotels closed, the Hartford Hilton and
the Summit Hotel, and HERE lost 300 members. Union
activities in both of these former establishments were
observed for this research. Even in the healthcare field,
1199 is experiencing the merging of Hartford's Mt. Sinai
Hopsital, in which several departments are organized by
1199, with St. Francis Hospital, a totally unorganized
hospital. Economic restructuring therefore affects all of
these unions and their organizing strategies must
accommodate this reality.
New Organizing Models: The Blitz
While one of the major methods by which the UAW
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adapts to changing conditions is to organize in services
and other areas in which they traditionally not been
involved, HERE and 1199 adapt by maximizing the organizing
they do undertake. Part of what is involved in this is
the ability to move in an out of organizing situations
rapidly and only continue drives where success seems more
likely or possible. Both 1199 and HERE have adopted
models referred to as "the Blitz" or the 1,2,3 method
respectively, in which at several key points relatively
early in the drive the unions assesss their strength and
decide either to continue or halt the drive. Both make
extensive use of home visits and/or one-to-one meetings
with workers in safe environments where they can feel
comfortable discussing their concerns. The UAW also uses
similar methods in some of the organizing drives it
undertakes.
The Blitz model developed by 1199 is a particularly
interesting one and has been used quite successfully in
organizing nursing homes of approximately 120 workers in
urban areas and has also been applied to community based
mental health facilities in Connecticut. HERE's similar
1-2-3 model is used in small- to medium-size hotels,
however the pacing is sometimes slower than the Blitz.
These models were developed in response to both the
increasingly sophisticated and virulent anti-union
campaigns of employers and the delays encountered during
the course of organizing drives as employers stall the
process at the NLRB. The Blitz attempts to maximize union
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contact with the workers before the employer discovers
that the union has been approached and essentially
compresses the timeframe of the initial stages of how
organizing drives were conducted ten to fifteen years ago.
It involves several key factors early in the campaign:
speed, leadership and motivation.
The essentials of the model are as follows. The
union is called by one or more workers at a workplace
where sufficient interest in unionizing exists to prompt
the contact. Within less than one week's time after the
union is initially contacted, the union organizer(s)
attempts to meet with workers - -generally through the home
visits--who are identified by other workers as leaders,
holds initials meetings to ascertain the degree of
interest among these leaders in establishing an organizing
committee, holds an organizing committee meeting, and then
assesses the potential for a successful campaign. This
assessment rests both on the anticipated response and
resources available to the employer to fight the union, as
well as on the capacity of the workers to organize.
Leaders are defined very simply: people who other
people follow. The leadership quality can be social in
nature and unrelated to particular worksite issues or it
can be tied very specifically to the workplace. The key
criterium is that a leader has influence over others.
Organizers estimate that there is roughly a 1:5 ratio of
leaders to the rest of the workers in a given worksite.
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Speed, specifically in reaching leaders, is very
important in the early stages of the campaign for several
reasons, the most obvious that the union wants to reach
the maximum number of people before the employer catches
on. The goal is to identify leaders in the first three
days and have time with these leaders in order to
"innoculate" them against employer propaganda and anti-
union arguments. Organizers realize that during this
first week of the campaign the employer will undoubtedly
find out that the union has been contacted, but the effort
is to maintain a degree of secrecy and keep control of
information and the pacing of organizing within the
union's province as long as possible. Employers may try
to dissuade leaders from continuing their participation in
the drive or else work eroding support among non-leaders,
whatever methods most effectively stymies unionization.
Other dimensions of the speed issue relate to both
union resources and worker motivation: the union does not
want to invest limited resources in losing campaigns and
therefore the determination must be made quickly as to
whether sufficient motivation exists among the workers to
sustain and win a campaign. The organizer bases the
assessment on a number of questions: is there sufficient
anger at the employer and intensity about the desire to
organize? Do leaders feel this anger very personally, not
necessarily "for" others, but for themselves? Is there
unity or division among the workers? Will the leaders
accept responsibility and take on tasks to move the effort
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forward?
Whether workers will take on tasks is critically
important in an organizer's assessment and is a key factor
in determining whether or not to continue the campaign.
The tasks and responsibilities that workers are asked to
assume do involve degrees of risk and do test commitment,
and yet organizers are trained not to prematurely ask
workers to do things for which they are not prepared or
which could frighten them away from the campaign. For
example, workers may be asked to set up meetings with co-
workers, to begin to persuade co-workers as to the
benefits of organizing, to obtain lists of workers' names,
addresses and telephone numbers, or other tasks which are
necessary in the campaign.
The first concrete test of the workers,
particularly the leaders, is the attendance at the initial
organizing committee meeting--are leaders there and have
they brought others? Is approximately 70% of the workforce
represented? If there is insufficient attendance and/or
representation from different work areas, the union may at
that point pull out of the effort with the proviso that if
events in the future generate greater degrees of interest
in organizing, the workers should recontact the union. In
these instances an organizer may remain in communication
with some of the key activists from the workplace. If the
campaign does proceed after this key point has been
reached it generally moves all the way to a collective
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bargaining election, alt-ough very occassionally the union
will pull out just before an election if the prognosis is
particularly grim.
If there is sufficient attendance and motivation
evidenced at the first committee meeting, then a "card
rally" is set for a few days later. At this rally (which
is actually an expanded and more spirited committee
meeting) organizers play a key role and entertain
questions, attempt to develop a sense of unity of purpose
among all of the various groupings of workers, detail what
employer reaction is likely to be--the anti-union tactics
that workers can anticipate--and pass out union cards. One
of the things that organizers caution in these meetings is
that it may be necessary to strike to gain union
recognition. They attempt to be very frank about the
potential hardships ahead in such campaigns, but also show
what workers stand to gain. Workers from institutions
which are already organized may speak at such meetings and
attest to the kinds of changes in the work environment
which unionization makes possible.
The workers then have approximately 72 hours to
distribute and retrieve signed union cards, cards which
state that the signer authorizes the union to represent
him/her. Once these cards are back to the organizer and
if at least 70% of the workforce has signed, some type of
demonstrative action takes place in front of the employer
demanding union recognition. In the vast majority of
cases, the employer refuses recognition by a show of union
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authorization cards and the union then petitions the NLRB
for a collective bargaining election.
After the Blitz: Aspects of the Remainder of the Campaign
Although the majority of organizing drives
eventually go before the NLRB, the union resists ceding
control of the timeframe and scheduling to an outside
entity as long as possible. Once the NLRB is petitioned,
the process of unit determination must take place and the
employer has available and often uses many opportunities
to stall the campaign. At this point the "blitz" aspect of
the organizing drive is over. A hearing must be held to
determine the unit size and then 'an election date is set.
Generally the election takes place at least a month
later if there is minimal disagreement between the
employer and union in determining the unit. If there is
disagreement, then several different appearances before
the NLRB can be required and the process may drag on
while enthusiasm for the union among the workers can die.
The union at this point may attempt to circumvent the
process by threatening to strike even before an election
is set if the employer's tactics are terribly
obstructionist. Even if the situation does not
deteriorate to that extent, the union's major task,
specifically the job of organizer, from this point on is
to maintain enthusiasm and support for the union among the
workers. This is also the point where the role of
consultants or attorneys engaging in the modern ' union-
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busting strategies promulgated during recent decades may
become more prominent.
Unit size can be very important in the success of
organizing drives. During the 1980's, NLRB decisions
regarding appropriate unit size for purposes of conducting
elections stipulated larger units, inclusive of many
different groups of workers, an arrangement which puts
employers and, in 1199's case, specifically hospitals at
distinct advantages. 1199 maintains that as many as eight
distinct groups of workers with distinct interests may
exist at a typical hospital and unit determinations should
reflect these divisions rather than the larger units for
which hospital managements argue. After these decisions,
1199 and other unions attempting to organize hospitals had
very few successes and 1199 began to focus its organizing
energies on smaller healthcare institutions such as
nursing homes and group homes. The union's probability
of success is much greater in organizing smaller, more
cohesive groups of workers.
During the crucial period of time between filing a
petition at the NLRB and the date of the collective
bargaining election the degree of responsibility assumed
by the organizing committee is most critical. Training
for organizers emphasizes that the organizer must not take
on all of the tasks and responsibility in the campaign,
that is, take on the role of the "best organizing
committee member", but rather mete out tasks so that
workers essentially organize themselves with guidance from
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the organizer. In turn, organizers spend time training the
organizing committee on how to keep the campaign moving
forward and what to expect from the employer.
This pre-election period is a very likely time for
workers to be fired or harassed and for union-busting
consultants to be retained by employers. Appendix A is a
description of their tactics as outlined by a former
management consultant. Organizers chronicle a wide range
of tactics they confront in organizing drives. One that
is used by union-busting consultants is the firing of
supervisors, either to instill fear in the entire
workforce or to appease workers who dislike a particular
supervisor. Sometimes consultants develop and use
psychological profiles of workers during an anti-union
campaign. In smaller workplaces where the workers may be
a more cohesive group, these tactics may not be as
effective as in larger multi-site situations: workers in
the more personalized work settings seem to be best able
to withstand the anti-union campaigns. However, certain
consultants boast extremely effective records specifically
against 1199. Moreover, the employer's response to the
unionization attempt always has the potential to create
fear among the workers, and this fear at the possibility
of losing one's livelihood is not at all unfounded (see
Goldfield, 1987).
Part of the 1199's training for workers in the
context of organizing drives consists of preparing them
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for what they can expect as the employer's response.
There are any number of tactics the employer may attempt.
One is to portray the union as an outside third party that
will complicate future relationships between the workers
and the employer. Another is to admit that some things
have been done incorrectly in the past and to ask for
another chance.
The cost of union dues is emphasized, often with
graphic illustrations such as the equivalent amount of
groceries to a year's union dues. Divisions among the
workers along racial and ethnic lines may be exploited or
fostered. Movies about past 1199 strikes are often
shown, with the intent to portray 1199 as a violent union.
If the workforce is predominantly Black, the union is
characterized as a Jewish communist union. If the
workforce is predominantly white, the union is
characterized as a Black militant union. (In the case of
HERE, employers characterize the union as mob-controlled).
One of the union's response is to develop outside support
by respected political, religious and community leaders--
often the Black clergy. However, 1199 has faced
situations recently in Southern states where employers
have countered by retaining a group of Black ministers
from different Southern cities who will travel to
worksites where union drives are underway and preach anti-
union messages.
Many of these activities took place in the past
within captive audience meetings during the workday,
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sometimes leaving patients unattended. However, employers
are now emphasizing the "one-on-one" (or two- or three-on-
one): meetings with individual workers where two or more
supervisors interrogate or scream at the worker, usually
within eyesight or earshot of other workers. It is often
against all of this that workers have to decide whether or
not they want a union.
While the organizer is employed full-time to do
his/her job and is involved in campaign after campaign,
the workers at an individual workplace are attempting to
unionize more often than not for the first time, in
response to the individual employer or supervisor or
working conditions. As is pointed out by Piven and
Cloward (1977), workers don't experience "class struggle",
they experience the unfairness of a particular employer.
They call the union because of their specific
circumstances. What the organizer does, especially by way
of warning the workers about all of the various devices
used by employers, is to show the workers how their
specific circumstances fit into overall patterns of labor
relations. So while the employer is characterized and
responded to on the basis of his/her individual behavior,
s/he is also characterized in more general terms as a
"boss", behaving like bosses behave. In this sense, the
organizers quite consciously convey a picture of
adversarial class relations in society and believe that it
is important to do this in the course of organizing in
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order to motivate and strengthen the workers resolve.
The Recognition Strike
Another feature of contemporary organizing involves
what is called a recognition strike, alluded to above.
While every aspect of labor relations has become
exceedingly difficult in the past decade as outlined in
Chapter 2, obtaining a first contract after a successful
organizing drive is one of thie most formidable tasks
facing unions. Recall in Chapter 4 that we described the
difference between an unfair labor practice strike and an
economic strike--essentially a distinction based on legal
status with legal implications. The recognition strike
can be either: it may or may not involve unfair labor
practices, but it usually takes place as a result of
failed negotiations for a first contract after workers
vote for unionization in an NLRB supervised election. In
rare instances, the union may call a strike when the
employer refuses to agree to an election.
If the union can document unfair labor practices
in the course of the negotiations for the first contract
and then strikes, it will file charges with the NLRB
asking the Board to charge the company with unfair labor
practices. If these charges are sustained by an
administrative law judge after a trial, the judge may
order the reinstatement of the workers. However, a
recognition stike without any allegations of unfair labor
practices is an immense gamble: once the workers walk out
the employer's door, they may be out forever if permanent
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replacement workers are hired. Even those unions who
eschew heavy reliance on legal strategies pursue this
route to hedge against the very real threat of permanent
replacements.
All three of the unions in this research have at
various times found themselves in strikes over union
recognition and in most instances attempt to transform the
strike into an unfair labor practices strike. During this
process union members and any outside supporters tend not
to use the term "recognition strike" either in public--to
emphasize that the employer broke the law and to
strengthen the case before the NLRB--or even in private--
to boost the morale of strikers who may be reassured by
the legal protection implied in the term "unfair labor
practices" strike.
One example of this strategy is the strike by
professional jai alai players which began in April, 1988.
The International Jai Alai Players Association (IJAPA)
declared a strike in order to gain union recognition and
soon after beginning the strike approached the UAW for
affiliation. Three jai alai frontons operate in
Connecticut (others are in Rhode Island and Florida) and
the IJAPA leadership was based at the Hartford fronton.
The UAW Region 9A leadership was willing to take risks
with this group of strikers who were very inexperienced
with issues of labor relations, and shepherded the process
of affiliation through the UAW hierarchy. Assuming the
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players were successful in their attempt to unionize, once
the strike was finished the UAW would gain several hundred
new members in an entirely new industry for the UAW,
professional sports. When IJAPA formally became affiliated
with the UAW, the Regional leadership began to shape the
strike strategy into an unfair labor practices strategy.
Accordingly strikers and supporters ceased referring to
the strike as a recognition strike. The strike remains in
effect as of this writing, now more than two years later.
The Culture of Organizing
Perhaps one of the most critical variables in the
whole area of organizing the unorganized is the degree of
importance attached to this aspect of work by the
union and how the organizational philosophy
incorporates new organizing. 1199-New England Vice
President for Organizing, David Pickus, refers to this as
the "culture of organizing". 1199 has historically devoted
a great deal of resources to organizing new groups of
workers and frames the issue of organizing not simply as a
means of obtaining larger membership rolls for the union
itself, but also as a political question of empowering the
working class in general, and health care workers in
particular (see Fink and Greenberg, 1989). 1199's New
England staff is organized to accommodate this mission
through its officer structure which includes a vice
president for organizing, and its staffing pattern which
includes an organizing team of at least three "field
organizers", those staff members assigned to organizing
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the unorganized. Field organizers may also be asked to
participate in organizing drives of national importance
to the union and assume temporary assignments on the West
Coast, in the South or elsewhere.
HERE Local 217 likewise places a heavy emphasis on
organizing new members and has reorganized its staff in
recent years to enhance its organizing capacity. Before
the reorganization, staff members did both new organizing
and work with the existing membership, "internal
organizing" in HERE's terms for this work. Now there is a
clearer delineation of work, and individuals have primary
responsibility for one or the other, "external" or
"internal" organizing. The emphasis on organizing by HERE
has yielded some notable successes in the area: HERE Local
217 was the key force for organizing Yale employees in New
Haven, who once organized, chartered new locals with the
international union.
The UAW in this region has five staff members of the
regional apparatus assigned to new organizing and locals
may also undertake organizing drives. New organizing is
assuming a more prominent role for the UAW, and, as noted
in the beginning of this chapter, this is among groups of
workers not previously considered UAW targets for
organizing.
Probably more than anything else, organizing the
unorganized in this era requires a capacity to constantly
refine and reassess techniques and strategies. 1199
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organizers--many only in their 30s and 40s--reminisce
about organizing techniques of as recently as 15 years ago
when the organizer would begin a drive by distributing
leaflets to workers at shift changes in front of a
facility. Any interested workers would be asked to join an
organizing committee, authorization cards would be handed
out continuously and once approximately 65% to 75% of the
workforce had signed cards, the workers and the organizer
would march on the boss and demand recognition. All of
this was much more public and much less precise than
contemporary practices. Organizing was not easy then, but
it is excruciating today, given managements' new
techniques, the manner in which labor law is currently
interpretted and enforced, and the difficult climate for
unions generally. Therefore, the importance attached to
organizing the unorganized and the tenacity of the union
leadership in maintaining the "culture of organizing" in
the midst of the very drastic changes in the organizing
environment are quite important to sustaining and
enhancing capacities for growth and empowerment.
MEMBERSHIP MOBILIZATION
At a time when they are beseiged by the external
challenges discussed in earlier chapters, the requirements
and demands on trade unions in satisfying membership needs
are innumerably varied and complex. Indeed for each
employer, for each industry, for each sector of the
economy, strategies and tactics must be devised and
201
constantly reformulated as even newer problems present
themselves. Certain types of problems are totally internal
to specific worksites, while others are more generalized
problems of the current labor relations environment. In
the several years that the unions in this study were
observed, they collectively confronted quite a wide range
of issues:
-industrial restructuring and resulting contraction
of firms' operations;
-foreign competition;
-mergers and acquisitions;
-managements beset on breaking the union in specific
worksites;
-plant closings;
-demands for concessions from employers in the
context of collecive bargaining;
-the specific problem of rising health care costs,
from both the standpoints of healthcare consumers
and workers in the healthcare industry;
-fiscal crises of both state and local governments
that employ particular groups of workers;
-publically regulated industries and resulting
bureaucratic entanglements;
-privatization of public services;
-economic swings in consumer leisure spending;
-regional and local economic development patterns
and shifts;
-local, regional and national political climates;
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-cumbersome legal processes in the NLRB bureaucracy;
-divergent philosophies and ideologies within the
trade union movement as to the most effective ways
of confronting the problems;
-lack of understanding within the larger community
of the role and mission of organized labor;
-the relative ease in replacing union workers with
nonunion workers during strikes.
There are still more issues but this list alone
illustrates some of the diversity of problems faced by the
unions. All of these issues require analysis, action
and varying degrees of membership involvement and
mobilization if there is to be any hope of successful
resolution for the members' benefit. Several strategies
and techniques pursued by the unions in dealing with this
problematic environment will be analyzed next. These
include shopfloor or worksite issues and power
relationships, union viewpoints as presented in
organizational media and other activities which educate
membership, external relationships with other unions and
in political processes, strikes and corporate campaigns.
While some of these topics are very similar to issues
covered in the last chapter on alliances and
coalitions, in this chapter we will attempt to deal
with them not from the standpoint of the functioning
of coalitions, but rather from the standpoint of how labor
functions, makes choices and takes action.
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Shopfloor/Worksite Issues
All three of the unions must develop among their
rank-and-file members the capacity to deal with worksite
issues and confront employers, usually the first level of
supervisors, on a daily basis without the assistance of
union staffpeople or perhaps initially even a union
steward. This is the most basic form of empowerment
afforded through unionization. There is generally an
apparatus of stewards (or "delegates" as 1199 refers to
them) and some type of shop committee. This level of
organization is truly the lifeblood of the union and makes
the difference between a workplace in which workers feel a
sense of and can exercise power or one in which worker
apathy and disorganization reign.
Various training activities are undertaken by the
unions to develop the leadership skills necessary to
function on the shopfloor level. All of the unions seem
to be experimenting with new activities and training
formats. One method which is used fairly regularly by the
unions is a workshop setting with simulations and role
playing. Workers are given a concrete situation to react
to and assume different roles in the situation: typically
the boss, the worker(s) and the steward. At a HERE
training session in June, 1988, this format not only
yielded knowledge about specific useful techniques, but
also helped to foster a sense of comradery among the
workers--another very necessary component of successful
shop committees.
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One of tie handouts in the HERE 217 training session
is attached as Appendix B and is an excellent synopsis of
the way in which that union approaches on-the-shopfloor
problem-solving. This outline of the steps involved in
handling a grievance was devised to train stewards, but
also demonstrates several other principles of unionism
which are emphasized by HERE 217. First and foremost is
the issue of developing a "fight", i.e. "getting the
victim to fight" and "pushing people to win, not whine".
Implied in this theme and throughout the outline is that
the steward does not do "for" others, but builds the
workers' collective capacity to confront issues. Careful
preparation and anticipation of the employer's reactions
is obviously another area which is emphasized. Finally,
fairness for the workers involved and future implications
of any problem resolution are also themes.
1199 frames the question of shopfloor activity in
terms of worker power and unity. It has developed a
training module for organizers and rank-and-file leaders,
"Our Role As Organizer", which is outlined in Appendix C.
This module is offered periodically to joint groups of
organizers and active members from various facilities.
The three objectives of the training as stated in the
outline of the module are:
1) to teach that the source of workers' power is
their united action:
2) to teach that an organizer's job is not to solve
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problems, but to lead workers into struggle so they
learn from their experience that their power comes
from their united action;
3) to introduce principles and concepts to help
leaders think, plan and function as organizers.
To accomplish these objectives, a number of role playing
scenarios take place which train participants how to
approach grievances, chapter-building and other union
activities, keeping in mind the goal of building power
and unity. One other important theme which applies to
1199's approach to the entire range of union issues is
that of the union being an "instrument of workers' power"
rather than a "service organization". This theme also
helps to explain 1199's aversion to reliance on attorneys
and legal procedures, and more generally, how it
distinguishes itself from other unions who do envision
their roles more as that of service organizations. This
type of content in union-sponsored training activities is
geared toward developing the capacity for militance and
activism among organizers and members.
Although the unions want to develop the capacity of
the workers to handle problems and empower themselves, the
leaderships do not necessarily envision every issue
developing into a major confrontation. They are
interested in instilling in the employer a "healthy
respect" for the power of the unionized workers so that
the employer has to think of the implications of his/her
decisions and actions vis a vis the union. This means that
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workers may have to exercise their power dramatically on a
periodic basis, but not over every single issue. In other
words, the union's "threat" to disrupt worksite activity
is an important means of maintaining or exerting power.
Shopfloor leadership and organization is critically
important during intense labor-management conflict. In
the Colt Firearms situation, prior to the beginning of the
strike in January, 1986, the UAW members at Colt staged
what they call an "in-plant strike" for nine months after
the expiration of their previous contract in April, 1985.
During this time, a virtual underground existed in which
the shop committee coordinated job actions and kept track
of employer violations of labor law in an effort to build
a case for later legal action. As antagonisms deepened
between the workers and the management, simultaneously the
anger and resolve which would propel and sustain the
workers during the eventual four year long strike was also
developing.
Developing Membership Power and Strength: Media and
Messages
Quite a range of membership development activities
are undertaken by the three unions. One important aspect
of this process is the ideological or philosophical
orientation and message that the union leadership wants to
impart to the membership. Several different means
transmit organizational points of view: various
conferences, conventions, and printed material all deliver
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messages which are viewed as "ammunition" for workers in
their workpJ lace and their communities as they confront
issues and struggles. Indeed, one the UAW's national
monthly publications is entitled "Ammo" and consists of a
regular series of small, pocket-sized pamphlets on a
variety of subjects from trade deficits to plant closings
to the effects of pesticide use in agriculture.
Publications and Printed Materials: The UAW
international headquarters issues a myriad of attractive,
professionally-produced publications geared toward
political and community action. For example, a 52 page
booklet entitled "Labor Economics '89" was published for
the UAW Leadership Institute by the International's
Education Department. The material in the booklet covers
economic trends and projections, budget and taxation
policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations, the state
of Black America, the state of the U.S. auto industry, the
trade deficit and other economic topics. Many charts,
graphs and illustrations help in supplementing the written
analysis which is simultaneously factual and dramatic in
its implications for auto workers, and which draws upon
much of the industrial restructuring literature referenced
in earlier chapters of this dissertation.
Another similarly prepared publication, "Political
Strength for Future Security A UAW Action Agenda 1989"
offers the legislative and political program under the
auspices of the Community Action Program (CAP) Department
and was distributed at the February, 1989 CAP Conference
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in Washington, D.C. This publication contains similar
material to the Labor Economics publication, but also
includes more detailed information on Congress and the
UAW's political strategies. These types of booklets are
often found in literature racks in union hall lobbies and
are distributed to union activists who participate in
different UAW activities. Additionally, the international
union's monthly magazine "Solidarity" is sent to every
member's home and the topics covered in this publication
likewise span a range of union issues, economic and
political topics, as well as cultural and leisure topics.
The perspectives within these UAW publications may
be described as solidly within the liberal-left Democratic
Party realm, emphasizing an economic interventionist role
for government through such measures as the development
of industrial policy. However, there is also an emphasis
on economic justice for segments of the population beyond
the UAW membership alone, especially minority and urban
populations, and a concern for workers' lives beyond the
workplace in political and community activities, and even
in recreational and leisure endeavors.
1199 publishes a smaller quantity of materials, but
its publications have likewise been attractive, very
easily read and infused with themes of economic justice
and struggle. Its recent merger with the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) has meant the
cessation and/or reorganization of the union's national
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publications, but the New England district continues to
publish several of its own newsletters and brochures,
including a 10 issue per year newsletter which is mailed
to each member's home.
Publications from HERE 217's international union are
nowhere near as prominent either in its activities or its
Hartford office as are those of UAW or 1199 in their
respective operations, but- the local itself issues
periodic newsletters and produces especially poignant
brochures and leaflets during contract negotiations and
strikes. Local 217 and the Yale University Locals 34 and
35 issue a "tri-local" newsletter periodically and the
three locals also engage in joint undertakings such as
training sessions and leadership meetings. However, the
presentation of the union's organizational point of view
to its members seems to come much more through meetings,
training sessions and the work of the organizers on an
individual and small group basis than through written or
published materials.
Ideological Messages at Conferences, Conventions and
Other Activities: Union conferences, conventions and
regular assemblies or meetings are also key
opportunities to convey organizational viewpoints. The
themes of speeches at such events are noteworthy and the
oral transmission of union messages is an especially
important medium because among the three unions'
memberships are many people with limited formal education,
people who speak limited English and read virtually no
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English, as well as people who are not necessarily
accustomed to a great deal of reading. Therefore,
speeches or oral presentations at union activities may be
a primary method of obtaining information for these
members, and oral and slide or video presentations may
indeed be the most effective media for transmitting
content and themes to many union members. In fact, after
realizing the problems of adult illiteracy and its
prevalency among lower paid healthcare workers, 1199
leadership in Boston considered launching a literacy
project in the late 1980's.
Two interesting examples of these presentations are
from 1199's seventh national convention which was held in
Hartford in December, 1987, and a similar presentation at
a delegates assembly in Hartford on December 2, 1988. Both
came from then-Executive Vice President for Organization,
Robert Muehlenkamp and featured a rather sophisticated
radical political-economy orientation. The latter
presentation employed the medium of a narrated slide show.
The written handout which accompanies the slides is
included as Appendix D. (The handout consists of printed
copies of most of the slides).
Muehlenkamp's accompanying oral narrative offers an
analysis of shifts in the economy, the ideology and
policy-orientation of the Reagan administration and the
implications for workers, specifically healthcare workers,
with the conclusion that unionization is the most impor-
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tant vehicle to address the problems. Far from being
simplistic in orientation, in order to buttress its main
argument, the presentation offers comparisons of unemploy-
ment rates and social welfare spending in different Wes-
tern countries with varying degrees of union strength.
Despite the valid problem of ensuring that the
majority of 1199 members who hear such a presentation will
comprehend it in its entirety and remember its fine
points, it is a genuine attempt at distilling complicated
material for use by average workers and arming them with
sophisticated arguments. More fundamentally, the
presentation represents the type of analysis which informs
1199's praxis and the message its leadership attempts to
impart to members.
Within its meetings, conferences and union
literature, 1199 regularly invokes the memory and words of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who participated in 1199
campaigns during his life, and it also maintains a
relationship with Coretta Scott King. The 1987 convention
kit contained a tape cassette of two of King's speeches,
one of which was delivered at an 1199 function in March,
1968. Inasmuch as this union often characterizes its
mission as a type of extension of the civil rights
movement into the economic sphere, locally and nationally
it allies with various civil rights organizations, as well
as with coalitions and organizations concerned with
American foreign policy.
In recent years 1199 has cultivated a relationship
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with Jesse Jackson and was one of the only national labor
unions to endorse him in his 1988 presidential campaign.
Many of the Jackson campaign themes have been incorporated
into the 1199 repertoire. During Jackson's campaign stops
in Hartford, 1199 leaders and' staff were integrally
involved in organizing and moderating rallies.
In April, 1987 1199's national leadership bucked the
AFL-CIO's objections and joined in the sponsorship and
mobilization for a national demonstration in Washington,
D.C. against U.S. policy in Central America and Southern
Africa. An emphasis on activism and social justice is
quite pervasive in most of 1199's activities and
publications, consonant with its left-wing heritage (see
Greenberg and Fink, 1989).
Many of the organizers on the staff of HERE Local 217
likewise are from activist backgrounds and they also view
their work as extenions of social movements, including the
civil rights and women's movements, as well as community
organizing. Union issues are often framed to members as
questions of power and the results of class- or power
relationships in the larger society. Efforts to ally
their union issues with larger civil rights issues were
evident in the 1988 Yale University labor negotiations.
As noted above, Local 217 leadership helped to build
and now works collaboratively with the Yale University
unions, HERE Locals 34 and 35. Local 217 also has
significant membership in New Haven, as well as in
213
Hartford. When the Yale locals were on the verge of a
strike at the university in 1988, one of the strategies
they opted for was to invite Jesse Jackson to come to
their assistance and speak at a large community support
rally on the Yale campus. Jackson, of course,
benefitted from his appearance: through this activity
Jackson was able to cultivate a relationship with one more
segment of the labor movement and secure the support of
these unions in his presidential campaign. The
relationship of civil rights and labor issues was also
stressed when Local 217 struck the Hartford Sheraton in
1987 by garnering support from Hartford Mayor Carrie
Saxon Perry who in her speeches at the various rallies
stressed these themes.
The UAW regional organization is able to draw upon
the prominence and the resources of its parent
international union in delivering an organizational point
of view and one facet of its regional educational
apparatus is to take advantage of the international's
facility in northern Michigan, the Walter and May Reuther
Family Education Center at Black Lake, Michigan. Every
year UAW members from different locals within Region 9A
take part in the educational programs offered at Black
Lake which constitute the formal UAW national educational
programs. Educational programs are also offered by the
Region 9A office. However, there are also the more
informal ideological and educational avenues, including
the speakers at various meetings and rallies, particularly
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in the political activities of the CAP Council.
During the Colt strike, national UAW speakers who
were featured at the major local rallies from
International President Owen Beiber to the late
International Secretary-Treasurer Raymond Majerus
consistently emphasized progressive social democratic
themes similar to those in the union's various printed
materials. As one would expect, the speakers would decry
the corporate greed of Colt and other union-busting
employers and the tedious NLRB processes, but also they
would recount the need for national solutions to economic
problems consistent with the policies outlined in their
publications, as well as the necessity of political
involvement of the strikers and their allies.
The UAW message is not framed in as radical a
rhetoric as is 1199's perhaps, but it does draw upon and
distill the industrial policy literature of the mid 1980s
which has become familiar to graduate students in the
political economy or industrial relations fields. Again,
how much of the written material the average worker may
comprehend is difficult to estimate, yet many Colt
strikers who were active in union-sponsored events during
the strike were quite capable of articulating the
relationship between their experience and the national
political-economic climate.
Estimating the Impact of Union.Messages: The Colt
strikers are a segment of UAW Region 9A's membership who
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relied heavily on the support and resources of the union
structure beyond the local level from both the regional
and international levels of the organization. The union
was an organization paramount in their lives and,
regardless of their level of union participation before
the strike, as a group they developed an intense loyalty
to the UAW. This loyalty found expression in the media
coverage afforded the strike, for example, a Hartford
Courant Northeast Magazine article of August 27, 1989,
"Shot From Guns" (Brodner, 1989) which recounted the
stories of individual strikers. One might therefore
expect that these strikers would either share or absorb
and adopt many of the ideas or themes which are prominent
in UAW publications and articulated by UAW leadership.
Proving such an assertion is difficult. However, we may
derive some preliminary notions on the opinions of the
strikers from a research project undertaken by Marc
Lendler in 1989 on the changing authority structures in
the lives of the Colt strikers. Part of his research
involved a survey administered to 253 strikers in the
spring of 1989. The survey was administered randomly to
strikers who attended one of the weekly membership
meetings during April, 1989. At these meetings, strikers
received their $100 per week strike benefits and were
brought up to date on strike-related events.
The answers to several of Lendler's questions
regarding political participation reveal a high percentage
of respondents who voted in the 1988 presidential
216
election, 87%, and of those who voted, 92.6% voted for
Dukakis. This compared to a statewide poll of Connecticut
union members conducted by the University of Connecticut's
Institute for Social Inquiry in which 55% of respondents
(N=106) voted for Dukakis. When asked to assess Reagan's
presidency, 71.5% of the Colt striker survey respondents
felt that he was a "poor" president, 22.2% felt he was
"only fair", while only 5.0% felt he was a "good"
president and 1.3% felt he was "very good". Although these
results are not surprising given the strikers'
experiences, they do demonstrate a consistency with the
themes emphasized by the UAW in its various media.
The survey results also suggest that involvement in
the strike stimulated new and greater levels of political
participation among some of the strikers. Respondents
reported an increasing level of contact with government
officials during the course of the strike as compared to
before: 36.9% reported that they had written or spoken to
a government official once or twice during the strike;
12.2% reported they had such contact "many times", with
50.9% reporting they never had contact with government
officials during the strike. This compares to 20.1%
reporting one or two contacts with government officials
before the strike, 7.5% reporting many contacts and 73.4%
never having contact with government officials before the
strike. The combination of the union leadership's
guidance and urging, coupled with what became obvious
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necessity during the strike--the pursuit of political
avenues--most likely produced these results. However,
Lendler's survey provides some indication that the rank-
and-file strikers and their union leadership's assessment
of the situation were shared.
Political Strategies, Membership Mobilization and
External Relationships in Pursuit of Goals
The unions upon which this research is focused
employ a variety of strategies to achieve their goals.
Rallies, marches, picketing, lobbying, civil disobedience,
targetting of specific public officials, and other
techniques are utilized. Many strategies can be
predicted: all of the unions establish picket lines during
strikes; all three hold rallies and call upon other unions
to attend and contribute financially to strike efforts;
all three. interact with political officials on their
respective issues. Yet in certain instances, these unions
have used rather bold tactics, both in terms of the risks
union members were willing to take and the possible
outcomes which might result from the actions. Several
dimensions of the various strategies are analyzed below in
order to understand both the rationales and the impact of
strategic choices, as well as how these might be
considered innovations which attempt to meet the current
challenges these unions face.
The Use of Protest: In a number of situations, the
unions used protest tactics in a manner which corresponds
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to Lipsky's (1970) model of protest described in the
introductory chapter whereby "reference publics" are
activated on protest targets. However, protest was also
utilized as a means of exerting pressure on the targets
directly. For example, in the spring of 1989, 1199 was
involved in contract negotiations with the State of
Connecticut for 7000 state healthcare workers. The
negotiations would eventually be resolved through binding
arbitration, but leading up to that point, the union
leadership wanted to facilitate membership participation
and present a militant, determined stance to the State's
negotiators. Accordingly, the union sponsored several
demonstrations in the area around the State Capitol
building and state office buildings in Hartford. During
one demonstration, the 1199 members blocked traffic and
sat down in the middle of a busy intersection in front of
the Capitol. In another, they burned a copy of the
State's last contract offer which was being submitted to
the arbitrator as the State's final position.
In these instances, the union was attempting several
things simultaneously: maintaining the membership's vocal
involvement and participation; exerting pressure on the
state bureaucracy; however, not altogether alienating the
Governor who might ultimately insert himself in the
negotiations with favorable results for the union. This
delicate balancing finally resulted in an arbitration
award that the union considered acceptable.
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The UAW conducted several marches at the State
Capitol directed at the Governor during the course of the
Colt strike. One march called on him to use his office to
bring the two parties together for negotiations. Governor
O'Neil had intervened in other strikes, but generally when
the possibility for a settlement was at hand, for example,
at an 1199 strike at Waterbury (Connecticut) Hospital in
the fall of 1986. He apparently perceived no such
possibility in the early months of the Colt strike and,
moreover, had an antagonistic relationship with the UAW
regional director at the time, John Flynn. Flynn was very
active in Democratic Party politics but in leadership of
the rival, more liberal faction associated with LEAP.
The UAW leadership felt that O'Neil's lack of involvement
until much later when the company was being sold stemmed
from these political differences and, accordingly O'Neil
became a type of ancillary target in the strike.
In public statements, UAW leadership constantly
challenged O'Neil to help settle the strike. In 1989,
another demonstration took place at the State Capitol
after the union discovered that the State of Connecticut
continued to purchase weapons from Colt for its law
enforcement personnel, despite a national AFL-CIO
sponsored boycott of Colt Firearms and a Conecticut
General Assembly resolution urging the pentagon not to
purchase Colt products until the strike was resolved.
These demonstrations were.readily attended by strikers who
had'grown very critical of and felt great animosity toward
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O'Neil for perceived inaction on their behalf.
The UAW and - 1199 enjoyed very different
relationships with the Governor during his tenure in
office. 1199 often held demonstrations at state offices
and, in fact, once conducted a sit-in at the Department of
Mental Retardation central office which resulted in
arrests. However, O'Neil, himself, was rarely the target
of the demonstrations. Rather it was the Legislature,
Commissioners of various state agencies, the Budget
office, and other targets--not the Governor, personally.
This enabled the Governor to intervene and "fix" certain
situations at the 11th hour. For example, O'Neil's
intervention just before threatened strikes at community
mental health and mental retardation facilities which
subcontracted from the state produced settlements instead
of strikes in 1987 and 1990.
1199 leadership attributes O'Neil's cooperation to
the fact that he knew, based on experience, that 1199
would strike if it needed to and therefore he respected
the union's threats, as well as its power. Moreover, 1199
members work in state agencies and in organizations which
received state funding, worksites which, if struck, would
wreak havoc for the state bureaucracy and bring criticism
to the leadership of state government. In contrast, the
UAW's relationship with O'Neil was not nearly as complex:
except for the jai alai players, UAW members did not work
under O'Neil's direct or indirect chain of command, and
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therefore his action or inaction in the Colt strike
remained confined to that one situation, without the
lasting implications which his actions with 1199 might
signify.
While HERE 217 has few occassions to make the State
government or the Governor a direct target in their
various struggles, they utilize the resource of protest
very much in the vane of Lipsky's model in the course of
organizing, negotiations and strike activities. During
one set of negotiations with the Hartford Sheraton Hotel,
union leaders sat in and were arrested at the main
entrance to Aetna Insurance which holds part interest in
the hotel. The banks and insurance companies
headquartered in Hartford seem especially averse to
demonstrations taking place in front of their buildings
and the use of such a tactic by HERE does not go unnoticed
by' corporate officers who potentially can influence the
process of contract negotiations at the hotel.
Political Channels: Besides protest, the unions also
engage in more "routine" political action to pursue
objectives. This area has been discussed in previous
sections, however, in short it can be stated that
leadership of all three unions believe that political
involvement is necessary in the course of their agenda.
HERE is substantially less active than either 1199
or the UAW and is not affiliated with LEAP. The UAW is
thoroughly committed to political action and strongly
endorses the LEAP model to the point of helping to expand,
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financially back, and cultivate the model in other parts
of the country.
1199 is likewise heavily involved in both political
action and LEAP, although its New England president
cautions against over-involvement in political work at the
expense of basic shop activities. However, in pursuit of
any specific union goal or in the course of solving any
particular union issue, 1199 regularly uses political
channels, mobilizing members to contact and lobby public
officials, and turn out in en masse for hearings and other
public meetings. HERE likewise mobilizes members to
lobby, attend hearings and other'similar events. Both the
UAW and 1199 have full-time lobbyists among their staff,
while HERE does not assign any staffperson that exclusive
role.
Inter-Union and Intra-Labor Movement Relationships:
The last area for discussion under the topic of strategies
to achieve goals is that of inter-union and internal labor
movement relationships and how these relationships
facilitate or impede goal attainment. This can be analyzed
both in terms of the formal organizational structures and
relationships which exist within the labor movement as
well as the norms or values which are articulated as labor
movement values and in a sense serve as standards by which
actions and behavior are evaluated. The example of a
strike situation is a useful illustration.
Unions in the area who are conducting strikes often
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contact either the Greater Hartford Central Labor Council
or the Connecticut State Labor Council, or both. As their
names suggest, these bodies are federations or coalitions
of unions and are local and state arms of the AFL-CIO
organization. Individual union locals or their various
statewide organizations affiliate to these bodies and pay
per capita dues based on membership levels. However, if
a union is not affiliated with the AFL-CIO nationally,
they cannot affiliate with local and state labor councils.
Conversely, a union may affiliate nationally with the AFL-
CIO, but not with the local or state levels of
organization. This was the case with the UAW in
Connecticut, who, until 1990, did not affiliate with
either the Connecticut or Hartford labor councils even
though its International union is affiliated nationally
with the AFL-CIO.
Once a striking union contacts a local labor
council, various things can happen from monetary
collections to mass picketing or rallies which are
attended by other union members to contact with. public
officials or other tactics. If the labor council
participates in any existing community-labor alliance,
that body may be approached. The activities during the
Colt strike which are outlined in the previous chapter are
clear examples. Unions expect such assistance because it
is articulated as part of the raison d'etre of such
councils. Moreover, the norm or value of labor solidarity
motivates participation and such slogans as "an injury to
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one is an injury to all" are often seen on the placards or
buttons of participants. Union members from other locals
who attend or contribute to these efforts do so both to
help fellow unionists and because they want to count on
reciprocal assistance if they go on strike.
Besides strike support, state and local labor
councils may be called upon to provide assistance during
organizing drives and they also engage in community
service and political action programs. Political action
activities sometimes generate controversy and division
when different unions back different candidates vying for
the same office. Although the following example took
place before the timeframe of this research, it is
painfully remembered by many labor activists and
demonstrates some past division among the three unions in
this project.
In 1982 when Connecticut's Republican Senator Lowell
Weicker was being challenged for re-election by liberal
then-Democratic Congressman Toby Moffett, 1199 and the UAW
both vigorously backed Moffett while HERE backed Weicker.
The AFL-CIO was so divided at its annual convention in
which political endorsements are made that the Weicker
forces were able to block the body from making any
endorsement in the race. The 1990 gubernatorial race in
Connecticut in which Weicker ran as an Independent against
the liberal Democratic Congressman Bruce Morrison and
conservative Republican Congressman John Rowland produced
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another no endorsement policy by the AFL-CIO, but with a
different configuration of forces. In 1990, 1199 chose to
back Weicker, despite the endorsement by the rest of the
LEAP forces, including the UAW, of Morrison. That
endorsement was greeted with great disappointment by other
liberal-left forces (Bass, 1990).
Besides working through the AFL-CIO, unions also
approach eachother on an individual basis for support and
attempt joint strategies with specific common employers.
For example, both HERE 217 and the UAW-affiliated IJAPA
have members who work at the jai alai fronton in Hartford.
During the course of the IJAPA strike, although the HERE
217 members have a no-sympathy strike clause in their
contract, various information has been shared and
sometimes joint strategies developed to deal with state
gaming agencies who regulate jai alai. However, even more
coordination could have been attempted had both sides
agreed. This is one small example of how various unions
work with eachother. Other examples include pension
coordination and pay equity projects among state employee
unions in which 1199 participates, as well as a range of
community services activities.
Within this span of inter-union contacts there are
many points of contention and sometimes the disagreements
or rivalries become quite intense. This is especially
true of contested elections for AFL-CIO offices or floor
fights at conventions on controversial resolutions.
Additionally, the division within the Democratic Party
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between the more conservative faction and the progressive
LEAP faction also serves to divide the labor movement in
its political activities.
One manifestation of these divisions related to
continued AFL-CIO support for the Colt strike during its
four year duration. Throughout the strike the UAW was not
affiliated with the Connecticut State AFL-CIO and when
rallies were set or fundraising appeals circulated,
occassionally complaints would be heard at labor council
meetings over giving continual assistance to a union which
was not part of the AFL-CIO in Connecticut.
The internal labor movement divisions which are most
significant in terms of of this research are those which
revolve around overall philosophy and vision of unions
and the labor movement as a whole. The three unions of
this study are among the activist unions which embrace
both a larger, progressive social mission for the labor
movement and an active, aggressive role for individual
unions responding to the contemporary climate of
industrial relations. This brings them not infrequently
into conflict with the more conservative elements of the
AFL-CIO.
Strikes and Corporate Campaigns
Risks and the Unfair Labor Practice Strike: There is
probably nothing more risky in this era for unions than a
strike. As described earlier, a strike over economic
issues alone is exceptionally difficult to win.
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Increasingly, unions are using the strategy of filing
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB against
companies they strike. The intent is to transform
economic strikes into unfair labor practices strikes in
order to legally protect strikers' jobs from being filled
by permanent replacements if the charges are sustained
through an NLRB trial. However, this strategy also
involves risk: there is no guarantee that a union will
win its case in the trial and the timeframe involved
usually is quite lengthy. The NLRB trial in the Colt
strike took over six months to conduct and the decision
was not rendered until more than one year later.
The Lockout: An auxilliary aspect of the legal route
of the unfair labor practice strike which sometimes helps
to enable strikers to receive unemployment benefits
involves the strike being designated as a lockout.
Generally after some length of time on strike, the union
makes an offer to return to work under the terms of the
previous contract. If the company refuses, the union
appeals to the state labor department to have the strike
declared a lockout. In the case of a lockout, the workers
who are refused by the company from working may be
eligible for unemployment compensation and the amount of
the unemployment benefit is generally greater than any
union's strike benefit. Such a turn of events generally
strengthens the case of the union with the NLRB since the
union can claim that by not accepting the workers back,
the company was not bargaining in good faith, an unfair
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labor practice. This strategy was pursued successfully
during the Colt strike and in some of the 1199 strikes.
Replacement Workers: One of the most critical
factors which makes strikes so difficult in recent years
is the ease with which replacement workers have been
hired. Winning a strike by setting up a picket line and
expecting to halt production or service provision because
no one will cross the line is now a virtual illusion for
many segments of the labor movement, especially in
situations where strikers are not engaged in highly
skilled work.
Besides the capacity of firms in the manufacturing
sector to move production activity to other sites, struck
companies may take advantage of firms who recruit
strikebreakers from other states, rendering the concept
community solidarity meaningless. Moreover, since the
labor movement has undergone significant membership
erosion in the past decade and unionized worksites have
ceased operations in many cities, large segments of the
workforce--particularly younger workers--have no
experience with unions and lack an understanding of the
ethos of the labor movement around strikebreaking.
Companies can exploit this situation quite readily.
Another example from the Colt strike demonstrates this
phenomenon.
Colt Firearms had approached the City of Hartford
for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to
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assist in modernizing the Hartford plant before the onset
of the strike. The company refused, however, to guarantee
job slots for Hartford residents in exchange for the
funding. The UAW supported the City's insistance on jobs
for Hartford residents. However, once the strike began,
Colt began recruiting replacement workers from among
Hartford's unemployed and underemployed populations,
particularly in the African American and Puerto Rican
communities, the very residents the City wanted Colt to
hire under the terms of the CDBG funding. The City
decided to hold up any approval for CDBG funds until the
strike was settled. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
the union and the Community Labor Alliance were
simultaneously approaching the neighborhood organizations
and urging them to educate their constituencies about the
issues of the strike. These constituencies included many
individuals who had no experience with unions and simply
saw an opportunity for employment.
The Corporate Campaign: Since it is so difficult to
win a strike on the picket line alone, besides the
strategy of the unfair labor practice strike, unions are
also embracing what has become known as the corporate
campaign. The term was first associated with the
methodology of a particular individual, Ray Rogers, who
worked with the J.P. Stevens boycott and Hormel strikers.
It is now used more generically to refer to a strategy
which attempts to discredit the struck company within the
larger community and which also targets the company's
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financial base of support through such tactics as
boycotts, attempting to halt third party payments or
government funding and contracts, pressuring the company's
financiers, clients or customers, and amassing political
pressure on the company to settle, and other similar
activities.
The previous chapter discussed in some detail many
activities undertaken during the Colt strike which conform
to this outline of the corporate campaign strategy and
will not be repeated here. However, both 1199 and HERE
217 also employ this type of strategy in the course of
their strikes of recent years. 1199 members at Kimberly
Hall Nursing Home in Windsor, Connecticut, just north of
Hartford, began a strike on February 14, 1990, which
remains unsettled as of this writing in late 1990.
The union leadership and the Kimberly Hall members
knew that this strike would be exceedingly difficult: the
home is the only unionized home of over 30 owned by the
Genesis Corporation and the corporation seemed determined
to break 1199. The union had completed negotiations with
29 nursing homes during the winter of 1989-90 and this was
the only home which would not settle for the same basic
pattern accepted by the other 28. Several workers crossed
the picket line and replacements were also hired. The
union leadership quickly decided to attack on as many
other fronts as possible besides the picket line. State
legislators were contacted; Hartford's mayor convened a
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Citizens for Justice for Kimberly Hall Strikers Committee;
other Genesis homes in the area were picketed as well as
shopping areas near these homes were leafletted.
Legislators in Pennsylvania, where Genesis corporate
headquarters are located, were sent mailings about the
strike. The union also pressured the State Health
Department to closely monitor health standards in the
facility. During the summer of 1990, 1199 decided to take
down its picket line and await the results of the NLRB
trial. While to date the strike remains unsettled, these
are the types of tactics which the union feels it must
employ to attempt to win.
Buyouts and Employee Ownership Options: The
settlement of the Colt strike was fashioned upon a unique
set of circumstances which were never envisioned in the
early years of the strike. As the strike wore on and the
union's demands to halt Pentagon contracts until the
strike was settled actually took the form of the Defense
Department awarding a contract for the M16 rifle to a
competitor, it became clear that Colt was experiencing
financial hardship. In April, 1989, Colt Industries
announced that it was putting the Firearms Division up for
sale. The union first pursued a strategy of developing a
proposal solely on its own for an employee ownership plan,
but was later approached by an investor, Anthony Autorino.
He asked them to consider a joint plan with other private
investors and the State of Connecticut who would be
involved through the investment of pension funds. After
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months of extremely complicated negotiations, the deal was
consumated in March, 1990.
The new company which emerged, Colt Manufacturing
Company, signed a collective bargaining agreement with UAW
Local 376, who also would have 11% interest in the
company. The settlement included raises and health
benefits which would be fully paid by the company, two
unsettled issues in 1986 which incited the strike. A $13
million settlement of backpay was agreed to by the union,
with $10 million to be awarded immediately and $3 million
in three years, assuming the new company would be
profitable. This backpay award is the largest in the
history of the National Labor Relations Board.
The union takes immense pride in the settlement,
something many even in the labor movement in Connecticut
never expected to see. The model of part ownership by the
union members, public pension fund involvement, and
private investment will undoubtedly be studied and perhaps
replicated elsewhere if appropriate factors converge.
However, the entire venture is tremendously risky: first
there is the problem of resecuring Defense Department
contracts in the era of new patterns and levels of defense
spending. Next is the issue of the movement for greater
gun control. Since its opening, Colt Manufacturing has
been embroiled in controversy over the sale of modified
assault weapons to the public and has attempted to
maintain production of its Sporter rifle in the midst of
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the call for the banning of such weapons.
There is also the critical issue of former strikers
working with the former strikebreakers who were kept on
the payroll of the new company. Shopfloor interaction
between these two groups during the first few months of
operation of the new company has been tense. Add to this
the readjustment of workers who have been on a picket
line, outside the regimentation and authority of factory
operation for four years, as well as some division between
different groups of former strikers and the prospects for
success of the new company become uncertain. Even though
the strike is formally settled and the new company employs
the former strikers, the effects of the strike will
continue for a number of years as this new company
cautiously carves out its existence.
Brinksmanship: In some situations, unions find
themselves using brinksmanship strategies to attempt to
achieve settlements. Both 1199 and HERE are often the
subject of media coverage with a theme of "it's down to
the wire" before threatened strike deadlines at worksites
such as hospitals, groups homes, hotels or the jai alai
fronton, respectively. HERE in 1987 faced the possibility
of strikes in three downtown Hartford hotels whose
contracts had been negotiated purposely to expire at
common deadlines so that the pressure of prospective
strikes at major hotels for business clients would induce
settlements. Last minute settlements were obtained with
two of the three hotels and a four month strike ensued
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at the Hartford Sheraton.
1199 has used a brinksmanship approach in
combination with pattern bargaining very publically in
recent years with both its nursing home division and its
private sector/community based mental health and
retardation division. Its 29 separate nursing home
contracts have been negotiated to expire at roughly common
deadlines, as have contracts for 14 private sector mental
health and retardation facilities and group homes. One of
the key factors for both divisions is that the employers
in each division rely on reimbursements from various state
agencies. As mentioned earlier, the union leadership knows
that the state can ill afford the chaos which strikes in a
large number of either nursing homes or group homes would
bring and the union therefore enjoys a decided advantage
in such negotiation scenarios. Both in late 1989 with the
nursing homes and in the summer of 1990 with the group
homes, the union faced the prospect of strikes in over a
dozen facilities at once. In both situations state
funding was guaranteed and strikes were averted in all but
one nursing home, Kimberly Hall, and in all of the private
sector mental health and retardation facilities.
Both sets of negotiations were preceeded by large
spirited membership meetings of the respective divisions
of 1199 where union members voiced overwhelming support
for the strike option, if necessary. The meeting of
private sector workers even included clients from group
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homes for the retarded, providing a poignant scene for the
media of the closeness which exists between the workers
and their clients and the concern the workers experienced
in feeling forced to consider striking. As a healthcare
union, 1199 regularly attempts to highlight quality-of-
care issues, i.e. staffing patterns, in its public
relations efforts surrounding strikes or potential
strikes, however the media does not always feature this
aspect of situations.
The gamble with this brinksmanship is that the
tactic may force a union into an impossible strike like
the Kimberly Hall situation, and eventually it may lose.
In situations faced by HERE where no state funds are
involved, strikes may either eventually close down an
establishment such as a restaurant or may result in the
end of the union shop at the site. In recent years 1199
has endured several strikes at nursing homes which ended
in the facilities being closed by the State or closing
due to problems with financing. The unions feel that
occassionally this may be a very unfortunate necessity if
they are ultimately to have power to improve conditions
for their members at other institutions.
Summary: Membership Mobilization
The centerpiece of any union's work is what is done
to involve and serve its membership. The articulation of
a union's mission and the philosophies and strategies
which inform and guide its activities are critically
important aspects of how workers experience union
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membership. Within the labor movement the distinction
between those unions who envision their role as one of
empowerment and those who define their role as providing
a service to members is becoming a basis of deepening
division. In varying degrees, I would assert that the
three unions being studied in this project fall on the
empowerment side of the dichotomy, however, as analyzed in
this section, their risks and challenges are still
formidable and, they do suffer significant defeats nonethe-
less.
Empowerment in this instance may be interpretted in
a number of ways: these unions all attempt to organize
unorganized workers and are devising the new methodologies
described in the first section of this chapter, forging
models that other unions are also adopting. These unions
also pursue as vigorously as possible raises in wages and
improvements in working conditions during collective
bargaining and will still go on strike as a last resort,
rather than capitulate to terms they consider
unacceptable. They will employ protest when necessary,
and also participate in electoral strategies which are not
failsafe. Perhaps most of all, they can be characterized
as unions with leadership who are willing to take
significant risks to advance their members' interests.
Many of labor's struggles are no longer able to be
won on the basis of the union's own internal resources but
require coordination with other unions, community' forces
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and the formulation of political strategies. These three
unions are each attempting to fashion strategies to meet
the difficulties of the contemporary labor relations
environment through methods such as unfair labor practice
strikes, corporate campaigns, the Colt buyout, new
training activities for members in tackling shopfloor
issues, the use of protest and political leverage in bold
manners and the other examples analyzed here. The next
section will continue to explore how the unions innovate
by examining organizational structural and maintenance
issues.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND MAINTENANCE
Various aspects of the organization of a union may
promote, hinder or in some other way influence how the
union accomplishes its goals. In this section several
dimensions of organizational structure will be anlayzed.
First, the organizational structures of the three unions
will be described, not merely to list the details of
structures, but to consider how these structures
facilitate goal attainment. Next, the issues of union
mergers and affiliations will be analyzed. Third,
staffing patterns will be considered, again, with the
purpose of revealing how these patterns relate to mission
and goals. Finally, the important issue of leadership
will be explored.
Organizational Structures
There are many common aspects of union structures:
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stewards, other officers and full-time functionaries, some
type of worksite-based level of organization and, except
in the cases of local independent unions, some form of
affiliation with a larger national/international
structure. However, there are also significant variations
in structures which afford different models of
accountability, degrees of centralization or
decentralization of authority and activity, and degrees of
membership participation in union affairs.
The UAW in Connecticut consists of approximately 15
different union locals which are part of the regional
apparatus of Region 9A. The Constitution of the
International Union spells out various details of how
union locals are to be organized, among them officer
structures, various financial and election procedures and
certain mandated committees. Within these constitutional
provisions, however, each local has a great deal of
autonomy in how it runs its affairs, and locals may adopt
their own by-laws. Strike actions require the sanction
of the International in order for strikers to obtain
strike benefits and other forms of support.
The UAW's regional apparatus is an extension of the
international organization headquartered in Detroit, as is
the role of the Regional Director, who is referred to
interchangeably as an International Executive Board
member. Regional Directors are elected in regional
caucuses at constitutional conventions which take place
every three years. The regional apparatus is not
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envisioned as another layer of organization to which
locals affiliate which then affiliates to the
International: rather the regional apparatus is the
International union and therefore, the Regional Director
can be a pivotal actor in certain situations in terms of
the direction of the union. In spite of the automony of
UAW locals, who at times may remain aloof from the
regional apparatus and carry on their affairs without much
consultation, the Regional Director has important
authority especially around strike matters. The situation
in Regional 9A in the beginning of the Colt strike vividly
demonstrates this issue.
When UAW Local 376 struck Colt Industries in
January, 1986, the Regional Director of 9A at that time
was E.T. "Ted" Barrett. The president of the local at
the time was Phil Wheeler. Wheeler and Barrett had
differed over a number of years, particularly over
Barrett's leadership style, his notions of membership
participation, and the degree of assistance offered to
locals by the Regional office. Although the strike at
Colt received the sanction of the International union,
Wheeler did not expect more than minimal assistance from
Barrett in what he knew would be a difficult and lengthy
strike. In order for the strike to have better chances
for success, the effort would need the full backing of the
Regional Director to obtain the full resources of the
International, including access to the International's
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legal, research and public relations divisions, as well as
the capacity to make the strike a national priority of
the union.
The constitutional convention of the UAW was set for
June of 1986. Early in the year, Region 9A CAP Director
John Flynn announced his candidacy for Regional Director.
Local 376 endorsed Flynn and participated in Flynn's
successful campaign for the position, a campaign which
emphasized the need to assist the Colt strike. Once
elected, Flynn, who had less experience with negotiations
and other shop issues than in the political action sphere,
appointed Wheeler as Assistant Regional Director. The
Assistant Regional Director position would assume greater
prominence under Wheeler's tenure than was the case in
previous administrations due to his experience with the
more technical aspects of trade unionism, aspects which
were often the basis of calls for assistance from union
locals. Wheeler felt that from his new position he could
provide greater assistance to the strike effort than as
the local president by marshalling support both within the
region and the International.
In 1989, Flynn retired and Wheeler ran for Regional
Director. After minimal initial opposition, Wheeler
handily won unamimous election. He has Continued to carry
out Flynn's political action agenda along the LEAP
tradition and directed the process of union involvement in
the buy-out of Colt and the end of the strike. Had Flynn
lost the 1986 bid, the entire course of events which
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culminated in the end of the Colt strike might have
transpired in a vastly different direction without the
crucial support of the. International union, and high
levels of tension might have existed between the Local 376
and the International. In this instance, the backing of
the Regional office was critical and the change in
regional leadership was an important factor in the
eventual settlement.
One other feature of TAW structure which exists in
almost every other international union is that there are
two types of union locals, locals which represent workers
in only one shop or or one employer with several sites,
and amalgamated locals which represent workers at
different employers, generally smaller workforces. This
affords unions "economies of scale" in dealing with
smaller workplaces or those where the workforce is
undergoing reductions. In situations where a workforce
has been reduced significantly, a local which was
chartered for one worksite alone may merge into an
amalgamated local to maximize union resources.
The district structure of 1199 in New England
resembles one large amalgamted local in that there are no
separate union locals. Rather, each worksite has a
separate chapter but without the automony and
constitutional or legal status of the locals of the UAW.
The major unit of organization within 1199 historically
has been the district level and this is the only level
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below the national level set forth in the constitution of
the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees,
AFL-CIO which was in effect until the merger with SEIU.
There is a district-wide executive board comprised of
rank-and-file members who are elected by worksites.
The district structure traces to the time when 1199
was a local of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union (RWDSU) and the membership was entirely within New
York City. As the union grew outside the metropolitan New
York area, the old Local 1199 subdivided, but into
districts which were still technically divisions of the
local. The merger with SEIU will require certain types of
reorganization and the district structure of 1199 will
likely be modified, although exactly what will emerge is
not yet totally defined and may not be for several years.
The district structure affords maximization of
certain resources such as organizing and support staff,
office and technical functions, educational programs and
other central functions. It also offers a more
centralized authority structure which can be important
when dealing with employers. It would not make sense, for
example, for each large state institution to have its own
local and bargain separately for salaries and other
matters when the personnel structure is one statewide
system for all comparable state institutions. Likewise,
the success in nursing home or private sector contract
negotiations would be much more difficult with separate
locals in each facility. Each chapter, however, does
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ratify the contract which is negotiated with its
individual employer. One major benefit of the district
structure, therefore,. is the greater level of
coordination.
Critics of such union structures maintain that
large amalgamated organizations may be less democratic
than smaller locals, that leadership in these centralized
structures possess inordinate power, and that the large
union organizations may become bureaucratic. 1199 in New
England has grown dramatically in membership over the past
15 years, especially after winning the right to represent
State of Connecticut health care employees in 1978, and
has had to develop an organizational structure to
accommodate this growth and the ensuing complexities of
serving members in the State bureaucracy.
Fifteen years ago the entire district staff of 1199
in New England could meet around a kitchen table and
organizers did all of the different tasks required by the
union. Now there close to 40 people on the district staff
with distinct divisions of responsibilities. Union
leaders maintain that the size and structure need not
interfere with union democracy if the membership is
activiated to maintain involvement in union affairs and
if the leadership stays in touch with the wishes of the
members. Since 1199 in New England became a separate
district of the National Union, during district elections
the offices of president, vice presidents and secretary-
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treasurer have not been seriously challenged. However,
slots on the Executive Board which are filled by active
rank-and-file members are sometimes contested.
HERE's structure in the Hartford area combines
elements of both the UAW and 1199. Local 217 is an
amalgamated local with members in Hartford, New Haven,
other Connecticut cities, Rhode Island and parts of
Massachusetts. When the Yale workers were organized,
separate locals were chartered in order to effectively
serve the concentration and specific needs of the
membership at that institution. Local 217 has a staff
which varies from 5 to 8 people, assigned to work either
on internal organizing in several different geographic
areas or to new external organizing. External organizing
is sometimes undertaken by a team of Local 217 and Local
34 organizers, an example of the cooperation between 217
and the Yale locals. As with 1199, each different
worksite has its own union committee and "house" meetings
of stewards are held monthly at the various worksites.
These different structures afford different degrees
of autonomy for the union organization at the worksite
level which in and of itself is neither positive or
negative. All three unions are tending toward larger units
of organization. Even within the UAW, most new organizing
results in the newly organized members joining an existing
amalgamated local rather than being chartered as a new
local. Within both HERE and the UAW, new locals are
chartered generally at large employers such as Yale or for
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new types of workers with unique issues such as the jai
alai players. However, college maintenance workers at the
University of Hartford who recently organized with the UAW
became part of UAW Local 376. Likewise in HERE with Fall
River (Massachusetts) Inn workers who organized in 1988
and became members in Local 217. If there is any trade-
off to be made, both union resource issues as well as the
issue of strength in numbers tend to out-weigh issues of
autonomy. The tendency toward larger units of organization
also is manifest in the patterns of mergers and
affiliations engaged in by these unions which will be
examined next.
Mergers and Affiliations
The patterns of mergers and acquisitions of
corporations have been the subject of much analysis and
scrutiny in recent years. Concentration of capital and
ever increasing monopolization of the economy are among
the outcomes of these economic activities (Bluestone and
Harrison, 1982, and Harrison and Bluestone, 1988). Among
certain sectors of the labor movement, in order to
increase their power and consolidate and maximize
resources, a somewhat parallel or analagous process has
begun. Although nowhere near as rapidly propelled as the
activities of corporations, unions are deciding that there
are major advantages in new combininations. Certain
mergers and affiliations unimagineable within the labor
movement as the Reagan era began are now either
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accomplished or under consideration: the Teamsters
reaffiliated with the AFL-CIO, and the American Federation
of Teachers and the National Education Association are
cautiously discussing a possible future merger. The
unions of this study are likewise involved in such
developments.
Mergers: As has been mentioned several times in this
text, 1199-New England's parent union, the National Union
of Hospital and Health Care Employees, formally merged
with Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in 1989.
To be technically more accurate, most of the National
Union merged with SEIU, as will be detailed below. This
merger followed several years of dramatic internal
dissention and division within the national union as the
problem of succession to the founding president of 1199,
Leon Davis, unfolded with as many twists and turns as an
afternoon television soap opera. In the end essentially
three factions of 1199 existed: the New York membership--
the union's original base which had grown to 70,000
members by the late 1980's--which remained affiliated with
RWDSU; the faction of the national union associated with
Henry Nicholas, based mainly in his home district of
Philadelphia and Eastern Pennsylvania, which eventually
merged with the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME); and the faction which took
leadership from the New England district and its
president, Jerome Brown, and National Executive Vice
President Robert Muehlenkamp, roughly 3/4 of the
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National Union, which merged with SEIU.
In 1989, each district of the National Union
conducted a membership.vote to determine whether that
district would affiliate with either AFSCME or SEIU. The
question of merging with another union became a
consideration of the National Union as organizing grew so
difficult in the 1980's and the resources of the National
Union shrank substantially after losing the New York
membership. The National Union was chartered by the AFL-
CIO in 1984, while the New York members remained
affiliated with the RWDSU following the lead of their
president at the time, Doris Turner. Turner had been the
heir apparent to Leon Davis, but increasingly deviated
from the direction which the rest of the national
leadership sought for the union and eventually was voted
out of office after a corruption scandal. Fink and
Greenberg (1989) detail this fascinating and unfortunate
history through 1988.
In the midst of this dissention and fracturing of
the membership and their loyalities, National Union
leadership came to the realization that merger was the
only method of survival and the Brown-Muehlenkamp-led
faction looked toward SEIU as a union which would be able
to absorb the 1199 tradition and methodology most
successfully. SEIU's organization is based on large
amalgamated locals, similar to the HERE 217 model, and
with various modifications will be able to accommodate
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1199's membership and structure. A health care division
of SEIU is being established and much of the former
leadership of 1199's National Union will have leadership
responsibilities in that division. As of mid-1990, many
of the details are not yet formulated, but the general
direction is as described here.
It should be noted that predating the timespan of
this research, a union with a similar heritage as 1199's,
District 65 Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union, also
once a district of the RWDSU, affiliated with the UAW. The
union now refers to itself as District 65 UAW. Under
Barrett's leadership of 9A, District 65's involvement in
UAW affairs was minimal. Since Flynn's tenure and
continuing under Wheeler's, District 65 is becoming
integrated much more fully into the regional apparatus.
The other example from the UAW of a merger is that of
IJAPA, discussed above.
Affiliations: The earlier section on internal labor
movement relationships noted that the UAW prior to 1990
had not been affiliated with the AFL-CIO in Connecticut
for several decades. Although affiliated in other New
England states, there was resistance in Connecticut among
segments of UAW members, particularly those active in the
CAP council. This was partially based on the issue of
finances and the dues which the UAW would be required to
pay to the AFL-CIO, which would of necessity come from
funds previously directed to the CAP Council. There was
also resistance to participating in AFL-CIO Committee on
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Political Education (COPE) procedures and endorsements and
losing the independence of the CAP. After several years
of discussions and negotiations, and upon the completion
of the Colt strike, the UAW did reaffiliate. Again, the
notion of coordinated activities of a more fortified state
labor movement led the UAW to reaffiliate. The UAW will
be an important factor in statewide labor council
elections and will have a substantial impact on future
directions of Connecticut's labor movement.
These examples of mergers and affiliations arise out
of both specific organizational circumstances, and what is
becoming more apparent in the larger labor movement as the
need to consolidate and coordinate resources and
activities. This pattern is something that will merit
close attention in the future to see what is successful in
terms of accomplishing new goals and what tends to merely
create larger but no more effective organizations. One
factor which may be a useful indicator of the utility of
such mergers is the amount of new organizing which is
facilitated by the new arrangements: will mergers indeed
result in new resources sufficient to underwrite major
organizing drives, or will the larger unions merely limp
along and face continued membership erosion?
Staffing Patterns
The variations in union structures also involve
variations in the nature of full-time functionaries, as
well as different officer structures and different models
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of accountability. For example, HERE Local 217 has an
elected President who is rank-and-file activist, but does
not work full-time as a union functionary. It also has an
elected Secretary-Treasurer who does work full-time for
the union and hires and supervises other full-time staff.
The UAW Region 9A headquarters is located in the
Hartford suburb, Farmington, Connecticut, and houses the
Regional Director, Assistant Director, International
Represenatives, a regional CAP Director and Retirees
Director. There are sub-regional offices in Boston and
New York City. International Representatives are hired
and assigned duties by the Director. Typically they are
assigned to functions such as new organizing, education
with locals, staff assistance to locals during
negotiations, strikes and other matters. The total Region
9A staff consists of approximately 15 to 20 people,
depending upon vacancies or extended leaves of absence.
UAW locals may also have various full-time officers,
as well as officers who remain in the shop. For example,
UAW Local 376 has a President who works in the union
office on a full-time basis, a Vice President who is a
Colt worker, a Financial Secretary who works in the union
office full-time, a Recording Secretary who remains in the
shop. The finances of individual locals determine how
many full-time union functionaries may be maintained on
the union local's payroll.
1199's structure in New England includes elected
officers of President, Secretary-Treasurer, six Vice
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Presidents, several elected organizers and additional
organizing staff who are hired by the officers.
Organizers work on one of several teams whose delineation
is based on sectors of the membership: state workers,
other hospital workers, nursing home workers, private
sector health and mental health and retardation workers,
and new organizing. There are area offices in Rhode
Island and Massachusetts where the membership is smaller
and staff members in both places cover a variety of
functions. Each chapter is serviced by an organizer and
organizers typcially have a number of worksites with which
they work. As mentioned earlier, this structure is highly
centralized in comparison to many other unions.
One very important distinction between the UAW
Regional staff and the staffs of 1199 and HERE is that the
International Representatives who work in the 9A office
have a staff union for themselves which bargains with the
regional leadership over salaries and other working
conditions, and can also challenge the actions of the
regional director through a grievance procedure. Such an
arrangement is extremely controversial within the labor
movement. 1199 leadership is vehemently opposed to staff
unionization and maintains that since 1199 staff also all
hold 1199 membership, unionization of the staff would be
unionization against oneself. HERE staff likewise is not
unionized.
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Leadership
One factor in how these unions meet challenges is
extremely unquantifiable, that of individual leadership
qualities and the phenomenon of leadership charisma.
Charisma in this instance includes the knowledge,
judgment, honesty, dauntlessness and commitment which
foster membership confidence and trust. In all three
organizations, certain unique qualities of one or more
leaders have immense impact on the ability of the union to
wage and win struggles.
Certainly within the UAW, one would have to
recognize Phil Wheeler's leadership in this light. The
tenacity of the Colt strikers was in part attributable to
their willingness to follow his direction and their faith
that ultimately he would fashion a way out of their
dilemma. By some estimations the strikers came to rely too
heavily on him, expecting miracles.
Wheeler is a self-taught union leader who worked at
Colt and spent 18 years as President of Local 376. Union
staff members relish relating stories of how he knows
labor law so well that he directs the union lawyers to
pursue strategies the lawyers themselves are unable to
conceive. However, Wheeler is also extremely amenable to
suggestions from forces outside the UAW, as was the case
in the Colt strike. Wheeler is relentless in pursuit of
the goals he believes are appropriate for the union and
there is also a very pragmatic aspect of his leadership
that can engage in the minute technical details of very
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specific plans. Though not formally schooled in radical
political-economy, in many ways he conforms to Gramsci's
notion of the organic intellectual, an individual who
rises to leadership from the ranks of the working class.
The leaderships of 1199 and HERE Local 217 come from
different backgrounds and origins, as activists who
entered the labor movement from a political commitment to
social change. The generation of leadership in both of
these unions today traces to the social activism of the
1960's combined with concrete experiences under the
tutelage of many older activists who helped to build their
respective unions. 1199 New England President Jerome
Brown "apprenticed" with retired 1199 President Leon
Davis; HERE 217 Secretary-Treasurer Henry Tamerin and
other -217 staff with Vincent Sirabella, currently the
Organizing Director of HERE's International. Other
leadership in both unions eminates from rank-and-file
activists, but also largely from the ranks of former
student, community, civil rights and women's movement
activists from the movements of the 1960's and 1970's.
What distinguishes many of these individuals from their
more conservative contemporaries in other unions are both
their more radical ideologies and sense of purpose for the
labor movement, and their personal commitment and efforts,
often long hours for relatively modest salaries.
Through the 1980's, 1199's accomplishments and
methodology have served as yardsticks for many other
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unions and union activists in the area. The collective
talent of its staff is impressive and has fanned out into
other areas: its former Secretary-Treasurer is currently
Deputy Labor Commissioner in Connecticut; a former Vice
President is currently a State Representative; a current
Vice President is Secretary-Treasurer of LEAP. Moreover,
in the midst of the dearth of new organizing of the
1980's, 1199 New England maintained its commitment to
organizing the unorganized and achieved greater success in
their organizing endeavors than most other unions. And
despite some crushing defeats, 1199 has been known as a
union that will "fight the good fight." How this
leadership will come to be regarded after the 1990 Weicker
endorsement may alter substantially.
These very unique sets of leaders influence their
respective unions quite distinctively: from Phil Wheeler
has come the carefully conceived of unfair labor practice
strike strategy and the Colt buyout; from Jerry Brown and
his colleagues have come bold, militant actions both in
strikes and contract negotiations, and new standards of
public employee unionism; from Local 217 has come
militancy and determination to take on some of the most
powerful downtown corporate interests in Hartford and
organize extremely difficult and transient worksites. The
presence of these various actors has an almost
serendipitous quality: it is difficult to imagine the
various successes of these unions without these specific
leaders in their specific roles. In this sense the unique
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or charismatic leader is most definitely an important
factor in understanding how these labor unions fashion
stxategies in the contemporary economic period.
CONCLUSIONS
In many ways the challenges these unions face in the
contemporary labor relations climate feel to their
leaderships as changes in the of degrees of difficulty
they have always encountered. Employers have become more
brazen in their tactics to curb unions' power, but they
have always resisted unionization. The unions therefore
have had to become more steeled in their own
determination. Some of their tactics are more of a "last
resort" type--using the NLRB to win strikes, participating
in a buyout of a company--strategies they would not have
pursued if winning a strike on a picket line alone was
still in any way a possibiity. Other tactics involve more
sophisticated use of activities they have historically
involved themselves in, but which today are more
strategicaly important in their work. An important
example is political action and attempting to insert
themselves more deeply into political processes by
participating in organizations such as LEAP or People for
Change, as well as enhancing their own internal political
action capacities.
One of the most difficult areas for the unions today
is organizing. In the contemporary climate organiting the
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unorganized requires more careful selection of worksites,
refinement of targetting and identifying worksite
leadership and more intense preparation with the
organizing committee. Besides developing the appropriate
models or techniques such as 1199's Blitz or HERE's 1-2-3,
the unions are also challenged to devote sufficient
resources and structure their organizations in such a
manner as to facilitate organizing. All have assigned
specific personnel to this function and/or reorganized
their staffing patterns to accommodate new organizing.
The major problem that the unions face is what was
identified in the literature, reviewed in Chapter 2: the
system of labor law in the United States no longer
facilitates worker organization. The NLRB has ceased to
be a vehicle to ensure workers' rights, but instead is
itself a battleground. Its processes are lengthy and
cumbersome, a factor which alone can dampen organizing
potential and which also is exploited by employers as they
attempt to stall organizing drives. NLRB processes also
tend to prolong any strikes which are being adjudicated
through NLRB trials, and especially if companies are
operating with replacement workers, the union strikers are
placed at a distinct disadvantage. Employers flagrantly
violate labor law with a type of impunity that the lengthy
processes of adjudication allow.
As labor's power has eroded at the labor board, so
has its power with employers and its respect in the
community. Accordingly, what has functioned in the past
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as a community solidarity ethos which mitigates against
strikebreaking has also seriously eroded. Unions are
trying to recapture community support by developing
corporate campaigns and attempting to place their
particular struggles with employers into larger community
contexts through such vehicles as community-labor
alliances.
Responding to these developments requires membership
involvement and cultivation. These unions engage their
shopfloor and worksite leaders in training exercises to
prepare them for shopfloor issues. The memberships hear
organizational points of view which are critical of
corporate power, but the range of ideologies varies among
the three from the UAW's more social democratic themes to
HERE 217's and 1199's more radical articulation of class
relationships. Beyond the themes which are stressed in
organizational activities and publications, opportunities
for involvement are afforded in public events such as
rallies, hearings and political action, and sometimes
disruptive tactics are employed.
Leadership and structure are important aspects in
terms of effectiveness in modern unionism and vary among
the three unions in this study. 1199's centralized
structure affords coordination but vests a great deal
of power in district leadership. HERE 217's amalgamated
structure similarly affords resource maximization. The
autonomy of the UAW's locals offers opportunities for
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different patterns of inteplay between "layers" of the
union, and the Regional Director, similar to 1199-New
England's President or HERE 217's Secretary Treasurer, has
great influence over the course of union issues.
Finally the individual qualities of the leaders,
themselves, significantly shape the directions of the
unions. Based on the different experiences and standards
of judgment used by their respective leaders, these three
unions take somewhat different paths toward their goals of
membership empowerment. Each provides an interesting
example of contemporary unionism and are observed with
great interest in Connecticut's labor movement as well as
the larger movement for social change.
At this point in their history, the types of
adjustments these unions are making to accommodate the
present labor relations climate to some extent resemble a
"treading water" approach--an attempt to simply hold on by
whatever means are available--and in other instances
provide some new models of membership empowerment. Yet,
some of their struggles have to be logged in the "loss"
column.
To return to the Colt stike and the questions raised
in the beginning of this chapter, it appears ironically
that at a time when the system of labor law seems to be
failing unions quite miserably, use of these laws is one
of the only major avenues which remains available to
unions in a number of situations. Another important
avenue is the attempt to recreate a public opinion climate
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which is more supportive of unions, ultimately leading to
legislation which is more supportive of unionization.
Toward this end the community-labor alliances, political
action and other extra-organizational activities,
simultaneously with an activated, involved and adroit
membership are important tools and strategies for union
survival and growth. These strategies and tactics by no
means assure success--these three unions still lose
strikes and elections as do other unions--but they tend to
be among the more creative unions and employ and exhaust a
wider range of options in the course of their struggles.
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NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANI Z ING
Neighborhood organizers in Hartford take great pride
in the degree of community organization which exists in
the city. In many cities, one or several neighborhoods
have some type of commrunity or neighborhood organization,
but most of the city remains unorganized. In Hartford,
the opposite is tie: most areas are within the "turf" of
one of the neighborhood organizations, residents can call
upon the organization and this arrangement encourages more
organization. Not all of the various groups or
associations follow in the Alinsky or neo-Alinsky
tradition, but the three largest, Asylium Hill Organizing
Project ( AHOP), Organized North Easterners - Clay Hill and
North End (ONE-CHANE), and Hartford Areas Rally Together
(HART), in some measure each trace their methodology and
philosophies back to the Alinsky legacy of block-level
organizing, bold confrontational tactics with public and
corporate officials, and the garnering of tangible,
specific victories.
The three Hartford -based organizations have existed
long enough to each evolve along distinct paths,
according to both the needs of the different neighborhoods
in which they function and the orientations of the respec-
tive staffs and local neighborhood leaders. These evolu-
tions, how and to what extent they embody responses to
economic restructuring, and what constitutes the salient
issues for neighborhood organizing will be analyzed in
this chapter. The comparlsons to labor organizing will
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then be offered in the final chapter.
As profiled in the introductory chapter, the logic
of neighborhood organizing as it exists in most locations
and particularly in Hartford is quite different than the
logic of labor organizing. Consequently, this analysis
will emphasize somewhat different facets of the neighbor-
hood organizations than those of labor unions discussed in
the previous chapter. Moreover, all of the categories of
the previous chapter will not be utilized here, but rather
those which most appropriately capture the essence of
neighborhood organizing. Accordingly, comparisons of the
two types of organizing will feature most important
aspects of each type of organizing and not be of a point-
by-point nature.
The first way in which our treatment of neighborhood
organizations will differ from the labor unions is that
instead of separating the organizing of new members and
the work with existing memberships into two distinct
segments , these two categories will be collapsed into one-
This is because for the neighborhood organizations, there
is no formal membership status based on legally defined
procedures such as elections, no payment of dues as a
condition of membershiLp, and virtually no method to
distinguish in any given neighborhood members from non-
members. Essentially, there are only active participants
in issues and campaigns undertaken by the organization.
Therefore, organizing new participants and maintaining the
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interest of the old participants i in reality one
activity, with leadership development receiving a great
deal of emphasis. Moreover, because the work with
participants is that of continual organizing,
organizational structure and maintenance issues have even
more to do with the life of the organizations and take
on even greater importance for the neighborhood groups
than for the unions, as we will attempt to demonstrate.
This analysis, is in the previous chapter, is based on in-
depth interviews, examination of written materials,
participant-observation of numerous events of the
respective organizations, and scores of informal
conversations with staff and participants.
ORGANIZING AND MOBILIZING
Neighborhood organizing in Hartford has realized
many achievements and its success has led to a type of
institutionalization. To understand the development and
methodologies of the three organizations, we will anlayze
who participates and the issues which are focused upon,
how the organizing is effected, the organizational points
of view and philosophies, and the manner in which the
issues addressed by the groups embody responses to
restructuring.
Participants and Issues
When one thinks of community activism, there is
often a mental picture of the 1960's with militant
young people demanding a share of resources and inclusion
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in public decision-making. The activists of Hartford's
neighborhood organizations, however, are a very different
set of actors than those in the picture from the 60's.
Issues addressed by the organizations such as crime and
health care attract property owners, small business people
and senior citizens. Education-related matters draw in
parents, many of whom are young single mothers. Tenant
rights and housing issues bring a range of individuals to
the groups. Participants may be motivated as much by fear
as by the desire to upgrade one's living standards.
In earlier chapters, we discussed the socio-economic
conditions in Hartford and pointed out that while
widespread poverty exists in the city, there is variation
among neighborhoods in terms of degrees of poverty. These
variations are sometimes manifest in the work of the
neighborhood organizations both in relation to who parti-
cipates and the nature of the issues addressed. For
example, ONE-CHANE operates in the northern part of the
city, an area with large concentrations of public housing
(al though ONE-CHANE refrains from organizing in public
housing where active tenants organizations have been in
existence for many years), and whose population is almost
exclusively African American and Puerto Rican, many of
whom are very poor. HART operates in the southern part
of the city which contains the remaining enclaves of
white ethnic groups, a surging Puerto Rican and Latino
population, increasing numbers of African Americans and
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Asians . Al thcugh poverty exists in HART's turf, many of
its neighborhoods are relatively better off than those of
the other two organizations. So while HART activists
attempted to stop the establishment of a "Chucky Chicken"
fast-food/convenience store in order to preserve the
character of a neighborhood during 1989, several years
earlier ONE-CHANE activists attempted to extract
commitments for jobs for area residents from the developer
of a Burger King franchise who opened a restaurant in
their neighborhood.
In the early years of the respective organizations,
a great deal of effort went into establishing block-level
organization, the block club. Staff organizers spent much
of their time going door-to-door, talking to residents,
attempting to ascertain what issues were important to
these residents. Efforts were then made to bring residents
together to discuss problems and define courses of action.
This was and remains a slow, painstaking process. And
although it is still employed by the organizations in some
situations, they now have sufficient histories and track
records to vary their methods. Accordingly, HART now
works more directly with the churches in its
neighborhoods, establishing contact with their clergy and,
through these clergy, the parishioners. The organizations
also make extensive use of the large mailing lists they
have amassed over the years, augmented by telephone
contact, as a method of organizing. Furthermore, now many
community residents approach the organizations with
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problemLs rather than wait for an organizer to come to
their neighborhood.
Within the organizations there are different task
forces, committees and other on-going formations which
devote efforts to specific issues. The individual
activists may change over time and various dimensions of
the issues may alter or evolve so that these committees,
themselves, look quite different from year to year. As an
illustratin, AHOP has been dealing with the issue of
crime essentially since its inception. In the period of
approximately 1987 and 1988, AHOP activists from the
group's anti-crime committee defined the issue around the
demands for more police officers in the neighborhood,
redeployment of police from the Colt picket line to the
neighborhoods, and the deployment and full staffing of
police foot patrols. By 1990, with the crime-drug nexus
producing an escalating public safety crisis, the crime
issue took the form of debate over whether to call the
Guardian Angels into the neighborhood, and a different
group of individuals were involved than those from two to
three years earlier.
One of the prominent methodological aspects of these
organizations is the definition of issues into very
specific and tangible demands which can be fought for and
won. Organizers characterize this as turning a problem
into an issue: a problem may be something extremely
general or global, but an issue is something specific
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around which a group can organize. One of the roles of
the organizer is to help a group delineate an issue or set
of issues from a larger problem. Issues must be amenable
to actions in which the organization articulates
one or more demands. Hence the crime issue becomes
defined in terms of a demand for foot patrols .
Besides being able to win a victory, another
objective of this methodology is that over time the
neighborhood activists should develop more sophisticated
analyses and be able to tackle more complex issues. This
type of growth in analytical ability occurred within
HART's anti-crime committee. When it became apparent that
foot patrols alone would not provide any ultimate solution
to crime, paticipants in the anti-crime committee began to
consider the issue from a more systemic perspective and
developed a comprehensive anti-crime proposal which
combined drug education and treatnent options with youth
recreation programming, community policing and other crime
control measures. It was through the process of working
on the issue with very specific demands that the need for
this broader perspective became apparent to participants
and, moreover, that comprehensive measures were the. best
methods to possibly address crime.
Most issues remain at a more simplified level of
analysis, however. Unless participants stay with issues
over an extended period of time--several years, as
illustrated in the above example--there is a need on the
part of the organizations to distill issues into
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"winnable" items. Moreo'ver, when neighborhood residents
are approached by or call upon organizers, often the
concerns they articulate are of a very parochial, local
nature: the street light that isn't working, the potholes
in the road, the lack of traffic control signs, the
overflowing dumpster down the street, etc. Developing the
capacity of neighborhood residents to move beyond the
"street-light and pothole" stage requires a great deal of
effort by organizers and considerable lengths of time.
And, if this development is achieved with one group of
activists, still newer participants are being recruited
into other organizational endeavors so that simplified
issues are always a part of the organizations' agenda.
The issues addressed by these organizations are
generally issues of social consumption, often expressed
as conflict within tie service delivery system of the
local state. In many instances organizational activity
revolves around local public bureaucracy: pressuring the
city government to take action against landlords of
abandoned buildings or to enforce building codes;
pressuring tie school board to allocate more supplies to
schools; lobbying the City Council to maintain services
involving items such as garbage collection from small
businesses or to adopt particular forms of property tax
relief; and, of course, pressuring the police department
to deal more effectively with crime control.
At other times specific individuals in tie private
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ecPtr become targets: umlords, bank officials, or a
hospital 's community relations representative. However,
even though the targets may be based or operate within the
private sector, pressures brought to bare on them may
often be orchestrated through municipal agencies: if. the
slumlord won 't accede to the demands of the tenants who
are organized by one of the neighborhood organizations,.
the tenants will then approach various municipal agencies
to take action in the situation or eventually take the
issue into the judicial system. Although as detailed in
the chapter on coalitions, the neighborhood
organizations attempt to avoid reliance on the legal
system or attorneys if at all possible.
As mentioned earlier, the participants vary with the
issues. Organizers characterize self -interest is the key
motivation for participation and view their job as
tapping that self-interest. Many older homeowners, on
fixed incomes, Black and white, participate in order to
preserve a standard of living which they perceive as
rapidly slipping from their grasp. Younger participants
who, in effect, are the indigenious leaders in their
neighborhoods are also found in the activities. Sometimes
very specific issues generate participation: tenants who
have nowhere else to turn in dealing with problem
landlords or small business people who are attracted to
the organizations because of the crime issue. There are
also individuals who contact an organization with a
specific type of request for information and become drawn
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into the group's work. This was how one former president
of AHOP was introduced to the group, by inquiring about
summer youth employment options for her children. Certain
services provided by the organizations do function as
incentives to draw people to the groups and these will
be described later in this chapter. However, through
participation in the organizations, the growth of "other-
centered" behavior is envisioned and initial self-
interest may be transformed into broader concern and
involvement in the larger community.
Processes of Neighborhood Organizing
An entire process of leadership development and
consensus formation through group decision-making precedes
any appearance of activists from the three organizations
at a public meeting. Several elements of the process
include the leaders, the organizer, the planning
activities and the choices of strategy and tactics.
Leaders: Neighborhood residents or other
participants in the organizations who develop into leaders
are key to the success of any group endeavors. Similar to
how union organizers define what constituties a leader,
neighborhood organizers define leaders as people with
constituencies and credibility with their constituencies.
Leaders need not be the loudest, the most articulate or
best-liked person in a group. What is important is that
leaders motivate others to participate and themselves take
on tasks and responsibillties, including the very mundane
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work the organization must engage in: preparing the
leaflets, calling other participants, setting up meetings,
and other similar activities. In many situations it is
important for leadership to be collective in nature,
especially among low income constituencies where problems
of survival and every day living may erupt into major
impediments to participation.
Organizers describe a type of testing process for
emerging leaders in which, based on having developed and
maintained followings, tbey assume responsibilities which
prove their reliability and stamina. However, there is
also extensive leadership training the organization
engages in, some of it in actual workshop sessions and
some on a one-to-one basis between organizers and leaders.
Leadership training focuses on organizational
requirements such as how to approach neighborhood
residents to discuss issues, techniques to mobilize
people, how to run meetings, how to make issues appealling
to organizational constituencies. Training also involves
analytical tasks such as strategy development, analysis of
power relationships in order to determine targets'
pressure points, and techniques of presenting issues to
the media and broader public. An extremely important
element in the entire range of training activities is the
developient of personal confidence on the part of the
potential leaders. The issue of how participating in the
organizations facilitates personal empowerment of women
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and people of color, in particular, is something that
arises in any sof neighborhood organizing with
organizers or leaders.
The one-on -one work with organizers is often the
most intensive type of leadership training. Organizers
describe a process in which they may eventually develop a
very colleagial relationship the neighborhood leaders,
engaging in mutual give -and -take in deciding upon strategy
and tactics. The organizer's role, therefore, is also
extremely critical to the success of the organizations.
Organizers: The role of the organizer in
neighborhood organizing is multi-dimensional. S/he must
be both a catalyst and a manager of action, as veteran
Hartford neighborhood leader and now organizing
consultant, Alta Lash of United Connecticut Action for
Neighborhoods, Inc. (UCAN) characterizes the role.
Organizers must have many of the same qualities as
leaders--credibility, integrity and an ability to inspire
confidence and action - -but must also know how to step back
and allow the leaders to lead. There can be a thin line
between prodding or challenging a leader and directing
the leader or the rest of the group, something an
organizer is essentially prohibitted from doing either
formally by the organizations or implicitly in the ethos
and models which inform the groups' practice.
The power of neighborhood organizers to potentially
manipulate situations or individuals is sometimes voiced
as a methodological criticism of the entire project of
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Alinksy-style neighborhood organizing (see Chapter 2). The
criticism is leveled because the neighborhood
organizations claim to be democratically controlled by
neighborhood residents and other participants who are
supposed to set directions, not the organizers. Yet, often
just at a moment when a meeting may be turning in one
direction, an organizer can inject a comment or suggestion
which can turn the meeting in an entirely different
direction. The suggestion may be quite subtle, but it
still can change the discussion substantially. These
types of interjections occurred at several meetings which
were observed during this research project.
Organizers counter the criticism by maintaining that
neighborhood people will not be convinced or manipulated
into taking actions for which they are unprepared and will
not come back to the organizations if they feel they have
no control over organizational direction. Organizers
assert that it is their job as organizers to provide
suggestions or stimulate discussion of different options,
that it is their role to provide a menu of possibilities
in a given situation and assist neighborhood residents in
working through these choices. They are also the people
who must be able to come up with new strategies when
setbacks or defeats occur.
The development of individuals into competent
organizers may take several years and is a process built
upon the trials and errors of on-the- job training. A
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great deal of subjective assessment is required where
there is not necessarily a right or wrong way to proceed,
but rather a more or less effective way which may not be
known in advance. There are formal workshops or training
sessions for organizers, but much of their development
comes through supervision and consultation with their
directors or consultants such as the UCAN staff .
Moreover, effective use of one's personality is another
facet of the job of the organizer, that is, capitalizing
on individual strengths and assets and feeling
comfortable in the organizer's role are also important to
successful organizing.
The Process of Planning and Orchestrating Issues:
The orchestration of an issue campaign involves several
stages of planning by organizers and leaders, at each
stage broadening the amount of participation by interested
neighborhood residents. A typical scenario is as follows,
based specifically on observations of an AHOP senior
group taking up the issue of crime. Generally initial
discussions take place between an organizer and one or two
leaders to chart a preliminary course of action. Then a
planning committee is assembled ranging in size from 6 to
10 people to affirm the direction and take responsibility
for specific tasks. The individuals who chair the
planning meetings spend a great deal of time with
organizers in constructing the agenda. Very little is left
to chance and these meetings have a fairly fixed format
with detailed lists of what must be done. Appendix E is
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the agenda of a plainng meeting for an AHOP Seniors
group which was working on the crime issue in 1987 and
demonstrates the detail of such an agenda.
If after routine contact is made with local
officials by a committee from a neighborhood group through
telephone conversations or in person, and their requests
on a particular issue are met with inaction, one likely
strategy is to organize a community meeting in which
someone with authority in the issue (e.g. a city
official) is invited to answer questions or respond to
demands. There is a standardized agenda used in most of
the community meetings- -accountability sessions, as they
are often called--which is both straightforward and very
helpful in keeping the meeting focused on the intended
objectives. There is great potential for these meetings
to get distracted into* tangential issues and it is
important for the leader to have such an agenda to keep
the larger group on track. The agenda outline is as
follows:
Introduction
Statement of the Issues: Background and/or Facts
Presentation of Demands
Response from Guest(s) (the guest may then be asked
to leave)
Discussion of Necessary Next Steps
This agenda forimat is used both by leaders and
groups who are experienced, unified on an issue and adept
at asserting demands, as well as with leaders and groups
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who are not particularly well-organized or articulate,
each type having been observed during this project. With
the more experienced groups, the organizers play a
minimal role and stay totally in the background. With
the less experienced leaders and groups, the organizers
tend to assert themselves at key points to keep the
group focused and help move the meeting along.
Despite all of the careful planning, sometimes
spontaneity reigns and totally unanticipated actions take
place at meetings. One such event was observed on August
6, 1987, when AHOP's Housing Coalition met to discuss what
steps to take nex.t in dealing with a recalcitrant landlord
who refused to properly maintain or take action to stem
drug dealing in his buildings. As tenants related
horrifying stories of fires in the buildings, intimidation
by drug dealers and absolute refusal on the part of the
landlord to make repairs, anger and outrage among the rest
of the meeting participants grew. The plans to take the
landlord into court or attempts to find buyers for the
buildings seemed too remote--the group felt the need to do
something at that moment.
On the agenda were items which suggested having
local police and state officials with jurisdiction in
housing and banking tour the buildings and see firsthand
the disgusting conditions the tenants were enduring. The
group decided that rather than wait until the future for
such a building tour, they would go to the police station
that night and demand that the police take action on the
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drug dealing. A call to a local television station was
made to obtain media coverage of the action, especially to
have a public record of the police department's response.
The group which included several small children piled
into AHOP's vans and several individuals' cars, drove to
the police station, met with the night sergeant and voiced
their complaints.
The sergeant attempted to placate the group by
stating that he would have officers look into the
problems, but also presented various reasons why little
had or could be done. This further angered the group and
even the otherwise low-profile organizers entered into the
heated discussion. A television news crew arrived and
filmed some of the interchange which appeared on the
11 p.m. news.
In this instance, no immediate effects occurred as a
result of the spontaneous action, but there was a type of
emotional release for the group and the tenants could at
least feel that they had supporters and had in some
measure exerted themselves. Moreover, the media coverage
helped in the continuing orchestration of the issue.
Eventually--much later--the landlord sold the buildings.
Spontaneity may also lead to situations where events
get out of control for the organization. On August 1,
1990, HART's tax committee called a meeting in a South End
church to discuss the property tax revaluations which had
taken place over the previous year. Homeowners were in
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tihe processof paying new, substantially larger tax bills
and complaints were being heard all over the city. At the
HART meeting one of the city's tax officials was present
to answer questions and discuss the various options for
tax relief which were available to residential property
owners. Several residents whose English -speaking
abilities were limited started screaming at the official
and grew so impatient that. they rushed the podium and
attempted to wrestle the microphone from the HART
president who was chairing the meeting. Al though the
president held her own and kept physical control of the
microphone, the meeting decorum was never fully restored.
Most of the meetings held by these organizations
proceed as originally intended, more often characterized
by solid planning and sometimes a tenor which seems almost
rehearsed. A frequently employed tactic involves some
type of guerilla theater skit or a satirical presentation
to a public official of items symbolic of the issue at
hand. The opening paragraph of this dissertation recounts
AHOP delivering uncollected garbage from a slumlord's
building to the Hartford City Manager's office. (This is
the same slumlord who was the focus of the sortie to the
police department described above). During the linkage
struggle in 1986, the organizations presented the City
Council with a skeleton which was missing its spine--an
attempt to dramatize what they characterized as the
spinelessness of the Council in acceding to the corporate
community by voting down the linkage proposals.
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Satire and comedy are used effectively by the groups
to make various points for the publiic, but also to reduce
fears on the part of neighborhood residents. Organizers
maintain that if residents can feel a degree of humor and
lightheartedness in some of the events in which they
participate, fears of participating and speaking out may
also diminish in the lighter atmosphere. In Hartford,
the effective use of humor has evolved over the history of
the three organizations, fueled by the skills and wit of
various organizers, but this tactic is recommended in many
national training workshops and in manuals or books on
neighborhood organizing such as Si Kahn's, Organizing A
Guide for Grassroots Leaders (1982: p.196) .
One of the most formidible requirements in an issue
campaign for the neighborhood organizations is determining
new tactics or next steps in difficult struggles . Winning
is very important, not merely in and of itself, but also
in maintaining the interest and involvement of
neighborhood residents. Therefore, choices of strategies
and tactics are critical not only to organizational
effectiveness but also to continued participation, and
are analyzed next.
Choices of Strategies and Tactics: A number of
considerations figure into decisions on strategies and
tactics. We will discuss several: the issue of
unpredictability, the use of media coverage,
personalization of organizing targets, the use of
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or t an;:d anger, and the interplay of the groups'
campaigns with politics .
Unpredictability: One rule of thumb of neighborhood
organizers is to maintain unpredictability. The object is
to keep organizing targets off balance and unable to plan
in advance responses to the actions of the groups. One of
the ma jor advantages the neighborhood groups hope to
achieve is maintaining greater control in media coverage
through the elements of surprise and unpredictability.
They want to be able to set the tone and not allow the
target any opportunity for advance preparation, but rather
place him or her in the position of scurrying to fashion a
response to surprise tactics. This raises another key
ingredient in the organizations' issue campaigns, media
coverage.
Media: Media coverage coupled with the element of
surprise support Lipsky's (1970) model of protest as a
very apt description of how the neighborhood organizations
fashion strategies. If one accepts staged actions
such as the guerilla theater skits mentioned previously
as protest, as well as protest with a genuinely angry
flavor, then it is possible to view a large portion of
the public actions of the neighborhood groups as
attempting to activate the targets' "reference publics",
and media coverage as a critical component of such a
strategy. In Hartford, the neighborhood organizations
receive a great deal of media coverage of their public
activities.
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Personalizing the Target: In as many instances as
possible neighborhood organizers prefer to personalize a
campaign and single out one individual as a target.
Rather than deal with an entire corporation such as a
bank, a particular bank officer or representative is held
accountable. Likewise with city bureaucrats or elected
officials: individuals who have the power to make
decisions or take actions are made the specific targets.
On the one hand this helps concretize the problem for
neighborhood residents--anger can be directed to a real
human being. On the other hand, even if s/he initially
resists, the target may eventually tire of the attention
and succumb to the group's demands. Recall in the chapter
on coalitions that during the Colt strike it was the
suggestion of a neighborhood organizer in the Community
Labor Alliance to specify the president of Colt Firearms
as the target of a protest campaign.
Confrontation and Anger: Often it may appear that
organizations in the Alinsky mold rush to confrontational
tactics, that there is a penchant for confrontation on the
part of these groups. Indeed, to this author, one of the
most striking aspects of their work which helped to
inspire this project is the way in which through
participation in these organizations, neighborhood people
without a great deal of experience in public affairs come
to the point where they will boldly confront a corporate
or public official. Yet, in reality, confrontational
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,ituations are not as routine for these organizations as
one might expect, despite the groups' reputatio'ns and the
ever-present threat which is felt by local politicians and
corporate officials that such tactics could be used.
Before any of the neighborhood organizations'
conuittees or other formations arrive at a point where
they undertake a confrontation, they generally attempt
more routine methods of ameliorating their problems. They
will patiently call a city official and set up a group
meeting which may be conducted quite civilly. If they
achieve the desired end, then the organization claims a
victory and the group can move on to other issues-
However, the kind of stalling tactics which may be
employed by bureaucrats or the indifference which a group
may meet even from elected officials can be used by
organizers to kindle anger. Under other circumstances,
without the opporunity to work in such an organization,
anger might not ever be cultivated or put to any strategic
use, and individuals could become cynical about the
possibility for change. But these organizations slowly
exploit the anger as a motivational force in their
campaigns. Leaders are also schooled in the use of anger
as part of issue orchestration.
Organizers assert that it takes an incredible amount
of disregard and neglect to get ordinary people angry
enough to engage in confrontation with public officials,
that such behavior is not generally within their
experience. So, at a certain point in the campaign,
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organIzers sense that the residents are "ready"--
sufficiently fed up--and begin to engage the anger to
generate a confrontation. Understanding when this point
is reached by a group is something that organizers learn
to recognize through experience and it involves a very
subjective assessment on the part of the organizer.
Interplay with Politics: Even though these
neighborhood organizations do not engage in partisan
politics through such vehicles as political action
commi ttees, they are constantly approaching elected
officials. They do, therefore, command a distinct presence
in local politics. Sometimes they will attempt to put a
politician on the spot and demand a commitment in a public
forum to a specific position or a particular vote. At
other times they meet with officials in more private
settings to discuss issues or jointly develop strategies
in a very cooperative manner.
In certain instances, the strategies surrounding the
work of the neighborhood organizations witl elected
officials are hard to decipher or may appear to be
soimething totally different than what is actually
transpiring. An example of this phenomenon took place on
April 19, 1989 at a HART meeting on property taxes. It
was held at the Legislative Office Building during the
middle of a legislative session which was embroiled in
revenue and spending , problems. Various state budget
proposals were being debated, as well as several plans for
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property tax relief which would hve to be passed by the
State Legislature as c.nabling legislation an'd t hen lbe
available for municipali ties to implement. The HART
meeting was attended mainly by residents from the deep
South End of the city, most of whom were retired or did
not have children in the public school system, and was
intended to focus solely on the issue of residential
property tax relief. Among the elected officials in
attendance were one of Hartford's two State Senators,
William DiBella , and former Deputy Mayor Al phonse Marotta.
HART was putting forth a demand for a certain form
of residential property tax relief under consideration at
the time which was known as the Homestead Exemption. The
meeting was to be conducted with the standard
accountability session agenda: a statement of the problem,
a media attention device, a demand delivered to elected
officials, time for short responses from the officials and
concluding statements from the individuals running the
meeting. Much of the meeting proceded according to the
plan, for the most part moderated by a Trinity College
professor. The media device was the display of a long
string of postcards with messages of support for the
Homestead Exemption from Hartford residents while people
in the audience chanted "Our relief is tax relief."
When it came time for the officials to respond to
the group's demand, State Senator DiBella entered into a
long explanation of the larger fiscal crisis that the
state government was experiencing. He was Co-Chairperson
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of the Legislature's Revenue, Finance and Bonding
Committee and at that particular time was deeply involved
in the crafting of a tax package for the State's next
fiscal year. His answer encompassed the need for overall
tax reform and restructuring, including support for the
institution of a state income tax, a proposal which the
Governor firmly opposed and vowed to veto. In the midst
of his detailed and technical explanation he introduced
the possibility of a newly conceived property tax relief
measure in the form of a cap on effective taxation of
residential property. He emphasized that property tax
relief was one item of several which were being considered
in the entire situation and stated his support for some
type of property tax relief.
The new proposal DiBella mentioned was just being
designed so HART had no opportunity to formulate a
position on it, nor did it have any information available
for the meeting participants. Moreover, HART was not
participating in any of several coalitions which were
demanding the creation of a state income tax to provide a
more equitable alternative for taxation than the former
7.5% and now 8% sales tax in the state.
After his sobering presentation on the state budget
crisis, DiBella left the meeting to return to a
Legislative Leadership Caucus and was unavailable for any
questions. To this observer, the introduction of a
entirely new proposal seemed to inject a measure of
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disorder to the meeting and as well as throw the moderator
off balance. Next, Deputy Mayor Marotta proceded to give
his views on the matter of tax relief, a confusing
presentation which only muddled the issues further. He
ended with the exortation to the group to attend the
City's budget hearings which were scheduled for a week
later and demand that the Council hold the line on
spending. He spoke of the "education people" who would be
requesting more funds for education, in effect, setting up
the education budget as a target for taxpayer discontent.
(ONE- CHANE was simultaneously organizing to demand
additional resources be allocated to under-staffed and
resource starved schools in the northern part of the
city). HART members then entered into a question and
answer/discussion session during which time all semblance
of order disappeared. Finally, after conferrring with the
organizers, the moderator of the meeting re-established
order and ended the session by stating that HART would
organize for the City budget hearings and demand property
tax relief and holding the line on city spending.
As stated above, it appeared to this observer that
DiBella's introduction of the new tax relief proposal at
the meeting caught the planners of the meeting by surprise
and that they later lost control. However, in a
subsequent discussion with HART's director, he stated that
he was pleased with the outcome because DiBella could use
the fact that constituents were demanding tax relief in
negotiations with other legislative leaders. This meeting
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and the demands of the group were actually part of the
orchestration of the property tax relief issue and HART
had previously discussed the strategy with the key
individual in the legislative scenario, DiBella.
Marotta's interjections were actually quite
extraneous to the strategies being developed by HART's tax
committee, although his message about education spending
did seem to have strong appeal to the people at the
meeting. If taken seriously, the Marotta message could
have actually been dangerous to HART's relationship with
one of its sister organizations, ONE-CHANE. That it
seemed to motivate a great many of the people attending
the meeting to return for future actions was particularly
ominous, given the racial differences between this group
and ONE-CHANE's educational activists, most of whom were
African American.
The point of this description is that the strategy
being employed by HART was not at all apparent to the
rank-and-file meeting participants or even to interested
observers. Of particular concern is how such shrouded
strategies are reconciled with the claim of participatory
democratic control of the organizations by the
neighborhood residents. In this case, it seems that the
more sound judgment of the staff and tax committee's
leaders rescued the specific meeting and the overall issue
campaign from succumbing to the demagogic appeal of
a politician such as Marotta.
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Organizational Messages and Media
Leadership of the neighborhood organizat ions
articulate the philosophies and/or ideologies which inform
their work in somewhat amorphous or vague terms. They
project a highly pragmatic approach to the pursuit of
goals and incorporate several general concepts such as the
explicitly stated themes of empowerment and participatory
democracy, and the implicitly embraced principle of
localism. Whatever ideologies organizers hold are more or
less private, that is, organizers will refrain from
interjecting viewpoints stated in ideological terms,
especially those which may reflect a leftist persepctive.
Privately, many of these organizers do hold radical and/or
even socialist beliefs, but these are separated from the
work of the organizations. Part of this separation flows
from the methodology employed by the groups and part from
funding cons iderat ions. Moreover, the written materials
produced by the groups tend to focus on specific issues
and do not offer a philosophical or ideologically oriented
analysis. These dimensions of the groups and their
implications will be analyzed in this section.
Empowerment and Participatory Democracy: While an
argument can be made that the existence of the
neighborhood groups serves to discipline and channel
discontent into manageable patterns (analogous to
characterizations of modern unionism as disciplining
labor), the individuals who establish, staff and assume
leadership in the organizations do so with very sincere
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desires to affect change and redefine power relationships
in local communities, with great personal effort and
sacrifice. Most often the rewards for participation are
riot of a monetary nature, except perhaps when an issue
inv olves taxation and participants expect to save money on
tax bills, or pressure is exerted on a bank to provide low
interest loans. The staffs of the organizations earn very
modest salaries and the neighborhood people who
participate all are volunteers.
The theme of community empowerment therefore appears
to have resonance and motivate participation, especially
when it builds upon and combines with the different types
of self-interest which exist in the neighborhoods.
Certainly the existence of HART since 1975 is one
indication of both the appeal of neighborhood organizing
in the comrminity and the tenacity of the organizers and
neighborhood leadership.
Article III in AHOP's by-laws which defines the
organization's purpose helps to illustrate how the mission
of conmmunity empowerment is conceived:
Article III Purpose
Section 1
The purpose of AHOP, as a non-profit community
organization, shall be to establish an organization
whereby the various age, ethnic, racial, and
economic groups within the neighborhood can come
together and address their concerns through a
democratic process.
Section 2
AHOP shall be the uniting vehicle whereby the
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community, as a whole, can work together to improve
the q'uality of life in the neighborhood.
AHOP shall, through its member groups and the Board,
organize and mobilize residents in the neighborhood,
empowering them through a process of democratic
decision-making and direct action to address
particular issues affecting the quality of life in
the neighborhood.
AHOP shall, through its member groups and the Board,
develop and implement service delivery programs that
strive to strengthen the bonds of community and
create a heal thy functioning neighborhood. (By-
Laws, 5/87).
How this is interpretted and what is meant by
empowerment takes many forms. On one level , the simple act
of participating in a neighborhood issue by attending a
meeting can be conceived as empowerment in that by their
attendance, residents are taking an interest and a role,
however minimal, in community affairs. That the
organizations hold meetings on community issues means that
local government or private interests often have to factor
the responses of the neighborhood groups into their plans
for the respective neighborhoods. Achieving such an
effect is considered by the orgranizations to be an
indication of success in the process of empowerment.
Besides participation and "watch-dogging",
empowerment encompasses tangible improvements in the
community, as well as avenues for more intangible effects
such as personal growth and development. In relation to
actual physical develo;:lment, all three neighborhood
organizations have been involved in the housing arena:
AHOP established Hill Housing, Inc. in the late 1980s;
HART along wi th several other organizations helped to
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establish the Broad-Park Developfment Corporation in the
early 1980's (although it has at times experienced
differences with the corporation over its direction and
priorities); and ONE-CHANE's staff functions include
housing development. All three hold periodic housing fairs
to hel p disseminate information on home ownership
opportunities. Any new housing which is developed both
fills a very dire need in and of itself, and also tangibly
demonstrates the worth of the organizations for the
neighborhoods' improvement.
The avenues for personal development have been
mentioned in the earlier discussion of leadership, but it
should be emphasized here that growth on very subjective
and personal levels by individual participants
simultaneously builds new local leadership, cultivates
organizational loyalty and contributes to greater overall
organizational effectiveness. Moreover, as other
communi ty residents watch their neighbors undergo this
personal empowerment, and as new indigenous role models
emerge in the neighborhoods, the organizations' stature is
often enhanced in the process. Organizers point to the
development of local leadership as a very important
component of coummunity empowerment.
Notwithstanding criticisms of the neighborhood
organizations in which they are characterized as being led
and, worse, manipulated by staff (see above), it can still
be argued that they do provide people at the grassroots
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I evel cf co:#mnuni ties opportunities for participation in
political and econic developments. The claims that
they build structures of participatory democracy can be
examined both in terms of internal processes and external
effects.
Internally, formal control is exerted by
neighborhood residents through the annual election of
members of the organizations' boards of directors and the
process of selecting organizational priorities. Priorities
are theoretically set at the annual congresses where
participants are asked to vote for the issues they feel
are most import-ant for organizational attention from a
list of potential issues. The items with the highest
votes are then taken up by the board of directors and the
various comnittees for development of plans and campaigns.
Obviously, many other issues arise during any given
year, but .the priority list is used as a guide or
indication of what is most important to area residents.
Neighborhood residents also exercise control over the
organizations' respective agenda simply by
demonstrating interest or disinterest in particular
issues through indicators such as meeting attendance and
follow-through on group decisions. If there is a lack of
interest, the organizations will not expend resources to
pursue an issue.
The creation of avenues for increased participation
by residents in larger community decisions is another
effect of the organizations' existence. Separate from
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aqy uesticons o internal organizational demoracy,
building these avenues is perhaps the more compelling
motivation for organizers and is what they envision in
formulations of participation in decision-making, that is,
community input into those decisions which affect
community life. In regard to these external effects, the
organizations attempt to counter both government
insensitivity or incompetency and the power of private
corporate interests in the community. This function or
mission is not necessarily articulated in strong
ideological or conceptual terms, but more by flavor of the
groups' day-to-day activities and the tenor of the issue
campaigns which they organize.
In discussions with organizers and executive
directors of the three organizations, it is often
difficult to elicit an articulation of the mission or
function of their groups in more detail than the very
general framework of empowerment and participatory
democracy. Due to the myriad demands on them, they
necessarily function on very practical levels and are
preoccupied with day-to-day operations and the need to
build the capacities of the organizations. They tend to
view many questions solely in organizational terms, not in
larger contextual terms. In fact, having opportunities to
do so is sometimes considered a luxury for which they
don' t have time. However, one dimension of their
organizational frameworks which is often implicitly
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i-corporated into discuss ions of met1hiodcdogy is the
"localist" dimension which will be addressed next.
The Localist Influence: In relation to neighborhood
organizing in Hartford, localism involves several aspects
of the groups' functioning. In its most basic
manifestation, it often involves characterizing problems
as being in large part locally created, but more
importantly, amenable to locally produced solutions.
Moreover, localism influences organizations to select
those issues for action which are more amenable to local
solutions and not the more difficult regional or national
issues or problems which affect community life. It also
fosters an orientation toward very specific geographic
areas, and tackling only those issues which exist within
the organization's specific turf, sometimes to the
detriment of other neighborhoods or turfs. For example,
when neighborhood groups demand that police deal with
prostitution in a given neighborhood (a frequent demand in
parts of Hartford), often the problem simply gets
displaced into another neighborhood, not eliminated, and
sometimes the new location is in another organization's
area.
While this localism is beneficial for building the
capacities of the neighborhood organizations, it can be
limiting in terms of developing the analytical capacities
of participants. It may also deter individuals from
participating in other types of organizations which do
attempt to deal with larger systemic issues.
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The loals orientation also helps to explain the
reticence on the part of the organizations staff to
encourage participation in coalitions- -such formations
take their activists outside the local organizational
boundaries and into different, expanded arenas with
different goals or varying models of organizing.
Moreover, building alliances as a means to improve the
general climate in which they function is not a goal in
and of itself for the neighborhood groups. Rather, as
discussed in the chapter on coalitions, alliances or
coalitions are approached more instrumentally with
specific ends In mind. The localist orientation
contributes to this tendency.
Another dimension of how localism functions relates
to national elections and specifically the Jesse Jackson
campaign of 1988. Even beyond the issues of restrictions
in by-laws or from funders on partisan electoral activity,
as well as the staffs' philosophical objections to
participation in such activity, the localist orientation
also tends to somewhat discourage participation or else
ignore these elections which effect the national climate.
So while the Jackson campaign grew to a fervor in
Hartford, the neighborhood organization activists were
absent from this significant social movement in the city.
Their leadership might argue that aside from questions of
by-laws and funding such elections are beyond the scope of
the organizations. Yet sitting out such a' broad
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mobilization within the community may be to ignore an
important opportunity for the organizations to interact
with local residents.
Finally, a localist orientation may serve to
diminish or underestimate issues of racism and race
relations in general Biased attitudes which are
verbalized by neighborhood residents or behavior which
reflects bias are dealt with on an ad hoc basis by
organizers, sometimes confronted and sometimes ignored.
The assumption by organizers is that over time, in the
process of working on issues, participants of different
racial and ethnic backgrounds will come to recognize their
common interests, and racist ideas will gradually subside
and eventually wither away. Unless championed by a
particular organizer or director--in most cases a person
of color--racism is not dealt with as an issue in and of
itself, or as an impediment to unity as many labor
organizers characterize it. While all of the fulltime
staff members sincerely personally deplore racist ideas
and behavior, the model of neighborhood organizing which
is embraced in Hartford does not explicitly factor race
or racism into its methodology.
In the case of ONE-CHANE where the organization' s
active participants are almost entirely African American
and Puerto Rican, the challenge is to prevent cleavages
between these two groupings. Racism on the part of whites
is not the major problem which ONE-CHANE encounters due to
a lack of white participation. There are times when ONE-
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CHANE participants whct are Black or Puerto Rican may snow
resistance or lack of enthusiasm at working with groups or
individuals who are white. However, within both AHOP and
HART where there is significant white participation, the
issue of racism or instances of racist behavior can impede
efforts. None of the organizations would ever absorb an
overtly racist group or block club under their umbrella.
Newsletters and Printed Material: The three
organizations do not publish a great quantity or variety
of materials. There is a notable lack of analysis within
their various publications, as mentioned earlier. What is
distributed to neighborhood residents usually are more
detailed accounts of what they might read in the local
newspaper. So it is not a strong conceptual or
ideological message that gets transmitted into the
community from the three organizations, but instead a list
of accomplishments and sometimes chronologies of events
surrounding a given issue.
HART's newsletter, "HART Times", is published
several times a year and recently went to a typeset format
on newsprint from a hand-typed format on 8-1/2 by 11 inch
paper. The change in format improves and professionalizes
the appearance of the publication. As mentioned, the
articles report activities and developments on issues and
offer very little analysis, even on those issues in which
the organization is deeply involved. However, many of the
articles are written by the neighborhood residents who are
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active on the respective issues, of ferin thm an ogther
avenue for participation in the organization.
AHOP's activities are reported in a newsletter,
"Asylum Hill Ink", published approximately six times a
year by the community organization Asylum Hill, Inc.
which collaborates with AHOP on many activities. Asylum
Hill, Inc. has existed in the neighborhood since the early
1970's and in mant respects has been overshadowed by AHOP,
although the two organizations have now developed a
cooperative relationship. Asylum Hill, Inc. receives
funding from Aetna Life and Casualty, and Connecticut
Mutual Insurance for general operation expenses and funds
from the city and state governments for the operation of
employment programs. The newsletter coverage of its own
activities and those of AHOP are so intertwined as to blur
much distinction between the two groups. The articles are
even shorter than those in HART Times and are more of a
community calendar format. In mid 1990 AHOP established
its own newsletter and plans to publish several issues
each year. ONE-C(HANE at this point has no regular
newsletter but periodically mails groups of fliers which
announce different events and mobilizations.
All three organizations receive substantial coverage
in the several weekly and bi-weekly community newspapers,
as well as in Hartford's one major daily newspaper, the
Hartford Courant. Occassionally the organizations are
featured on the community access cable television station
in Hartford, although they have not yet made routine use
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of this media outlet a feature of their organizing.
Al though their own publications are not a
necessarily their strong assets at this point, the groups
seem to be moving slowly to improve formats and expand
coverage. However, any analysis of problems or issues
takes place not within the newsletters but rather in the
context of the on-going work in the communities and wit~hin
meetings and planning activities where the time is set
aside for such assessment. So unless one is an active
participant in a committee, on the board of one of the
groups or in the various informal communication networks
which exist both in the neighborhoods and within the
organizations, it is difficult to ascertain their deeper
assessments or evaluations of the issues.
Neighborhood Issues and Economic Restructuring
Depending upon the specific agenda at hand, the
issues of collective consumption which are addressed by
the neighborhood organizations may or may not be
immediately related to issues of economic restructuring.
To the extent that any concern of urban neighborhood
residents can be placed in the context of the current
stage of development of the economy, one could say that
the issues of the neighborhood organizations are a
consequence of that development, that these organizations
confront the local manifestations of national economic
growth and trends. So, for example, if the crime and drug
problem can be described as derived from a configuration
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of larger nation-al economc forces in which the lack of
opportuni ty for economic advancement of the poorest
segments of society leads to involvement with crime and
drugs and, further, that this lack of opportunity is
traced in part to the problems of the contemporary
segmented urban labor market, then one might attempt to
argue that there is a relationship between such issues and
economic restructuring, albeit a secondary or tertiary
effect.
However, if one is looking for a closer mapping of
neighborhood organizations' issues to specific stages in
urban economic development, then it is more difficult to
delineate such relationships or demonstrate cause and
effect between economic restructuring and an increase in
a local problem such as crime. For instance, it unlikely
that one can ascertain that the closing of a particular
factory coincides directly with an increase in crime or
drug trade in the area where the factory once stood or
where the former workers of that factory live. Problems
such as crime and drugs may emanate from economic and
social inequality, but once unleashed, take on dynamics of
their own.
In some senses, many of the issues addressed by
Hartford's neighborhood organizations in the late 1980's
and the beginning of the 1990's do not appear to be as
directly related to economic restructuring as the issues
which were important earlier in the decade. Public outcry
over questions such as who reaps the benefits of downtown
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development substaitiLally diminished by 1989 as the pace
of that development in Hartford slowed considerably and
many ambitious plans of developers were interrupted or
halted. In fact, in mid-1990 by one account in the New
York Times, Hartford' s downtown was dying (Johnson,
1990). Despite the fact that a local research
organization, Citizens Research Education Network,
conducted a study (1990) which calculated the revenues
linkage would have brought into city coffers had it been
adopted, the neighborhood organizations did not embrace
the report's findings as the basis of any new linkage
campaign. What has consumed much more of the neighborhood
organizations' energies are questions of state and local
taxation, municipal budgets, resources for education and,
as mentioned throughout this chapter, the crime/drug
problem rather than demands for linkage.
There is an obvious relationship between the general
economic health of the city, the region, the local taxbase
and many of the questions faced in the neighborhoods--
whether, for example, municipal budget shortfalls result
from the revenue loss associated with capital flight or
failed condominium projects- -but the ways in which
these issues are perceived, defined and experienced by
neighborhood residents and organizations tend not to
highlight such connections. Rather, more recently, issues
tend to be addressed as distinct or isolated problems,
with less emphasis on corporate power or advantage and
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more on the practices of the local government.
There are several consequences of the neighborhood
organizations' methods of framing issues, especially
in terms of cultivating coalitions with labor. Indeed,
the same issues facing the neighborhood organizations face
labor union members as they experience community life in
Hartford and the surrounding region, since union members
are obviously residents of .ocal communi ties, including
Hartford. However, most of these problems are not
presently within the scope of work undertaken by unions.
Conversely, since neighborhood issues are not
immediately derived from specific problems of industrial
relations as experienced in workplaces, they do not appear
to be problems with common origins to those of labor.
Therefore, coalescing with labor, or developing analyses
of community issues which emphasize any common roots of
neighborhood problems with those of labor unions are not
necessarily either obvious conclusions or necessary
strategic choices for neighborhood organization activists.
In other words, the manner in which neighborhood activists
tend to conceptualize and experience their struggles does
not necessarily lead them to see or to seek conunonal ities
with union members who experience economic and social
insecurity arising from a changing economy. This is one
more reason why the building of coalitions and alliances
between labor and connunty organizations is often
difficult.
Having considered a number of important dimensions
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of neighborhood organizinig methods and participants in
Hartford, we will turn next to issues of organizational
structure and maintenance. These features also bear
heavily on the potential and accomplishments of the
neighborhood organizations.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES
The purpose of the following discussion of several
organizational dimensions of the neighborhood groups is to
highlight how issues of structure, leadership and
organizational process affect goal attainment. As in the
discussion of structural questions in the previous chapter
on labor unions, the effort is not to simply describe
structures but rather to consider how they facilitate or
impede community empowerment. First we will assess
several specific structural features of the groups, then
move to discuss the issue of leadership and staffing
cycles within the organizations, and finally analyze the
spinoff effects and new organizations created by the
presence and efforts of the three neighborhood
organizations.
Structures and Processes
All three of the organizations have similar
structures: a board of directors, elected at an annual
community congress, whose members come from the
constituent units or block/area clubs which function under
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the auspices of the organization cir, in some cases,
individual coirmmunity activists whose membership on the
board enhances its capacity. For example, AHOP's board of
directors includes members from several localized units
(groups which cover several square blocks), churches
within the Asylum Hill neighborhood--even though most of
the parishioners live outside the area, the AHOP seniors'
group, and the AHCOP youth group, among other
representatives. In AHOP s case, this arrangement helps
to maintain support and involvement by the churches,
despite the fact that large percentages of their
respective congregations live outside both Asylum Hill and
even Hartford.
The boards of directors hire the executive directors
and the executive directors hire other staff members.
There are the typical additional sets of officers besides
presidents: various vice presidents, secretaries,
treasurers, etc. The boards meet specified numbers of
times each year and consider organizational priorities and
the progress of various issue campaigns. As with many
community boards, much of their work is quite routine,
however there are occasions when controversy arises and
dissention results. For example, during the years that
the neighborhood organizations were observed for this
research, the AHOP board asked one executive director to
resign due to his inability to effectively facilitate
grassroots organizing.
These structures do afford community residents
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formal control over the organizations . The board members
represent ranges of issues, constituencies and organized
segments in the respective areas of Hartford. However,
the bulk of the work of the organizations takes place in
the various issue committees, local block or area
coummittees and task forces rather than at the board level
of the organizations or in the board meetings.
The annual congress which each organization holds is
a very important feature of the groups' functioning. ONE-
CHANE and AHOP hold their congresses in the spring and
HART's takes place in October. Hundreds of hours of
collective work go into the planning and organizing for
these events. This organizing attempts to tap and
mobilize every possible constituency and every single
participant from the entire scope of each organization's
work. Staff, leadership and, very often, UCAN consultants
involve themselves in the preparations through various
conmittees. Tickets for very low prices (one or two
dollars, including dinner) are sold to attract
participants. Tickets are distributed to and sold by as
many organizational activists as possible in order to
broaden participation and insure attendance. Program
books with advertisements from local businesses and
politicians are also produced for the congresses. Numerous
different roles and tasks are assigned to dozens of people
so that responsibility and ownership of the event is
shared.
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The congresses are usually held in a facility such
as a school auditorium or caf eteria and tend to attract
several hundred people. Typcially the agenda includes
introductions of various officers of the organization and
moderators for the day's event, reports from planning
committees, reports from issue committees regarding
accomplishments during the past year, some type of
accountability session with local public officials on one
or more current issues, presentation of a slate and
election of officers, and voting on organizational
priorities. In many congresses the group breaks into
several different issue workshops which also may include
some discussion or "nini" accountability session with
public officials. If the congress is held on a weekend
afternoon, the dinner takes place at the end or, if it is
held during the evening, at the beginning of the event.
There is often entertainment such as performances by youth
groups or church or senior citizens' choirs based in the
local institutions within the organization' s turf.
There are several ironies in relation to these
congresses. For organizations who trace their
methodologies to Alinsky's confrontational tactics, the
gatherings tend to be very free from conflict or
dissention. Moreover, for organizations who claim to
foster participatory decision-making, the congresses are
so highly orchestrated and the agenda so tightly
controlled that few substantive decisions are made. For
example, a slate of officers and executive board members
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is offere by a nominating committee and in the seven
different congresses which were observed during the course
of this research, there were no challenges or competing
slates. (The October 1990 HART Congress which was not
observed did, however, have a contested election, but this
was considered a rarity). The slates that are presented
are very broadly representative of the different
constituencies and groupings within the organizations, so
that the officers and board members who are elected very
adequately reflect the ranges of activism and viewpoints
within the organizations. But all of the real decision-
making in this regard is done before the congresses,
themselves, take place.
To further illustrate, the accountability session
portions. of the agenda are very well rehearsed in these
events as is the case with other types of accountability
sessions. In fact, in the 1989 ONE-CHANE congress, the
moderator actually prevented participants from really
taking on a police department representative on the issue
of crime control and police response to community needs:
when several participants began to debate with the
officer, rather than let the encounter escalate, the
moderator "pulled in the reigns" so to speak, called the
meeting back to order and moved on to the next part of the
agenda.
What these congresses do accomplish is the
development of a deeper sense of community among the
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participants, especially a sense of pride in the
cTumtlulative yearly achievements of the organizations. The
congresses also serve as a reminder to elected and other
public officials of the potential power of these groups
to present claims to the government and of their power to
organize and accomplish their goals. Particularly at
HART' s congress which takzes place in the peak of campaign
season for local elections in alternate years, politicians
flock to meet the several hundred concerned active
residents and sometimes office seekers openly pander to
the crowd.
Despite the fact that the format and outcomes of the
community congresses vary little from year to year, the
organizations continue to expend the energies to recreate
the annual events. For the leadership, particularly the
respective staffs, the congress becomes in some measure a
test of both their organizing capabilities and the general
coherence of the organizations. A great deal of
importance is attached to gross attendance figures and, in
fact, one of the program evaluation measures submitted to
funders is numbers of individuals who attend the various
organizational events and mobilizations, the most
important of which is the annual congress.
Staffing. Leadership and Organizational Cycles
One thing which characterizes the work of the
neighborhood organizations in Hartford is a type of cycle
effect of their work and leadership. There are definite
ebbs and flows of activity within the organizations,
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especially publicl.y noticed or reported activity, and this
phenomenon can be partially traced to staff and leadership
turnover. The turnover is both intentional and
unintentional in nature.
Elected neighborhood based leadership is mandated by
the respective by-laws to change minimally every two
years, that is, a president may serve a maximum of two
one-year terms. Often a person serves a single one-year
term as president. One of the consequences of this
turnover is the dilenia of what to do with past
presidents: these are individuals who usually have
undergone intensive training and development to become
leaders, to whom the organizations have devoted
considerable amounts of resources- -particularly in the
form of staff attention, and who, at the end of one or two
years of concentrated activity and energy, no longer have
a very important organizational role to fulfill.
Several past presidents remain on the boards of
directors, but eventually most of these individuals tend
to drift away from the organization. Several have gone on
to play important roles in the community in other
capacities: an AHlOP past president, Marie Kirkley-Bey went
on to become active in politics and was elected as one of
the first People for Change council members; Ron Cretaro,
a former HART president, was the first chairperson of
People for Change; and Alta Lash remains closely tied to
neighborhood organizing as one of UCAN's two staff 'members
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who provide technical assistance to the neighborhood
groups and other organizations. Yet these examples teid
to be the exceptions. Often by the time five years have
elapsed, a person who was once president is no longer
active within the organization in any capacity. This was
noted by several organizers as a problem which should be
addressed, but somehow does not ever get on any
organization's agenda.
The issue can have even more ramifications as it
relates to staff and staff turnover. Al though by the end
of the 1980's the salaries for organizers employed by
these three groups were in the mid-twenty thousand dollar
range, it is a very demanding job in terms of hours,
energy and concentration. It is often difficult to fill
vacancies and individual organizers can suffer burn-out if
they don't develop pacing and coping mechanisms, and/or
adopt a long-term perspective on the nature of and
potential for change. The job can easily strain family
life.
Beyond these issues, there are various ways in which
cooptation away from neighborhood organizing and toward
assimilation into the local power structure can occur.
Talented organizers become recognized by both their allies
and their organizing targets, and the targets generally
have enticements of jobs and higher salaries available to
offer. While more obvious examples of cooptation of
organizers are rare (an organizer taking a job with a bank
around which the neighborhood group developed a campaign,
310
for example), organizers and directors have ended up in
positions such as Trinity College' s community relations
official or with for-profit housing development concerns.
However, many organizers who leave the groups' employ do
end up in other human service or non-profit organizations.
What results from this turnover is a type of cycle
of organizational capacity and effectiveness. It takes
several years for new staff and new leadership to develop
the full potential of the configuration of organizational
resources which combine at the beginning of any given
cycle. Kevin Kelly, AHOP's first director, was quoted in a
Hartford Courant article (Romash, 1987) specifically on
this trend: "(i)t's not unusual for community groups to
go through cycles. You need to build, maintain, rebuild,
maintain." Moreover, once the groups reach a peak of
organizational capacity, if the key actors start to remove
themselves from the situation, the groups' effectiveness
can rapidly diminish.
In the late 1980' s this phenomenon occurred in
Hartford. All three organizations experienced tremendous
staff turnover: each changed directors at least twice and
organizer turnover was even more pronounced. The set of
directors of the three organizations during the previous
several years--each a very talented individual in his own
right--had achieved a very collaborative relationship and
were able to guide the organizations to function in
mutually-complementary ways. The collective departure
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AHOP's Kevin Kelly, HART's Mike Allison and ONE-CHANE' s
Eddie Perez over a relatively short time span effected
significant changes for each individual organization as
well as for their collective functioning. HART seemed to
have the most developed organizational infrastructure and
the greatest ability to maintain momentum. Its two
executive directors who served in the late 80's (one
continues into the 90's in the position) provided a great
deal of continuity for the organization. However, AHOP
had to totally reconstruct its apparatus and rebuild its
organizing capacity with an almost entirely new staff. As
of the beginning of the 1990'5, ONE-CHANE is taking on
more and more connunity development functions and while
still involved in organizing, is placing less
organizational emphasis on neo-Alinsky methods.
Another aspect of the organizational effectiveness
cycle involves what one veteran organizer described as a
certain type of limit or set of limits to the scope and
reach of the organizations. Rick Koz in, who held
organizing positions at HART and ONE-CHANE before moving
to Nebraska to continue his organizing career, observed
that there may come a point when the organizations are at
such a peak of activity and effectiveness that the logical
next steps - involve the groups, themselves, actually
creating the goods or services that they demand (a prime
example being housing) or filling the elected positions of
municipal government to be able to determine more
neighborhood -oriented public policy.
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In Hartford, given the particular set of constraints
in funding with supporting organizational by-law
provisions which preclude direct sponsorship of partisan
political activity, community development has been the
more available route. Of course, one of the major
stimuli for People for Change came from the failed linkage
campaign waged by these neighborhood organizations and
specifically from several of their key community leaders,
but the organizations as entities could not officially
sponsor or participate in People for Change, as has been
discussed earlier in great detail. The neighborhood
organizations, therefore, have in several different
manners pursued development options, and also some degree
of social service provision. These "spinoff effects" are
analyzed next.
Mergers and Spinoffs
The neighborhood groups in Hartford have both
absorbed other entities and created new organizations in
the courses of their respective histories. Before
examining these developments, it is useful to consider
certain incentives for participation offered by the
organizations and analyze the spinoffs with respect to how
they follow from these incentives and address those needs
which motivate residents' participation in the first
place.
Incentives and the Context for Spinoffs: Certainly
one of the greatest needs in the City of Hartford is
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fordable housing a constant reference throughout this
project. And, as mantioned earlier, all three
organizations engage in several different housing related
activities. Besides helping to create housing development
corporations, they also provide different forms of
information to area residents. The housing fairs which
HART holds make representatives of lending institutions
and housing service organizations available to help first-
time home buyers find their way through the maze of
programs, processes and paperwork associated with the
purchase of a home. The provision of this service helps
establish HART's worth t.o a segment of the population who
may not yet want to storm City Hall and who are introduced
to HART through this very tame, but helpful activity.
In the area of social service provision, AHCP's
unemployed group, Communication Development Enployment
Council (CDEC) evolved from direct action and advocacy to
a more traditional job training, job readiness and
referral service. AHOP was able to facilitate this shift
through its relationship with Asylum Hill, Inc. which
administers a state-assisted job training program. AHOP's
ability to refer interested individuals to the program
also functions as a type of incentive for involvement with
the organization.
Beyond the more general attraction to the
organizations due to the intellectual or political appeal
of the concept conmunity empowerment, these services do
stimulate interest and participation. In AHOP's case, the
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board of directors and its most recent exccutive director
are deeply committed to ensuring that grassroots
organizing continue to be the definitive feature of the
organization. HART is also firmly established in the
organizing tradition as its defining characteristic. As
alluded to above, the character of ONE-CHANE is in flux as
of the early 90's, but there will most likely continue to
be an organizing component, regardless of whether
development activities evenutally dominate the group's
activities.
Mergers and Acquisitions: While not an extensive
list of mergers, two of the Hartford neighborhood
groups in their current form represent combinations of
previously separate organizations. ONE-CHANE is the
merger of the neighborhood association -type ONE, whose
programs included development and social services, with
the more neo-Alinsky oriented CHANE. However, CHANE also
undertook housing developmnent projects prior to the
1988 merger since a constituency interested in development
activities existed within the group throughout its early
history. That the organization's priorities are somewhat
in flux as of the early 1990's around the question of the
relative emphasis on organizing or development is not a
totally unpredictable phenomenon.
AHOP has a rather complex set of arrangements with
other organizations. In its early years it absorbed an
independent social service organization in Asylum Hill,
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the HillI Center, and now continues to provide a number of
social services once provided by this center, but with a
distinctive gras sroots organizing flavor or orientation.
AH(-OP's nine to ten member staff include the director, two
to three organizers, two support staff , and four service
program staff. The building which housed the Hill Center
now houses AHOP.
Asylum Hill, Inc. (AHI) mentioned above in the
section on newsletters collaborates with AHOP on
employment programs and other activities such as the
newsletter. AHI together with the Hill Center and five
area churches constituted AHOP's initial sponsoring
organizations in the early 1980's.
Spinoffs: Due to the pressing need to acquire local
apartment buildings in order to maintain them as
affordable units, AHOP created a housing development
organization, Hill Housing, Inc. AHOP is the sole member
of the corporation's board of directors so that Hill
Housing is in all respects a subsidiary of AHOP. AHOP's
first director, Kevin Kelly, became Hill Housing's first
director.
Besides this direct spinoff, AHOP helped to create a
local child care center in cooperation with a local church
and the Hartford Region YWCA whose main branch is located
in Asylum Hill. AHOP also maintains a cooperative
relationship with a local soup kitchen, Loaves and Fishes,
shares information and referral resources and jointly
coordinates a small emergency relief fund with the
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kitchen.. Finally, as of mid 1990, AHOP is in the
intermediate stages of developing a new, larger community
center which will accommodate a broader range of
activities in Asylum Hill than is currently possible in
AHOP's present building or in combination with other
organizations and the local churches.
HART was instrumental in creating the Broad-Park
DeveloLment Corporation, referred to earlier. Although it
is in communication and works with dozens of organizations
throughout the southern half of Hartford as necessary,
HART, itself, has been less active or directly involved in
facilitating new local organizations than has AHOP.
These patterns do illustrate the fact that
neighborhood organizing in Hartford is built upon other
local neighborhood based organizations and can be
instrumental in creating new community-based institutions.
The spinoff effects are not simply other organizations,
but also different or new social processes in the
neighborhoods and the city.
CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to imagine what the social and
political landscape of Hartford would resemble without the
presence of the neo -Alinsky neighborhood organizations.
The concerns of the residents and the issues which these
groups address certainly would still exist and find some
manner of expression or give rise to some form of
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rganizationl. What is interesting .in Hartford is the
particular pattern of grassroots organization which has
evolved through the presence of AHOP, HART and ONE- CHANE.
Clearly these organizations have provided
opportuni ties for popular participation in local
developments and avenues for popular expression. Their
activities have helped to demystify government processes
and social issues for grassroots neighborhood residents.
They have also been able to protect neighborhood residents
from certain aspects of the deterioration of urban life
and communities underway in older northeast cities.
However, that process of deterioration continues to erode
the social fabric of Hartford and elsewhere as the 90's
begin: in September of 1990, one more study detailing one
more dimension of the city's poverty was released. This
report dealt with childhood hunger and estimated that
approximately 75% of low income families with children
under 12 years old either experience hunger or are at risk
of hunger in their households (Hispanic Health Council,
1990).
In the face of such poverty and with the needs of
the population so dire, the efforts of the neighborhood
organizations may resemble someone plugging a leak in a
dam with one finger, only to have a new leak spring up
elsewhere. The constraints of both methodology and
insufficient power or resources tend to compound the
difficulities in addressing local problems.
Methodologically, the localist orientation fosters a
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propensity to absorbp "anything that moves" in a particular
turf . For AHOP and ONE-CHANE most things that move are
moving in a redistributive direction, with goals of social
equality and a continuing strong role for local government
in solving social problems. However, in HART's larger
geographical area, many different things move in
conf Ii cting and sometimes outright contradictory
directions, placing HART as an organization in the
position of. mediating conflicting set of demands. HART's
significant constituencies of older homeowners and small
business people (many of whom live outside Hartford and
operate businesses or own property in the city) raise
demands for lower taxes and reductions in municipal
spending which come into conflict with other
constituencies' demands for greater levels of services,
especially in the areas of education and public safety.
This is a delicate situation for the organization, both
with respect to internal coherence and external
relationships with the other community organizations.
Moreover, to add to the complexities within this entire
mix, the issue of race relations is always under the
surface but tends to be minimized by the organizations.
Victories for neighborhood organizations are very
hard fought in most instances, especially in dealing with
landlords or the local municipal bureaucracy. Often
success has to be measured in small doses, in very
incremental units or steps, or in a group's capacity to
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prevent further erosion of the quality of life in an area.
They are often successful in forcing powerful interests to
pay attention to their presence and demands, but may not
always possess sufficient power to significantly alter the
overall direction of development in a given neighborhood.
Nonetheless, through the years they have become quite
adept at working through the maze of zoning boards and
city departments to attempt to forestall some plans.
However, when these groups do have the opportunity to
create their own institutions, housing development
corporations or day care centers, a deeper sense of
organizational accomplishment and power is achieved.
By building upon other local institutions such as
churches, small service organizations or neighborhood
improvement associations, these neighborhood organizations
have achieved a presence and attained a level of power for
neighborhood residents. That power tends to be rather
elusive and fluctuates with the cycles of organizational
effectiveness which the groups experience, but in
Hartford's mix of conflicting and competing interests,
these groups do command responses. Individual leadership
has played a significant role in each organization,
however, the cycle effect of changing leadership makes for
a measure of discontinuity, as well.
There are times when the work of the neighborhood
organizations has a great deal in common with that of
labor, but often this is not the case. Common roots of
problems experienced by labor and neighborhood
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organizations are niot necessarily apparent and alliances
with labor are not automatically sought by the
neighborhood groups. In the final chapter, we will move
on to compare the work of the two types of organizations
and offer the conclusions to this research.
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COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Vice President for Organizing in 1199-New
England, David Pickus, describes his approach to potential
members: he tells them that he is not a salesman, he is not
selling encyclopedia, he is offering a vehicle for them to
help themselves and if they want it, they will have to work
to get it. Perhaps less eloquent than the Frederick
Douglas statement regarding power conceding nothing
without a struggle, but an apt assessment of the work of
his union and, I would add, that of the other organizations
studied in this research.
Many implications flow from an analysis of the work
of these organizations, particularly in the context of
economic restructuring. First there is the issue of
comparison: as this research was in its beginning stages a
question sometimes surfaced from colleagues about
"comparing apples and oranges". Was it possible or
appropriate or even necessary to compare labor organizing
and neighborhood organizing since on the surface they are
such a very different set of activities. Having undertaken
and approaching the conclusion of the project, I believe
that there are a number of worthwhile points to be drawn
from such a comparison, and that it is an appropriate line
of inquiry. Particularly for researchers who explore and
attempt to analyze the impact of economic restructuring on
communities and workplaces, and who might wish to consider
why it is so difficult to fashion cohesive responses to
these developments, this project can aid in formulating
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some answers.
Comparing the models and methods of work of
neighborhood organizations and labor unions might also lead
down a path which asks if they can collaborate and why this
could be be important. If it is important in terms of
providing vehicles for people to confront and participate
in social and economic change, then it would be useful to
consider the problems and issues in such collaboration.
Beyond issues for the specific organizations involved,
there are implications for the wider community and how life
is experienced in urban areas, how the fabric of community
is affected by the work of these' organizations.
Finally, there are implications for future research
and theory which can flow from this analysis. While this
work has not been set forth in highly theoretical terms,
this research is relevant to certain areas which are under
discussion and being debated in recent urban studies
literature, including the important question of whether
there is still life within urban politics.
To deal with these questions, this final chapter is
organized into three sections. The first section will
compare the two types. of organizing and will deal with one
set of questions that framed this project: in what ways are
the practices of the two types of organizations similar and
different. The second section will present several
conclusions to the research and will be concerned with how
these two different forms of social movements impact the
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contemporary social, political and economic environment,
both separately and in their joint activities, as well as
the prospects for alliances between them. The third
section will outline various implications for future
research and practice and consider several different
questions which might be suggested from the work.
COMPARISONS
There are a variety of points of comparisons between
the neighborhood organizations and the labor unions that
were observed in this project. Three broad categories will
be discussed in this section: one kind of comparison
involves organizational processes or methodologies, and
structures. Another encompasses how each confronts the
power of external forces and amasses its own power.
Finally, there is the issue of outcomes from the work of
the two types of organizations, both for individuals who
are members or participants and for the larger community or
society.
Organizational Processes, Methodologies and Structures
If both kinds of organizations help individuals learn
how to stand up and confront powerful actors or forces,
they each use somewhat different means to achieve that end.
Some of the differences are extremely obvious, others are
more subtle, and yet, there are some similarities, as
discussed in the analysis which follows.
One of the basic and most apparent differences
between unions and the neighborhood groups are their
organizational structures. Neighborhood organization
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participants are volunteers who can come and go and the
organizations are constituted to accommodate these
conditions. Unions consist of dues paying members who, in
extreme cases, can sue the organization if they feel the
union has failed to properly represent their interests,
much the same way the client of an attorney or physician
can sue for malpractice. Such lawsuits rarely happen.
However, the different structures are reflective of these
different bases of membership and participation. In
effect, unions have a legal accountability to their
members. Inasmuch as the neighborhood organizations are
non-profit corporations, they are accountable to funders
and boards of directors, but their accountability to the
people who participate in their activities is somewhat
indirect.
Both build their overall structures from organized
activity at the base: the neighborhood organizations
serve as umbrellas of local block or area level formations
or special constituencies such as seniors citizens; and
specifically in the case of amalgamated union locals, the
union organization is built upon shop committees in each
worksite.
While maintaining communication between the base and
the organizational center is very important in each case,
there are several other levels of organization within labor
unions which may be important factors in goal attainment.
In the case of the Colt strike, the regional office of the
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UAW played a pivotal role and the change in regional
directors was very imp-rtant in the eventual outcome of the
strike.
Leadership is also very important in neighborhood
organizing in terms of guidance for the organizations in
achieving their goals, but changing that leadership is
somewhat easier for these groups. When AHOP's board of
directors felt that one executive director could not
adequately fulfill his responsibilities, they asked him to
resign and did not have to mount an election or take their
request to a higher level of the organization to accomplish
the change.
There are also basic differences in structure between
the neighborhood groups and the unions with regard to what
types of officers and committees are necessary or
mandated. In fact, the UAW constitution specifies several
committees locals must establish. The three different
unions in this project also differ structurally from each
other, while the neighborhood organizations have
essentially similar structures.
Generally the leader of a union has the title of
president, business agent or, in some cases, secretary-
treasurer, and is vested with the authority to make many
types of ' decisions about the organization and its
activities. Moreover, upon assuming the respective
position, this leader typically works as a full-time union
functionary. Within the UAW, the shop chairperson in large
plants often also works full-time as a union functionary
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within the shop, handling grievances and other union
matters. This arrangement is quite different than in the
neighborhood organizations where the president is a
volunteer and the executive director is the highest full-
time functionary. The issues that may arise from such
differences are discussed in detail in the chapter on
coalitions but briefly restated, this arrangement means
that neighborhood group executive directors tend to share
leadership with and refer back to their boards and
presidents before taking action or making many kinds of
important decisions.
All of the organizations attempt to increase their
numbers and expand their influence. The tendency toward
larger amalgamated organizations exists in all three
unions, as well as patterns of mergers with other locals or
international unions. Larger organizations afford more
power and leverage, both with employers and in the
political arena. The neighborhood groups enlarge the scope
of their work in two ways: initiating more constituency
groups, block clubs, and other activities, and diversifying
their functions through acquiring social service
organizations, assuming housing development responsibili-
ties within their staffs or creating spinoffs. So while
unions increase their power by new organizing and joining
with other unions, neighborhood groups, who can' t enumerate
a membership on the basis of people who pay dues, increase
their power by building capacities and sometimes absorbing
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other smaller organizations.
One very striking difference in the processes of the
two types of organizations is in the role of the organizer.
The role of the labor organizer in dealing with members or
potential members is directive, that is, the organizer
conducts the meetings and has clear responsibility for its
direction. In numerous situations in which the three
unions were observed, organizers fulfilled their roles by
constructing the agenda and assigning tasks which had to be
undertaken. Rank-and-file members may at some points run
meetings on their own, but the organizer is in essence a
I ink to the rest of the union.
Within the neighborhood organizations, the organizers
play a more facilitative, consultive and less directive
role. Neighborhood residents or one of the group
participants conduct the meetings. As was discussed in the
chapter on neighborhood organizing, the organizer tends to
inject him/herself only at critical moments in order to
clarify 'a situation or set of options, or to suggest
something which may be overlooked by others in attendance.
What is similar in the role of the organizer in both
types of organizations however, is that s/he does not
perform tasks which are required to advance the
organization, but rather facilitates the members and
participants assuming responsibilities and accepting
assignments. Both kinds of organizers look for similar
qualities in potential'leaders, including this willingness
to accept the goals and tasks of the organization and to
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take -responsibility on oneself for the process of
empowerment.
For unions, there has been a fairly large distinction
between what is required in organizing new members--the
various laws and processes which circumscribe an organizing
drive--and much of the rest of their work. Work with
existing memberships is similar to new organizing in terms
of the goal of members taking on responsibilities and
learning how to organize themselves, however, organized
worksites present a different set of issues and problems,
often of incredible complexity. After the struggle to get
the union's "foot in the door" is over, staying in the room
is difficult and must be negotiated and renegotiated. In
the era of overt union-busting, staying organized is coming
to resemble new organizing in terms of what may be required
of members. In some instances it is more difficult: the
four year long strike at Colt was more challenging to
sustain than are most union organizing drives.
All of this is said to contrast the challenges
inherent in different phases of unions' work with that of
neighborhood organizing where such ready demarcations do
not exist. Rather, work with the participants in the
neighborhood organizations consists more of a developmental
process in which over time participants strengthen their
capacity to take on increasingly more difficult issues.
However, there is greater lattitude for the neighborhood
group participants to set their own goals and agenda than
329
for un ion-i members who cannot necessarily anticipate and
certainly cannot control what employers might Co.
Moreover, unionized worksites can be decertified: the
workers can vote to do away with their union and unionized
status. For a neighborhood organization, participation in
a given area may dwindle, but residents do not have an
option of formally voting the organization out of
existence.
While there is an observable cycle effect of
organizational capacity and leadership effectiveness within
the neighborhood organizations which flows from the models
and methodologies employed by the neighborhood groups,
there was not an analagous process observed among the labor
unions. Perhaps because the tenure of office among many
of the leaders of these particular unions has been quite
lengthy, and due to the fact that union offices involve
full-time employment with consequently more incentive for
individuals to remain in the position, the same type of
effect could not be observed.
In the most significant instance of a change, in union
leadership among the unions in this project, that of UAW
Local 376 and Region 9A, one prominent leader, Phil
Wheeler, did not leave the organization, but instead moved
up within the UAW hierarchy. His expertise and influence
were not lost to the organization but actually extended.
UAW Local 376 did experience some disruption upon Wheeler's
departure, but the individual who assumed the presidency,
Robert Madore, remained in close consultation with Wheeler
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until eventua e also became a regional official.
Even with this qui.te significant leadership shift within
the UAW, there seems to be more continuity within the three
union organizations than among the neighborhood groups in
terms of overall organizational stability during leadership
change.
For the labor unions, a rich and varied labor history
exists which informs and helps to guide their work. Each
of the three unions situates its work within either its own
traditions or this more general history. Certain facets of
the unions' practices resemble traditional practices of
political parties, and indeed even democratic-centralist,
Leninist parties. For example, within the UAW, the tri-
annual constitutional convention is defined as the highest
body of the organization, similar to Leninist
organizations. In potential strike situations, once a vote
is taken to begin a strike, all members are expected to
honor the picket line whether or not they voted in favor of
the strike.
For the neighborhood organizations there is not an
analagous history or tradition to which participants and
leadership relate, save the localized tradition within
Hartford over the span of years of the three organizations'
existence and a very general reference to Alinsky.
Although the various national organizations and networks
which were described in Chapter 2 are beginning to define a
history of neighborhood organizing, and scholar -activists
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such as Fisher and Delgado are beginning to analyze its
effects, the Hartford organizations tend not to relate to
these national developments or situate themselves within a
larger national history or tradition. However, one might
argue that the Hartford groups broadly incorporate New Left
models of participatory-democractic organizational style,
combined with elements from the Catholic left, of which the
founders of HART were a part.
Both organizational styles carry the potential for
manipulation of membership by leaders, but both have
various checks and balances. Both also offer a wide
variety of opportunities for participation by grassroots
people and/or rank-and-file members. Each confronts power
with different kinds of strategies and tactics, and this is
discussed next.
Strategies and Tactics: Confronting Power and Wielding
Power
There are important differences in the contexts
within which choices of strategies and tactics by the two
types of organizations take place. The strategies and
tactics employed by the unions and neighborhood
organizations are fashioned to meet specific situations
and problems. For unions, the issues and goals have tended
to be quite specific: winning a collective bargaining
election, winning a particular grievance, negotiating a
contract, and so on. However, during the increasingly
hostile climate of the 1980's, labor had to respond to a
more generalized challenge. Yet, large segments of the
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labor novement were il - -prepared for the task , having
become accustomed to the legitimacy afforded labor in the
post World War II era. To compound the problem further,
the wcrksite issues, themselves, grew ~more difficult in the
hostile climate.
The neighborhood organizations were born and/or grew
to maturity in this national context of political
conservatism, attacks on the social wage and decreasing
federal commitment to the social welfare state and to urban
concerns. Much of their methodology was formulated within
this climate and was devised in a manner which did not rely
on any legal structure for legitimacy. In Hartford, the
neighborhood organizations' development transpired in a way
that was largely separate from other social movements,
building their capacities almost from scratch, with some
assistance from local religious organizations. Neighborhood
organizations, like unions, concerned themselves with very
specific issues, but not at any real cost organizationally:
neighborhood organizations have not been the target of the
same type of assault as unions have and have not had to be
as introspective about what they must do to confront a
hostile external climate.
One obvious factor in strategy decisions by all of
the groups in the research is that choices reflect the
desire to win an issue or struggle. However, definitions
of success may vary, as well as what are perceived as
obstacles to success. There are still the very specific
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issues for the unions, as there are for neighborhood
gro-ups. A particular grievance or the installation of a new
traffic light at a specific intersection may both involve a
fairly specific target and often a relatively small group
of people can achieve such victories.
In the more complex questions, the definitional
problems may cloud the issue. For example, although the
the union eventually won in the Colt strike, questions were
often raised throughout the strike and even in the euphoria
of the settlement as to whether the victory was
commensurate with the costs, especially in human terms.
Union members outside the UAW, as well as parties outside
the labor movement voiced this concern. For the UAW,
success in the Colt strike had to be defined and was
realized in stages, first largely focusing on winning the
case at the NLRB, setting the stage for the eventual
backpay award, participation in the buy-out, and the
strikers going back to work. However, success at each step
along the way did not guarantee success at the next phase,
and victory had to be eked out of the incredibly arduous
process.
By way of contrast, 1199 has opted to fold strikes in
various situations based on what its leadership perceives
as the costs in terms of union resources, the potential for
success and the capacity of strikers to persevere: despite
all of their efforts in the Kimberly Hall strike of 1990,
1199 decided to await NLRB action and halt all other strike
activities.
334
Neighborhood organizing , drawing heavil y on Al insky' s
ideas, readily emphasizes "winnable" struggles and
immediate, specific victories or results in order to both
demonstrate the worth of organizing and maintain interest
and participation in the organizations. The leadership of
these organizations like to be able to point to very
specific results as proof of their group's viability.
Complex issues such as linkage are far more difficult to
win and since the linkage defeat of 1986, the neighborhood
groups have become more circumspect about all-or-nothing
battles. As difficult as issues such as housing or crime
may be, limited or incremental successes may be achieved
which can be claimed as victories by the organizations.
A common feature to both types of organizing is that
most successes are built upon mobilizations of members or
participants. Organizers in each organization spend large
quantities of time insuring turnout to events or actions at
city hall, the state legislature and other locations. Both
types of organizations also strike a balance between
confrontation and compromise, not opting in every instance
for confrontation, but with the threat or "insurance" of
their organizing capacities which can produce large,
boisterous and disruptive crowds, when necessary.
The question of the "insurance" for the organizations
which derives from their abilities to mobilize also points
to another common feature for all six groups. Besides
defining success in terms of winning issues or campaigns,
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success also becomes defined as building the capacity of
the particular organization in question. Hence 1199 may be
willing to see a nursing home close during a strike
rather than agree to concessions which would undermine its
power against other nursing homes in the future. Likewise,
AHOP leaders and staff would rather not have the Guardian
Angels come into their turf do deal with crime and in so
doing both undermine group consensus within AHOP due to the
surrounding controversy, as well as create an alternative
organization in Asylum Hill. They describe this phenomenon
as not being "organizational", meaning that it does not
build organizational capacity for AHOP.
Labor organizers emphasize that employers hold
immense power over workers by virtue of controlling
livelihood and incomes, something they contend is
unparalleled in community or neighborhood organizing. The
only comparison they might entertain is that of landlords'
power over tenants or financial institutions' power over
people who face the loss of their home. But since the major
focus of unions' work revolves around workplace issues
which are directly related to the maintenance of people's
livelihoods and incomes, there is always great potential to
evoke the enmity and wrath of employers and often serious
risks for union members who are vocal and outspoken. In
most neighborhood organizing scenarios, there is not an
analagous risk factor.
Building power among union workers necessarily
requires building the confidence among workers to confront
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their em:ployer. Therefore, specific victories over
relatively small issues are important in union work as well
as in neighborhood organizing. However, it is difficult to
remain at this more simplified level of confrontation
because eventually contract negotiations arise and the
intensity of conflict elevates substantially. Neighborhood
organizations have more choice as to how and when to
escalate a struggle and may choose not to engage
participants in heightened confrontation if they are at a
disadvantage. However, this may lead to a perception of
the organizations as weak or bluffing.
Perhaps the most important-set of differences between
the two types of organizations in terms of using and
confronting power is in the interaction with laws and legal
procedures. The chapter on coalitions highlighted these
differences in relation to how they impacted the
functioning of the Community Labor Alliance during the Colt
s trike- -the types of frustrations experienced by
neighborhood organizers in conforming with the UAW's
reliance on attorneys.
Beyond the use of legal strategies to win strikes,
another dimension of this difference may be understood in
considering how unions relate to legal and legislative
reform: in 1990, for example, unions began lobbying the
U.S. Congress for legislation which would outlaw the hiring
of permanent replacement workers during strikes--an attempt
to enact and rely upon a law to overcome a disadvantage
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uons currently suffer. This type of goal, the passage of
nationa- legislation, is sometring which could deeply
affect the three unions in this project. However, such an
activity is also something totally beyond the scope of the
neighborhood organizations, both in terms of how they view
their mission and what they would commit themselves to
accomplish or be a part of accomplishing. Yet, the reforms
which unions most require are national in scope in the
main: they are part of a set of national conditions which
are played out in local settings. The inherent localism of
neighborhood groups' operations and the issues which they
embrace make them loathe to take on such campaigns.
In another example of the impact of law on unions,
1199-SEIU awaits a decision in 1990 as to whether the U.S.
Supreme Court will hear an appeal of a ruling favorable to
the union with regard to unit determinations in hospital
organizing drives. The union hopes that the court will
refuse to hear the case and allow a lower court ruling to
stand which specifies smaller units. The outcome of this
case will have long-lasting implications for the fate of
hospital organizing by all unions in the healthcare arena
and will likely set precedents for organizing in other
sectors.
Neighborhood organizations are more able to take
advantage of public relations -oriented strategies, creating
impressions through the media and using tactics as protest
to gain leverage. Institutions, banks, or individual
public officials are generally very concerned any about
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negative publicity which neighorhood groups can generate.
Unions also use these tactics , but they may not produce
results as readily for labor as for neighborhood groups.
Colt, Genesis Corporation and other employers were or are
content to live with bad publicity in order to break their
employees' unions. This is one more factor in why unions
pursue legal strategies and legislative reform.
Incentives and Outcomes
Incentives: People join and participate in both types
of organizations for a number of reasons. In the case of
unions there are definite material issues which serve as
incentives to organize: low pay, poor working conditions,'
unfair supervisors, lack of benefits and so on. However,
union organizers cite another type of incentive or
motivation of a more intangible nature: the desire to be
treated with dignity. Especially in the case of the low
paid service workers who 1199 and HERE consistently target
in organizing drives, but also among the UAW's existing
membership and in its new organizing, the quest for dignity
on the job is a very crucial factor. In fact, 1199 uses
the slogan "Work With Dignity" on buttons, posters and in
other printed materials.
In nursing home organizing motivation often comes
from the owner--perhaps a young white male entrepreneur--
who treats grown women workers more than twice his age,
many of whom are African American, West Indian or Latina,
as if they are children incapable of exercising any
339
independent judgment or making decisions . Likewise among
hotel managers and even university adIinstrations, as the
UAW has discovered with its members who are maintenance
workers at the University of Hartford. Organizers maintain
that the desire to be treated with respect and dignity on
the job is the most powerful factor in union organizing.
Similar to neighborhood organizing, much of the
motivation to unionize emanates from immediate self -
interest, although a self-interest which arises from
worksite issues. In settings which have been unionized
for some time the fervor which sustains new organizing may
not be present in the workforce, but the need for an on-
going organization to defend employees' interests is
generally evident to a segment of the workforce who
participate in and sustain the organization. Although
there is always the potential for antagonism between
workers and their supervisors or employers, many workers
do not relate actively to their union until some type of
crisis erupts or a contract has to be negotiated. The
three unions observed in this project attempt to deal with
these classic "free-rider" issues by providing
opportunities for involvement by their membership in a wide
range of activities from political action to union training
sessions to conventions and even charity walk-a-thons.
UAW Region 9A sponsored two walk-a-thons to raise funds for
local homeless and anti-hunger organizations in 1990.
By creating avenues for involvement in both worksite
and larger community issues, as these unions attempt to do,
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they are also diversifying the benefits of membership.
While many labor unions are experimenting with membership
benefits such as low interest credit cards, pre-paid legal
services, low cost insurance and other consumer services,
the unions in this research focus less on what some of
their leaders consider gimmicks and more on the difficult
challenges of organizing and meeting existing members'
needs.
Neighborhood organizations build participation upon
the self -interest which manifests in community problems and
issues. Because these issues can sometimes be less obvious
or easier to ignore than worksite issues, participation in
the groups' campaigns may have to be cultivated more
deliberately. Since there is no vote required to establish
the organization, non-involvement rather than pro- or con-
sentiments becomes the problem. A small group of people
may initially raise an issue, but a wider audience
generally has to be developed and activated in order to
sustain an issue campaign. Different incentives may need
to be offered to familiarize and accustom neighborhood
residents to the benefits of participation. Social service
provision and housing development are among the incentives
and benefits offered by the groups.
However, analagous to the quest for dignity on the
job, many individuals are motivated to participate in
neighborhood organizations because the groups offer an
opportunity to defend the community against speculators,
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cr.ime and government excess or tran;s gression. Community
empowerment themes do have appeal . Even thg-i-h the
organizations eschew electoral politics, they function as
quasi -political entities by aggregating and presenting
claims upon the government and the local state, in
particular.
In brief, then, incentives for joining and
participating in both the unions and neighborhood
organizations have two bases: tangible, material benefits,
and issues of individual and collective empowerment. The
outcomes of both types of organizational agenda reflect
these two tendencies and are discussed next.
Outcomes: The outcomes of the existence of the labor
movement are so numerous and complex that it is ludicrous
to attempt to proffer a generalized list. Labor history
offers myriad insights into a more generalized
understanding of his tory; labor relations influence many
social processes beyond the workplace, itself. However,
the three unions of this research have had important
specific impacts in Hartford in recent years, and
particularly on the movements for social change in the
area.
From the experience of the Colt strike has come an
entirely new level of recognition by many local forces of
the impact of labor relations on the community at large.
It was the strike which generated mutual interest on the
part of the labor and' the neighborhood organizations never
previously evidenced. Especially with the eventual victory
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of the strikers regaining their jobs, the potential of
unions was demonstrated to some members of the community
who never before paid attention to labor issues.
There are trade unionists who believe that a strike
of such duration tends to dampen enthusiasm for new
organizing and can have an overall negative effect for
union efforts in the area in contract negotiations as well
as in organizing. Quantifying this assertion is quite
difficult: how does one measure something which did not
occur because of the strike against those events which
actually did occur. However, it is interesting to note
that it was during the midst of the strike that University
of Hartford maintenance workers approached the UAW to
organize. The UAW leadership asserts that the maintenance
workers' interest in organizing developed because the Colt
strikers and the union served as examples of workers
defending themselves.
The activities of HERE and 1199 also help to
demonstrate that people can and do stand up for themselves
against employers and, more importantly, deserve to treated
with respect on the job. In the case of 1199 and its state
employees, new standards of public employee unionism are
being defined. 1199's progress in collective bargaining
with the State of Connecticut sets the pace for over one
dozen other unions who deal with the state government, this
author's own university faculty union included.
Effective union techniques serve as examples in
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arenas other than the workplace. Organizing drives involve
very specific tracking of supporters and opponents.
Techniques from organizing drives have been adapted to
electoral work and have helped LEAP and People for Change
effectively garner and mobilize support. People for
Change and LEAP are themselves key examples of the impact
which unions, working with other forces and sharing
resources, can have in a community and through the efforts
of the UJAW and other forces are being replicated in other
locales.
These types of community effects have to be weighed
against the tremendous obstacles which unions face, both in
Hartford and nationally, and how these problems become
perceived by the public. Setbacks of the labor movement
are very public affairs, in both the local and national
context. For example, when the UAW lost a major campaign
at Nissan in 1989 in Smyrna, Tennessee, it was highly
publicized in every major national media outlet. Little
was mentioned about the company's hiring procedures in
which workers who would potentially support unionization
were systematically screened out of the applicant pool.
However, when the UAW won elections at Mack Truck in South
Carolina in 1988, or at Freightliner, a subsidiary of the
German firm Daimler-Benz, in 1990 in North Carolina,
publicity occurred within labor and left publications, but
hardly anywhere else. Locally, the closing of two downtown
hotels in Hartford has been attributed in some accounts to
labor costs which derive from unionization. These events
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and the media coverage surroun-ding them can lead to
percepti ons that unions are no longer necessary or
relevant, or that they are such risky propositions that
organizing is not worth the gamble and that unions
eventually put firms out of business, anyway.
Union leaders and organizers face all of these issues
when they approach a new group of workers in the beginning
of a campaign or when they start a new round of contract
negotiations. Their role in interpretting events and
trends to members and potential members is critical in
producing the next set of effects which will impact the
workplace and the community. The union internal education
activities and union-produced media are therefore very
important in shaping responses among rank-and-file members
who can communicate ideas to wider segments of the
community and who also may need philosophical or
ideological strengthening and preparation in order to
tackle their own issues.
Whereas sometimes the outcomes and effects of the
unions' work have implications beyond the confines of the
specific worksite--wage patterns or legal precedents may
be established through certain local developments which
influence the prospects for other unions in other areas,
the outcomes and effects of the neighborhood organizations'
work tend to be more localized in nature and often can be
readily demonstrated. The leadership and participants of
these groups point to very specific effects: physical
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changes nei housing rehabilitation i
particular buildings, specific policies adopted by the city
government. In neighborhood organizing there is not the
constant fear of losing financial and material resources
among participants which inhibits organization as is the
case in labor organizing. The major obstacle is apathy
moreso than the fear inherent in labor organizing, and the
challenge for neighborhood organizers is to confront and
overcome this apathy.
One important effect of the neighborhood
organizations in Hartford is the cultivation and
development of new local leadership. While as
organizations the three groups have to confront the issue
of maintaining involvement of past presidents and other
former leaders, this problem does not diminish the fact
that a large number of individuals from the grassroots have
learned how to make government and other institutions more
responsive to community needs and have gone on to
participate in other dimensions of community life. Not
every past president becomes a city council member as has
Marie Kirkley-Bey, or the chairperson of People for Change
as Ron Cretaro became, but neighborhood organizing was
the springboard for their emergence and for others'
development into community leaders.
The capacity of the neighborhood organizations to
safeguard neighborhood interests is very important for city
residents. Developers and city officials do have to factor
the response of these organizations into the plans which
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they construct for the city. There are some difficult
issues for the neighborhood groups, however, when the
question of taxation arises and different constituencies
within the same organization can offer competing sets of
demands.
The neighborhood organizations' work is often seen
and felt locally, specifically and concretely. The labor
unions' work is not necessarily experienced so visibly,
except perhaps during strikes and in the large public
events which attend the strikes or other occassional
issues. What this points to is an asymmetry in attempting
to compare the two types of organizing. There is not a
neat line which divides social life down the middle, with
the world of work on one side and life in the community on
the other.
Both types of organizing produce beneficial results
for members and participants, but they are not necessarily
analagous in many respects. For example, the phenomenon of
union-busting is a part of contemporary labor relations,
but there is really no equivalent in neighborhood
organizing. The relative freedom to operate enjoyed by
neighborhood organizations means that they rely on
different techniques than labor unions, although we have
seen where there are some similarities. What both do offer
is the opportunity and the training to defend oneself and
one's co-workers or neighbors, as well as the potential for
individual and collective advancement. As we conclude this
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research, we will consider these and other features of
organizing in the two arenas.
CONCLUSIONS
These next considerations involve how the labor
unions and neighborhood organizations can and do work
together and inform each other, and how they impact
contemporary social, political and economic phenomena as
they confront the effects of changing economic conditions.
We will also discuss issues which are specific to Hartford
and those which are more generalizable.
Capacities and Opportunities for Collaboration
To start with, I would assert that there are no
objective reasons which should prevent both types of
organizations from working together. That is, except for
the electoral area which will be commented upon later,
differences in structure and organizational practices or
traditions do not constitute insurmountable barriers.
Rather, it is really a question of how open the leadership
of the respective organizations are to forging alliances,
how necessary they perceive alliances and coalitions to be
in achieving their goals, how tolerant they are of
alternative methodologies and ideologies, and how they
approach external relationships in general.
Kip Lockhart, the President of the Greater Hartford
Labor Council, and Phil Wheeler, former President of UAW
Local 376 and now the Director of UAW Region 9A, both feel
that coalitions are critical to the future of the labor
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movement and in different ways each factors coalition work
into their respective organizations' agendas. 1199-New
England President Jerry Brown and some of the HERE 217
leadership give somewhat less credence to an overriding
importance for coalitions, although other leadership of the
organizations do consider such work very important. The
neighborhood organizations are even less inclined to enter
coalitions unless the purposes coincide unambiguously with
organizational goals.
In order for the two types of organizations to
collaborate, there are several areas that would warrant
consideration in any joint undertaking. Before any
substantive decisions are attempted, there needs to be
clear mutual understanding of the respective organizational
processes each group adheres to in order to avoid simple
misunderstandings and so that unrealistic expectations do
not arise. The groups cannot be pushed to take actions in
specific .situations for which they do not have adequate
preparation. The organizational differences must be
respected, even if they seem non-sensical to the respective
"outsiders". It also seems that the best possibilities for
collaboration are in starting with small projects which
build trust and help to acquaint the different actors with
each other. Larger projects may result after people from
the different organizations know each other, not as a
result of an abstract notion about the general desirability
of coalitions.
349
S3omething which potentially builds respect and
empathy between the organizations is to participate in each
other' s mobilizations. When HART leaders, for example, can
witness 1199's vocalism and militancy, or when HERE's
members can support AHOP' s tenants groups, then the common
bonds are built. In Hartford, these simple acts of
attending other organizations' activities are very
difficult to effect: inertia can result from inflexibility
in individuals' schedules, lack of sufficient mutual
interest, or lack of making the support of other
groups' activities the priority of any given organization.
All of these factors are important in the success of
collaborative efforts.
Subsequent questions then arise as to whether it is
important that the two types of organizations work
together, and moreover, if they do indeed inform each other
or perhaps merely potentially complement each other as
forms of social movements. First, based on all of the
observations of this project I believe that in order even
to achieve their own goals, it can be very important for
them to work together, if for no other reason than neither
type of organization on its own can address the totality of
issues and problems in their members and participants'
lives, problems which for so many individuals overlap. For
example, low paid workers in insecure employment also are
likely to inhabit the worst housing in a locale, and the
problems in both arenas can compound and reinforce each
other. At this stage, however, it is unlikely that the
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unions in Hartford are going to devote huge amounts of
energy to housing-related issues, even though the union
leadership may recognize the severity of the problem.
Joint projects between unions and neighborhood
organizations around housing issues would certainly be
welcomed by housing advocates and one of the local housing
advocacy organizations is attempting to facilitate dialogue
between unions and community development corporations,
including AHP's subsidiary, Hill Housing, Inc. But any
cooperation is in its embryonic stages and will not see
fruition for a considerable amount of time.
Healthcare accessibility ahd affordability is another
area in which it would make sense for both types of
organizations to collaborate, given that many recent
strikes have focused in large measure on who will bear the
burden of healthcare coverage, and the most pressing
concern for all of the neighborhood organizations' seniors
groups is healthcare costs. Some initial efforts at
coalitions on healthcare are underway in Hartford, but
there is room for much more collaboration. Employment
creation would also seem a natural point of mutual concern,
but only minimal joint efforts have ever been undertaken.
Progress in developing mutual agendas comes slowly, having
to overcome mistrust and reticence at sharing resources,
human and otherwise, especially on the part of the
neighborhood organizations.
As we highlighted in Chapter 4 on coalitions', at this
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point it seems that the labor unions have a more apparent
need for cooperation from the neighborhood organizations in
such matters as strike support and occassionally in
organizing drives, but there are also less obvious ways in
which the neighborhood organizations could benefit from
labor union support. For example, in the Fall of 1990, as
a result of an emphasis on education-related issues within
AHOP's work in particular, but also among the other groups,
a school bonding referendum on the November ballot became a
priority of both HART and AHOP. Their lack of previous
organizational involvement with electoral campaigns led
them to overlook some of the obvious steps which might have
made their task easier, but they did make a general request
to the labor movement to support the bond questions. Much
more cooperation could have been achieved, especially since
the unions do participate routinely in electoral work.
Crossing the Boundary of Work and Community
One of the central concerns in the framing of this
project was whether labor organizing and neighborhood
organizing inform each other, or, it might be added,
potentially inform each other across the boundary of work
and community. That is, do the two forms ' of organizing
provide any insights or models which the respective other
form can or does draw from? As the work progressed, I
began to reconsider the question in terms of how these two
forms of organizing might complement each other, rather
than necessarily inform each other. First, we will
consider where there are possibilities to inform each
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other.
The greatest similarities seem to be in how both
forms of organizing identify and cultivate leadership,
engage frustration and anger to serve meaningful purposes,
and attempt to confront and redefine power relationships in
their respective environments. The dissimilarities in
organizational structures, relationships to legal processes
and ability to control agendas and timing with respect to
issues or campaigns serve to distinguish the organizations.
Moreover,
important
ideology, t
some risk
organizing
incorporate
organizing,
no space
approaches
such Fishei
Then there
one of the
ithin labor organizing ideology can be an
tool and if a union chooses to incorporate
here is space within the methodology. Despite
for the organizations, leftist ideological
is a specific option, and both 1199 and HERE 217
it into their work. Within neighborhood
specifically in Hartford, but also elsewhere,
has been created for explicitly ideological
to the work, much to the concern of analysts
or Delgado whose work is reviewed in Chapter 2.
is also the issue
greatest barriers
of
to
partisan electoral work--
collaboration--as well as
the very different funding bases and very different types
of accountability. Given all of this, where might there be
room to inform each other?
From the experience of this research, it does not
seem that at this point in their respective histories the
two types of organizing explicitly do inform each other,
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except -within references to Alinsky's original vision and
his inspiration for neighborhood organizing from labor and
the CIO. When mutual interest does manifest, it is
generally of a very instrumental nature and not an attempt
to learn from each other. However, it would seem that
there could be exchange, the most fruitful areas being
precisely those strategies and tactics which are the most
distinct from one another and those where the type of power
which is being confronted seems to be the most different.
By devling into each other's logic and methodologies,
various new options for both types of groups could be
developed. Labor could benefit from more of an appreciation
of how to operate outside of externally imposed legal
constraints, or for those unions who are already so
inclined, from consideration of new tactics to include in
their repertoire. Neighborhood organizing could benefit
from learning how, without surrendering autonomy, to use
legal means more effectively to achieve their ends and how
to use legislative reforms to forge social change. Such
exchange could certainly be accommodated within the Alinksy
vision and could easily be incorporated into labor's thrust
toward more outreach. Several examples of dialogue over
methodology between the neighborhood groups and unions have
occurred in Hartford: two workshops on organizing in the
arenas of work and community were held, one in June, 1986
and another in September, 1989. However, any lasting
effects of these efforts are difficult to estimate.
Attempts at collaboration still tend to be of an
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instrumental nature, that is, geared toward specific issues
and specific ends.
Given all of the afore-mentioned issues, it might be
more appropriate then to suggest that the two types of
organizing and types of organizations complement each
other's work. However, first it should be emphasized that
there are many more considerations in studying social
movements than either the sum of these two types of
organizations' activities or their separate enterprises.
So while they may be seen to complement each other, they
also complement other movements, as well. This also
relates to the point raised earlier that there is not a
symmetry between labor and neighborhood organizing: first
that they are not necessarily equivalent or of equal weight
in terms of processes or outcomes, but also that the two do
not add up to one whole and that other forms of social
movements complement the combination of their efforts.
However, there are several aspects to consider with regard
to how these two movements do indeed complement each other.
First, both focus on quality of life issues in their
respective environments and on material outcomes. Income,
employment, housing, public service provision and their
various other concerns all combine to affect standards of
living in given communities, in this case Hartford. The
impacts of both labor and neighborhood organizing do result
in specific consequences for the community and help shape
the fabric of the community. Second, the ways in which
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individuals learn to confront their conditions - -their
landl ord or employer or elected official - -al so impact
the quality of life, but in a more intangible fashion.
With varying degrees of success, these two types of
organizations offer people hope that they can sometimes
change conditions, that their efforts and collective will
can be a factor in power equations. Moreover, the notion
of empowerment--a process of. people gaining control over
their lives--can be a powerful motivation and the work of
both types of organizations offers genuine avenues to
achieve degrees of empowerment.
Empowerment, itself, may have to be understood as
meaning different things in each sphere, experienced in
quite different ways and evaluated using distinct criteria.
It could be argued that each form of organizing takes a
very dissimilar road toward a goal which each conceives
of' as empowerment, something which may sound or appear
similar, but in actuality is not mutually equivalent.
Moreover, empowerment may also need to be understood as
much as a process or condition(s) to be attained as it
is an outcome: more input into the course of community
development, less intimidation in the workplace--each of
these very qualitative and involving both the "what" and
the "how" in the respective organizing arena.
The different meanings and outcomes which empowerment
embodies may flow from both the different logics of the
organizing in the two arenas and the different social
dynamics that give rise to organizing in each sphere.
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For specific individuals, problems in one or the other--
the workplace or the community- -may be more compelling.
However, workplace relations and conditions in
neighborhoods and communities, in combination with other
factors as well, coalesce to produce the living standards
and the possibilities for different styles of life for
individuals, families and the larger community. The
specific social processes which produce the outcomes in
both spheres may or may not be closely related, but the
resulting conditions constitute what is experienced in a
community. It is in this sense that the achievements of
the two forms of organizing come to complement each other.
Confronting Economic Restructuring
The preceding three chapters on coalitions, labor
organizing and neighborhood organizing each have analyzed
the varieties of ways in which the organizations impact
social, political and economic phenomena in the context of
economic restructuring. Certain things that they do are
examples of refining techniques to meet more extreme
conditions, for example, the Blitz model of labor
organizing. Other activities create new forms of community-
controlled services and development: AHOP's spawning of
Hill Housing, Inc. or HART's housing fairs. However, there
are other activities which present new demands and new
claims on government and in effect begin to redefine the
public agenda.
The Community-Labor Alliance (CLA) transformed the
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Colt strike into a public issue and forced public officials
to take positions on the issue, recast2ng the strike from
the status of a "private" matter between employer and
employees to a community-wide issue with community -wide
implications. People for Change has attempted to take this
process further by pressing for new types of local
government action and intervention which support the
needs of union members and neighborhood residents and their
organizations, and also the demands of civil rights,
women's, gay rights', homeless advocacy organizations and
others. Whereas labor has historically been active in the
political arena, People for Change attempts to sharpen the
involvement and redefine the nature of how issues are
articulated and addressed. Its success has been limited in
terms of winning votes within City Council deliberations,
but it has certainly been able to recast political debate
in Hartford.
There are various ways in which certain unions are
beginning to carve out other new forms of community
involvement for their memberships which are based on the
joint status of union membership and community residency.
Although the New York organization of 1199 was not
specifically examined in this research, one example from
its work which was related by 1199-New England staff is
most interesting. 1199 in New York is working with the
teachers' union, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT),
to develop lines of communication between the teachers and
1199 members who have children in New York's public
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schools on matters of mutual interest. The initial
approach is made unionist-to-unionist/parent or vice versa,
thus highlighting a common status in order to break down
mistrust and facilitate greater parental involvement in the
schools. It was the UFT who approached 1199 and other
unions to begin this project.
Certain impacts of the work of these organizations
in this economic period could be described as perhaps
inevitable, that is, a union would be expected to fight a
plant closing or negotiate for wage increases and improved
working conditions. In that sense, the question arises as
to what is new about their responses in this time period
versus the pre-1970's onset of restructuring? From this
research, I would argue that one of the most important
factors has to be the ability of labor leadership to
understand emerging trends, assess situations and -forge new
courses of action, albeit risky ones. The innovations in
Hartford which have been described here are in large part
due to this capacity among the respective union leadership.
In the case of the neighborhood organizations, their
entire, relatively brief histories have been built upon
taking risks and cultivation of new grassroots leadership.
The choices that the organizational leadership--
professional staff and neighborhood residents--have made
also flow from the combination of their analytical
abilities and their visions for their respective
communities. There has been nothing inevitable in their
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work, it has been based on their judgment and choices, and
they have defined their courses of action.
Conditions in Hartford Compared to Those Elsewhere
The observations above lead to one of the final
discussion points of this research, the issues which are
unique to Hartford and those which are replicable or more
generalizable. The obvious point that the events and
developments in Hartford are a result of the city's
specific history with its specific institutions and
particular individual organizations and leaders does not
need a great deal of elaboration. However, certain
patterns within the events in Hartford do seem to conform
with larger trends. These include strike support
coalitions and, more generally, community-labor coalitions
which arise from strikes, capital flight and other issues
once thought to be labor's province which now are seen as
affecting entire communities. Brecher and Costello's
anthology (1990) documents and analyzes the experiences of
such coalitions over the past decade, including a brief
account by this author (Simmons, 1990) of several issues in
Hartford coalitions, as assessed in Chapter 4. Electoral
coalitions are also viewed as part of the "emerging
alliance" of labor and community forces upon which Brecher
and Costello focus, and People for Change (PFC) and LEAP
are indeed being used as models from which other locales
can extract various lessons.
One area which is truly unique to Hartford and which
may not be replicable elsewhere is the governmental
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framework in which People for Change emerged. That it
arose as a possibility is largely a product of several
specific structural features of Hartford's municipal
government: the at-large city council elections, the size
of the city council at nine members, the Connecticut
statute which mandates minority party representation.
Other factors which gave rise to PFC are perhaps found more
readily in other cities: disaffected Democrats, labor
activists, frustrated community forces, and under-
represented cormmnunities of Color. Also, as was discussed
in Chapter 4, the option of creating a third party was
viewed differently by the the various forces involved, some
seeing it as worthy goal of a more permanent nature and
others seeing it a tactical decision for the specific
situation. The third party option may or may not be seen
as necessary or possible in other municipalities.
There are regional differences in economic conditions
and huge sectoral distinctions in terms of dominant
industries that shape and influence the response of forces
in different cities which are analagous to Hartford's
organizations. There are also different local traditions
and differences in the way unions are regarded by community
forces in various cities. If, for example, labor has been
more integral to community issues and local politics than
in Hartford, then perhaps the problems encountered both in
the CLA and PFC may not be so prominent.
Many of the examples in this dissertation were drawn
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from the experience of the Colt strike. This was certainly
a unique strike, especially in its conclusion. But if it
was unique, it had regional and even national implications.
To being with, the work of the CLA would have been
important whether the strike was won or lost. Given that
the union was able to persevere and win, the CLA's efforts
have been hailed as exemplary on a national basis by the
UAW and other labor organizations. The determination of
the strikers has likewise been hailed nationally. However,
there have been other strikes of both larger and smaller
proportions which have not resulted in the ultimate success
of a union victory, but which have involved the same degree
of sacrifice and community solidarity. Labor and community
forces can look to these experiences for lessons, as well
as the Colt strike. Certainly the efforts of the Jay,
Maine paperworkers come to mind: on numerous occassions,
they participated in Colt strike support activities and
their accounts of their strike support activities seemed to
often surpass the efforts of the CLA.
One area which has been emphasized in this analysis
is the role of neighborhood organizations vis a vis
electoral work, specifically their refraining from partisan
participation. This has been traced to two factors,
methodological considerations and funding considerations:
some neighborhood organization staff members vehemently
oppose partisan electoral participation and all of the
organizations are expressly prohibitted from such
participation within bi-laws in order to conform with
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funding rest-ictions. Whether ote neo-Alinsky
organizations in other cities share in this orientation or
are similarly constrained by funders may impact the
directions of local political initiatives and indeed
national electoral developments. Moreover, the general
disposition toward coalition work may vary greatly among
different neo-Alinsky organizations and national networks.
Hartford's organizations happen to take the particular
stances described in Chapters 4 and 6, but other
organizations may view coalitions much differently and the
coalition work in their communities may proceed much
more easily.
One of the things which I would argue is the most
generalizable is that individuals do look for avenues to
respond .to problems in their workplaces and communities and
also look for ways to express their grievances and
frustrations. Whether they find the more constructive
outlets of the unions and neighborhood organizations that
are available to the respective constituencies in Hartford
depends a great deal on labor and community leadership in
their particular area. With all of their limitations and
despite all of the setlbacks and defeats, Hartford's
neighborhood organizations and labor unions, specifically
those in this study, provide the city with leadership who
are willing to innovate, take risks and aggressively work
to move their memberships and participants toward the
elusive goal of empowerment.
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The activities of both forms of organizing have
important impacts on the Hartford community,* both
qualitatively and quantitatively, both subjectively for
individuals who participate and objectively for the
conditions in the larger community. They are not
necessarily equivalent, but in combination they offer their
members and participants greater possibility for control
over their lives, and that. possibility is all that they
promise.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE
This project was intended as an exploratory effort
to document and analyze organizational responses to
economic restructuring in the arenas of work and community
and to do so by examining labor and community
organizations in Hartford, Connecticut. It was not
intended to test one specific theory but rather to use the
insights of numerous authors as the context for the
inquiry. However, some of the developments highlighted in
this research may either have theoretical implications or
speak to emerging debates in the urban studies literature.
Recent Theoretical Work and Relationships To This Project
One of the ways in which I believe this research
helps to build knowledge is in its focus on organizations
within a specific locale. Typically, case studies of
economic restructuring focus on industries, regions or
cities, but not on labor or community organizations in
reference to their specific adjustments and adaptations to
the socio-economic environment. However, authors such as
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Smith and Tardanico (1987) call for an examination of the
miL4crostructur-es of social, economic and political life as
an essential component in our understanding of and ability
to adequately theorize about economic and spatial
restructuring. They argue specifically for consideration
of the household unit and household activities as "basic
elements of group and class formation in any social
system" (p.100). I would suggest that collectivities such
as neighborhood organizations and local labor unions are
also among such microstructures at a level immediately
above or outside the household unit. Moreover, I would
also assert that much of their analysis and concern for
the adaptive strategies. of low income households is
transferable and applicable to the neighborhood
organizations and labor unions:
Even when popular movements are weak or non-
existent, knowledge about the political significance
of the interplay between work and residential
arrangements is vital for evaluating the latent
political interests and capacities of the urban
working classes. Such interests and capacities must
be taken into account as we consider the
consequences of state and business policies; the
options of powerful interests, such as government
officials, party organizations, domestic
entrepreneurs and foreign investors; and the
potential outcomes of social, economic and political
crises...In light of the everyday networks of low-
income pepple, their role in urban politics directs
attention to this question: To what degree, and how,
does ' the interplay of relations to workplace,
household and neighborhood influence their political
interests and capacity for political action?
(p. 102).
In concluding their analysis, they specifiy a research
agenda which addresses both global and local level
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questions and includes the following local level issues:
1) What social networks are created within, between
and outside households by the income - producing and
culturally reproductive activities of the urban
popular classes?
2) What cooperative and conflicting social interests
are generated by such networks, and what resources
can be mobilized on behalf of the various interests?
3) How do such networks, interests and resources
interact with the organization and control of
production as well as with the structure and
policies of the state to promote or impede work-
based and community-based political action? (p.
106).
My research begins to address these kinds of
questions at a level of social organization outside the
household, but still quite within the grasp of the "urban
popular classes" referenced above. I have specifically
attempted to identify adaptive strategies of the two types
of organizations and some of their implications for local
politics in Hartford. While these strategies were
explored in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, several findings
begin to offer insights which may speak to the concerns of
Smith and Tardanico.
First, within the range of factors that are
important in shaping patterns of organizational response
are the judgment and strategic choides made by
organizational leadership, areas which I have given
considerable attention. These choices of leadership are
informed by individual experience, organizational
traditions and ideological preferences, and are certainly
within the realm of the contingent, that is, they are not
necessarily predictable or pre-determined. Such factors
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are not of ten sep:arately considered in the discussion of
popular response to restructuring and may be useful to
explore in much greater depth in the future in relation to
other organizations.
Another consideration involves the emerging
strategic patterns identified in this research in which,
despite a very inhospitable climate for such demands,
labor has attempted to redefine many of its issues--
particularly
issues and
implications
called upon
considered
employees,
other words,
its struggle
and public
contemporary
major strikes or plant closings--into public
demands with community-wide and regional
Local and state levels of government are
to mitigate the effects of problems heretofore
"private" matters between employer and
and not the responsibility of government. In
labor is in a sense attempting to socialize
s in terms of redefining both public discourse
action in relation to the consequences of
economic issues. While their efforts may not
necessarily often be successful, that these issues surface
in the public arena and that labor sometimes succeeds to
any degree seems to demonstrate that popular praxis does
matter and can create new options in certain situations,
despite the immense obstacles. Future theoretical work
may profit from more systematic considerations of these
and other similar patterns, as well as unsuccessful
efforts.
With respect to another theoretical area, within the
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pge f U Affairs Quarterly of March, 1990, a debate
or discussion seems to have arisen between Gottdiener on
the one hand and Clarke and Kirby on the other over themes
and conclusions of Gottdiener's The Decline of Urban
Politics (1987). At the core of the controversy is the
question of whether a genuine urban politics can or does
exist given both the historical evolution and juridical
limitations of authority of the local state, especially in
the context of economic and political restructuring and
the emerging global urban hierarchy.
Gottdiener's work was not a consideration in the
formulation of this project: the date of its publication
occurred well into the time that this research was
proceeding. However since his conclusion regarding the
demunition of urban politics seems to represent a trend
or, if not a full-blown trend, at least a resonant theme
in urban studies literature, my research may have some
relevancy to the debate, or the debate to this research.
First, I should state that Clarke and Kirby's critique
seems to me a convincing one, summarized particularly well
in their invoking the metaphor of Mark Twain's comment
upon reading his own obituary that reports of his. death
were "much exaggerated." Urban politics may be greatly
constrained' or circumscribed and participation may have
greatly contracted, yet it seems hardly accurate to
announce its demise. My research highlights a number of
examples of a very animated local urban politics in
Hartford, in which the contests and policy debates do
368
transate into Iscrnable issues for the local electorate
and citizenry, despite all of the constraints upon local
government. However, what seems more relevant to this
project than the debate, itself, are several references
and concepts employed by Clarke and Kirby in buttressing
their arguments. They comment:
Deducing local political change from spatial
configurations or economic logic leaves huge
silences about the people affected by economic
transformation and their varying responses to these
changes. An alternative interpretation of global
economic change (from Gottdiener's) emphasized the
destabilizing effects of changing investment and
migration patterns for communities and households
(Feagin and Smith, 1987a: 24).. .Is this deathly
local silence that Gottdiener anticipated in the
unfolding logic of capitalist development, or does
it signal the lag in political development and
institutional change that so often characterizes
momentous economic transformation? Obviously, we
argue for the latter... [emphasis mine]
Many of the researchers in this field echo
Gottdiener's somber view of the increasing
constraints on local politics but are informed by a
view of history that is less equifinal and linear
than his approach. In consequence, researchers
allow for contingent local responses and hold open
the possibility that these same structural
conditions that Gottdiener interprets as sounding
the death knell of local politics also contain the
seeds of future political change. Harvey'.s (1987:
280) view of emergent flexible accumulation
processes, for example, allowed for contingent local
responses and "new paths of social change,"
including resistance and empowerment of worker and
community groups. As he put it, the deconcentration
and decentralization accompanying these new
processes create a political climate "in which the
politics of community, place, and region can unfold
in new ways" (p. 279). M.P. Smith (1987: 244) also
was optimistic that this era of fiscal austerity,
wage cuts, productivity measures, sectoral
restructuring, and privatization may, nevertheless,
offer grounds for overcoming historical cleavages
between community and workplace. (p. 401).
Later in concluding their critique, Clarke and Kirby refer
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to their conception of cities as "contested areas
shaped by economic agents and political actors" (p. 407).
I believe that while not specified in the above language
and conceptual framework, what I have been focusing upon
are just such contingent outcomes of economic
restructuring and the forces at the grassroots level of a
city which influence and shape the outcomes. Local
developments in Hartford indeed offer new ways in which
social change can and is unfolding, and these trends do
seem to correspond to the "lag in political development"
which Clarke and Kirby argue characterizes economic
transformation.
This research raises more questions than it answers
in many respects. Perhaps because I am not aware of any
other studies focusing specifically upon organizational
response to economic restructuring within a particular
locale which could have used as a model for this effort,
I was left with such an immense disjuncture between the
complexity of the theories which informed the project and
either a space in which to situate the findings or a
method of analysis of equal or near theoretical
complexity. These findings seem to beg for incorporation
into a larger, more complex theoretical framework. While
I am not at this point offering such an analysis, I can
identify several areas which the research might speak to,
particularly in light of the two areas from recent
literature identified above.
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MA in s and pol0tl ence attach]i a
great deal of importance to adequately emphasizing human
agency and historical contingency within social theory in
order not to fall into the trap of overly economic-
deterministic analyses. Both Smith and Tardanico (1987)
and Clarke and Kirby (1990) build their arguments around
such notions. Moreover, Gottdienter's work emphasizes the
need for greater attention to the nature of the local
state. These three concepts, human agency, historical
contingency and the local state all seem to be interacting
in new or different ways during this period of economic
transformation and more attention seems to be required as
to the concrete choices and adaptations of individuals and
their organizations. Yet how to adequately theorize the
micro-level responses--the actual patterns and
manifestation of human agency--is still an open and, it
seems to me, under-emphasized area. Perhaps this research
can provide some specific examples for consideration in
future theoretical considerations.
Implications for Future Organizing
Several patterns identified in Hartford through this
research involve attempts by labor and community
organization forces to come together and bridge the gap
between workplace and community. However, even though an
event like the Colt strike wrought financial hardship for
those involved, these patterns were observed during a
period relative economic growth within the context of
restructuring, the mid- to late 80's. As the research was
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Coicluding and both a recession and state budge crisis of
immense proportions were looming, and with additional
anticipation of a local municipal fiscal crisis, it is
quite possible that the patterns of coalescence during the
1980's may be altered substantially in the 90's as the
very participants in these coalitions come into
competition with each other over scarcer and scarcer
resources. Within these developments, choices and
assessments by organizational leadership will be of
paramount importance to the outcomes.
It seems to me an open question as to whether under
these conditions the coalitions between labor and
community forces will strengthen or deepen, no matter how
desirable this might be as a goal for increasing the
potential of local movements for social change. If the
coalition efforts can remain at the present level and not
diminish, then some lasting results may have been created
during the 1980's. But a true assessment needs to include
consideration of how lasting the coalition efforts are. I
am cautious in light of the constraints for neighborhood
organizations within their methodology and philosophy,
and, moreover, because the leadership of several labor
unions seem not to attach sufficient importance to such
endeavors, save for perhaps the UAW, to commit the
resources or give over organizational prerogatives to a
coalition. Perhaps if there were more common
organizational processes and targets, or more similarity
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in the obstacles faced by the srgan i lasting
coalitions would be easier to construct. Given these
issues, the dichotomy between community and workplace
continues, but perhaps the chasm is not as deep as it once
was.
It is likely that in many cities local electoral
activities will command greater energies, but in a new
mode akin to the People for Change effort either within or
outside of the Democratic Party. I have outlined the
reasons why an actual third party may not seem appropriate
or possible for other cities, but insurgent electoral
formations or groupings are forming and have formed,
breathing life into the moribund urban politics Gottdiener
decries. One problem inherent in Hartford which could
develop elsewhere in such efforts is that they depend in
large measure upon activist unions. The resources of these
unions will probably become more strained during the 90's
unless they can organize large numbers of unorganized
workers. In a recession, this is exceedingly difficult
and as a result, insurgent electoral efforts that are
dependent upon these unions may suffer, although they may
not falter entirely. In cities other than Hartford, more
open neighborhood and community organizations may play a
greater supportive role in such electoral efforts.
I would also speculate that the ability of unions to
organize in the immediate future will have wider
implications. A reinvigorated labor movement, particularly
with respect to its organizing capacity, could animate
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other social movements and transform the specific issues
of labor into issues with broader appeal. Organizing
drives, as well as strikes or plant closings, can be
developed in ways that involve many segments of a
community and raise a variety of- ancillary issues with
civil rights, civil liberties and other relevant equity
implications. If larger sections of the labor movement
take their lead from the activities of the unions examined
in this research, then such a revitalized labor movement
may begin to accomplish the mission it proports to
champion, empowerment of workers. More likely, there will
be some significant segments of the labor movement who
will attempt to organize the unorganized, but other
segments who will be incapable of rising to the occassion.
Neighborhood movements offer great potential as a
method of ameliorating urban problems, but here again, the
important factors of leadership judgment and capacity to
re-evaluate models and assumptions will figure prominently
into whether or not these oranizations live up to their
promise. In Hartford, the problems of the city seem to
become more and more entrenched and complex, and the
neighborhood organizations are faced with confronting
these difficulties without necessarily devoting sufficient
effort toward re-analysis of method. Perhaps in Hartford,
as elsewhere, a type of plateau has been attained in
neighborhood organizing which may require reformulation
from the national organizing networks, although
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dissemIn ating- any such conclus o co nnsus will be
difficult, given the often resistance of local
organizations to outside advice.
To Conclude
To conclude, these activities and movements need to
be examined more thoroughly and factored into theoretical
formulations of economic change, and the participants,
themselves, need to scrutinize the methodologies and
assumptions of their organizations. I would offer no easy
advice in either endeavor since the unfolding of urban
social change rests on so many indeterminate and distinct
issues. I have attempted to explore and set forth several
areas which I feel are important for such future
considerations. Hopefully the experiences in Hartford have
provided insights for developing deeper knowledge about the
important changes underway in American cities.
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SUPPORTIVE MATERIALS
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ABREVTIONS USED IN DISSERTATION AND APPENDICES
Asylum Hill Organizing Project
organization)
(neighbrhoc
New England Health Care Employees, District
1199-Service Employees International Union
(labor union)
HART
HERE
LEAP
ONE - CHANE
PFC
UAW
UCAN
Hartford Areas Rally Together
organization)
(neighborhood
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees, Local
217 (other locals of the same international
union identified by local number) (labor union)
Legislative Electoral Action Program (electoral
coalition)
Organized North Easterners -Clay Hill and North
End (neighborhood organization)
People for Change (third political party in
Hartford)
United Auto Workers; referring both to Region
9A and Local 376, as specified (labor union)
United Connecticut Action for Neighborhoods
(technical assistance organization
neighborhood organizations)
for
Note:
Grassroots -Labor Forum
information
neighborhood
president of
refers to monthly meetings
exchange between unions
organizations, initiated by
the Labor Council (see Chapter
377
AHOP
1199
for
and
the
4).
INTERVIEWS
SOURCES OF DATA:
CONDUCTED FOR DISSERTATION
7/17/87
10/13/87
3/11/88
3/22/88
5/12/88
6/10,/90
6/20/88
6/20/88
9/13/88
9/26/88
10/27/88
11/3/88
2/27/89
5/11/89
6/2/89
12/19/89
6/27/90
7/27/90
9/2/90
AHOP
UAW
AHOP
UAW
HERE
HERE
HERE
UAW
HART
HART
HART
Greater
1199
ONE-CHAN
1199
1199
UAW
UCAN
Mike Gorzach, Organizing Director
(through 1988, now Executive
Director) and Kevin Kelly, former
Executive Director
John Flynn, former Regional Director
and Phillip Wheeler, Assistant
Regional Director (1986-89), now
Regional Dirctor
George Jefferson, former Organizer
Phillip Wheeler, Assistant Regional
Director (1986-89), now Director
Robert Traber, former Organizing
Director and Connie Holt, Organizer
Robert Traber, former Organizing
Director
Connie Holt, Organizer
Charlene Block, Organizer
Nancy Ardema, Executive Director
through 9/88 and James Boucher,
former Organizer (through 9/88),
now Executive Director
Nancy Ardema, former Executive
Director
James Boucher, Executive Director (as
of 10/88)
Rick Kozin, former organizer with
HART and ONE-CHANE
Hartford Labor Council: Kip Lockhart,
President
Jerome Brown, President, New England
District
[E Patricia Wrice, former Executive
Director
David Pickus, Vice President for
Organizing, New England District
William Myerson, Education Director
Robert Madore, Assistant Regional
Director (as of 1989)
Alta Lash, Staff and Organizing
Consultant
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SOURCES OF DATA:
LIST OF ACTIVITIES ATTENDED RELEVANT TO DISSERTATION
1986
The following meetings and discussions took place during
the proposal phase of this effort and augmented
discussions with the dissertation committee.
3/12/86
S/23/86
6/18/86
10/11/86
10/14/86-
10/16/86
10/16/86
Discussion with Richard Ratcliff, Sociologist
Discussion with Rick Kozin, Community Organizer
Community and Labor Organizing Workshop at the
University of Connecticut School of Social Work
Discussion with Cecilia Bucki, Labor Historian
UAW Region 9A Leadership Conference, Hyannis,
Mass.
Discussion with Kenneth Neubeck and Richard
Ratcliff, Sociologists
The meetings and activities listed for the years 1987
through 1990 were attended after the committee's approval
of the topic and the research formally began.
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6/17/87
6/19&20/87
6/22/87
7/27/87
8/6/87
8/6/87
8/25/87
9/13-18/87
9/24/87
10/10/87
10/18/87
11/20/87
12/9/87
12/10/87
AHOP Mee-ting with Mike Gorzach, Organizer
LEAP Issue Conference - Middletown, Conn.
AHOP Observation of Participant attending City
Council
AHOP Planning meeting--seniors on crime
UAW Meeting with John Flynn, Reg. Dir.
AHOP Housing Coalition Meeting
AHOP Crime Meeting
UAW Black Lake Conference
HERE Pre-strike support meeting
HERE Strike Support Rally
HART Annual Congress
HERE Strike Support Rally - Hartford Fire Ins.
1199 National Convention in Hartford
1199 National Convention - Demonstration in
solidarity with Colt strike at NLRB office
On-Going Meetings-1987
CLA & Colt-related Meetings & Activities:
Major Issues & Events: January Rally for Anniversary of
Strike, International Women' s Day Event
for Women Strikers; Demonstration at
Corporate Headquarters in New York,
4/1/87; Legislative Reception at State
Capitol for Legislators, 5/27/87; Trial of
Phillip Wheeler on strike-related charges,
June, 1987; Vigil at Gary French's home,
7/14/87; Rally to mark NLRB Trial opening,
9/27/87; Holiday Food Baskets Fundraising,
NLRB Trial Opening (after delays) 12/8/87.
Dates of Meeting attendance: 1/6/87;
1/28/87; 2/11/87;
3/11/87; 3/25/87;
5/13/87; 5/20/87;
6/17/87; 6/24/87;
7/29/87; 8/17/87;
9/9/87; 9/23/87;
10/28/87; 11/18/87;
1/14/87;-
2/18/87;
4/8/87;
5/27/87;
7/8/87;
8/12/87;
9/30/87;
12/16/87.
1/21/87;
2/25/87;
4/15/87;
6/2/87;
7/22/87;
8/27/87;
10/14/87;
PFC Meetings, Activities and Campaign
Dates of Meeting Attendance: 3/3/87; 3/30/87; 4/21/87;
5/5/87; 5/14/87; 5/18/87; 5/26/87; 6/3/87;
6/8/87; 6/15/87; 6/23/87; 7/6/87; 7/20/87;
7/24/87; 7/27/87; 8/12/87; 8/25/87;
9/22/87; 9/29/87; 10/6/87; 10/22/87;
10/27/87; 11/19/87; 12/15/87.
Grassroots - -Labor Forum
6/30/87;
11/9/87;
Meetings:
7/23/87;
12/2/87.
4/20/87;
8/31/87;
6/2/87;
10/5/87;
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4 / 22/88
5 /15 /88
6/7/88
6/18/88
8/16/88
10/21/88
12/2/88
12/7/88
12/13/88
12/14/88
HERE
AHOP
UAW
HERE
HART
HART
1199
HART
HERE
HERE
Meeting with Rob Traber Organizing Dir.
Annual Congress
Meeting with Congresswoman Kennelly on Colt
Training Session for Union Activists
Meeting with Nancy Ardema, Exec. Dir.
Annual Congress
New England Contract Conference
Barry Square Meeting to decide priorities
Summit House Committee Meeting
Sheraton House Committee Meeting
on - Going Meetings -1988:
CLA & Colt Related Meetings and Activities: Major Issues--
NLRB Trial, January Rally on Anniversary
of Strike; Work With Jay Maine Strikers,
Corporate Greed Rally in concert with
other strikes, Jai Alai Strike Support,
Vigil at Gary French home, Holiday Fund
Drive.
Dates of Meeting Attendance: 1/20/
2/24/88; 3/9/88;
4/27/88; 5/18/88;
6/15/88; 8/3/88;
9/28/88; 10/19/88;
11/30/88.
88; 1/27/88;
3/30/88;
5/25/88;
8/10/88;
10/26/88;
PFC - Meetings, Activities and Campaigns
Dates of Meeting Attendance: 1/20/88;
3/11/88;
5/17/88;
7/26/88;
10/11/88;
12/13/88.
3/12/88;
5/24/88;
8/9/88;
10/25/88;
6
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2/10/88;
4/12/88;
/14/88;
/23/88;
1/1/88;
2/10/88;
4/13/88;
6/8/88;
9/21/88;
11/9/88;
2/22/88;
5/9/88;
6/21/88;
9/27/88;
11/15/88;
Grassroots -Labor Forum Meetings: 1/20
5/4/88; 6/1/88;
11/21/88; 12/21/88.
/88; 2/23/88; 4/6/88;
9/21/88; 10/19/88;
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1989
1/9/89
I /12/89
1/13-14/89
1/19/89
2/1/89
4/9/89
4/19/89
4/27/89
5/21/89
5/23/89
6/3/89
6/7/89
8/23/89
9/14/89
10/20/89
10/23/89
10/29/89
11/12-17/89
HERE
HERE
LEAP
HART
HART
Meeting of Hartford Leadership
House Visit with Rob Traber, Organizing
Director
Northeast Area Conference, Framingham,
Mass.
Meeting on Future Organizational
Direction Survey of Participants
Meeting of Parkville Residents on Crime
ONE-CHANE Annual Congress
HART Meeting on Taxes at Legislative Office
Building
HART Meeting of Parkville Residents on Crime
AHOP Annual Congress
1199 Rally on State Workers Contract at
Office of Policy & Management, State of
. Conn.
ONE-CHANE Leadership Training Session
HART Meeting on Development Moratorium with
President of Labor Council
HART Meeting on Unemployment Issues/Services
HART Meeting with Jim Boucher, Exec. Dir.
HART Annual Congres's
ONE-CHANE Meeting with Patricia Wrice, Exec.
Dir. and Jay Schmitt, Organizing Dir.
1199 Meeting with Nursing Home Division
Members on Contract Negotiations
UAW Coalition Conference at Black Lake,
Mich.
On-Going Meetings-1989
CLA-Colt Related Meetings:
Dates of
Major Issues--January Rally on
Anniversary of Strike; Sale of
Company; Union Participation in Buy-Out;
Holiday Fund Drive;
Meeting Attendance: 1/18/89; 2/8/89; 2/22/89;
3/8/89; 3/22/89; 4/12/89; 4/25/89;
5/10/89; 5/24/89; 6/14/89; 6/28/89;
7/12/89; 8/23/89; 9/20/89; 9/27/89;
10/11/89; 10/25/89; 11/8/89; 11/29/89.
PFC Meetings, Activities & Campaign
Dates of Meeting Attendance: 1/25/89; 1/31/89; 2/7/89;
2/14/89; 2/21/89; 3/21/89; 3/28/89;
4/11/89; 5/2/89; 5/9/89; 6/13/89; 7/11/89;
7/31/89; 8/1/89; 8/8/89; 8/15/89; 8/22/89;
9/5/89; 10/17/89; 10/24/89; 11/20/89;
12/12/89.
Grassroots-Labor Forum
3/15/89;
8/30/89;
Meetings
4/19/89
9/23/89
1/18/89
5/17/89
10/18/89
2/15/89
-6/21/89
11/29/89
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1/13/90
2/24 /90
3/15/90
4 / 21/90
4/22/90
5/6/90
6/20/90
6/30/90
8/7/90
1199 House Visit with Pearl Granat, Organizer
1199 Support Rally for Kimberly Hall Strike
1199 Organizer Training Sescion, Pauling, N.Y.
1199 Support Rally for Kimberly Hall Strike
ONE-CHANE Annual Congress
AHOP Annual Congress
1199 Meeting on Mt. Sinai -- St. Francis
Hospitals Merger for Union Members & Community
1199 Meeting of Group Home Division Members
on Contract Negotiations
Meeting with Marc Lendler, Political Scientist
On-Going Meetings-1990 (through middle of year)
CLA & Colt-related Meetings & Activities:
Major Issues & Events: Buy-out finalization & return of
strikers to work; Kimberly Hall strike;
Greyhound strike; Corporate Greed Rally;
University of Hartford contract
negotiations; Holiday Funds for Jai Alai
strikers and Greyhound strikers.
Dates of Meeting Attendance: 1/10/90; 1/24/90; 2/21/90;
3/14/90; 3/20/90; 3/27/90; 3/28/90;
4/7/90; 4/11/90; 4/18/90; 4/25/90;
5/9/90; 5/23/90; 6/27/90; 7/25/90;
9/5/90; 10/10/90.
PFC Meetings, & Activities
Dates of Attendance: 1/2/90; 1/23/90; 2/7/90;
3/8/90; 3/13/90; 4/17/90; 5/1/90;
5/18/90; 5/19/90; 6/12/90;
8/1/90; 8/14/90; 9/18/90;
10/16/90.
Grassroots-Labor Forum
3/21/90;
7/25/90;
Meetings:
4/18/90;
9/26/90;
1/17/90;
5/16/90;
10/17/90.
2/13/90;
5/14/90;
7/10/90;
10/9/90;
2/21/90;
6/20/90;
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1990
OUTLINE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ASKED OF UNION AND
NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATION LEADERS
Below are the questions asked in the initial interviews
with leaders and officers of neighborhood organizations
and unions. These were adapted to the respective
organizations. With some individuals, specific areas such
as organizing or coalition work were expanded upon in
subsequent interviews. All organizations' leaders and/or
directors were asked questions- about these following
general aspects of their work.
Mission and Philosophy:
How does (organization) perceive the issues facing the
area or your members?
How do you see your organizational mission?
How have you arrived at your perspective?
What is being done by (organization) to get your message
into the neighborhood? to the rank-and-file?
Targets of Organizing:
Who have been some of the major targets or foci of your
work? (For unions: ) Who are the firms and employers that
you deal with, the types of industries and has this
changed over recent years?
What kinds of resistance do they offer to your demands and
to what do you attribute their resistance? (for unions)
What kinds of variations are you finding in employers'
responses to contract demands and organizing drives?
Participation:
What is done to motivate the residents/members to get
involved? Are there some methods that are more effective
than others? what are they? what are incentives for people
to participate? What about those who benefit but don't
participate--how is this dealt with?
Models:
On what models and/or views of organizing (labor
relations) do you base your work? Could you give
examples? (for unions) How do you view organizing in the
total picture of your union activities?
At what point do you decide to use confrontational
approaches and how do you view the function of these
actions? How do you prepare members for these actions?
What are the factors upon which you base decisions on
strategy and tactics?
What about legal maneuvers--does this strategy take
control away from your hands? (to unions) To what extent
do you rely on labor law and to what extent and how do you
attempt to circumvent the law?
384
Coalitions and Electoral Work:
What types of coalitions are you involved with? which
specific coalitions? On what basis do you decide to
participate? Who participates on behalf of the
organization? How are people prepared to represent the
organization within coalitions?
How do you assess these experiences in terms of furthering
your goals?
Could you describe your involvement in electoral politics.
What is the basis of your decisions in this area of work?
Do you sponsor issue sessions with candidates? What about
members who get involved on. an individual basis -- does
their experience in (neighborhood groups ) guide their
involvement? -- (to unions) what about members who favor
candidates the union does not endorse?
Decision -making processes:
What decision-making processes are used and what
structures exist in the organization? What factors go into
decisions by members to become' active? How is conflict
handled?
What avenues for leadership development exist?
Staffing:
How is staff hired and what are the means of
accountability? How much automony do staff have? What
types of training avenues exist? (to unions) What is the
relationship between officers and hired staff?
Constraints:
What would you describe as the major constraints that you
face? How do you circumvent them?
Experiences with other type of organization:
What types -of experiences do you have with (unions)
(neighborhood organizations )? How would you compare. what
you do with what they do?
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APPENDIX A
AFFIDAVIT OF MARTIN LEVITT, FORMER MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT
The attached text was presented to the National Labor
Relations Board in Cincinnati, Ohio, in relation to a
case involving the Ohio District.of 1199-SEIU. Levitt's
signed testimony was presented in lieu of an appearance
in the case and was offered as a description of
management practices, specifically under the direction of
union-busting consul tants, during union organizing
drives.
In a telephone conversation with Mr. Levitt on
December 9, 1990, he described his current activities as
an advisor to labor and as president of a foundation he
has established since leaving the "union-busting" field,
his "former field", as he refers to it. The foundation
is called the Justice for Labor Foundation. Much of his
current work involves lecturing at universities and
colleges, consulting with labor unions, and lobbying
government to regulate union-busting. He has also
appeared on numerous television and radio programs,
including "The Today Show", an upcoming segment with
"20/20", and has been featured in numerous newspaper
articles.
Levitt will have a book published in late 1991 by Crown
Publishers, entitled A Dirty Business: Confessions of a
Union Buster. A motion picture based on his experiences
and his ultimate "turn-around" is being produced for HBO
and will be aired in mid to late 1991. He eagerly seeks
avenues to share his experiences and discuss the abuses
inherent in union-busting consultation.
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AFFIDAVIT
My name is Martin Le'vitt. I reside in Lafayette, California, at 1208
Vacation Drive, my phone number is 415-947-3900. I have been a union-
busting consultant for almost twenty years.
In 1969, I joined a firm in Chicago, Illinois, by the name of John
Sheridan Associates. John Sheridan, who prior to forming his
consulting firm was an organizer with the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, was the first firm in the country that focused -on,
as it's specialty, the campaigns against union organizing that
utilized the first line supervisors as the principle weapon to defeat
the union.
It was John Sheridan Associates that really pioneered the transition
in anti-union campaigns from a series of on-going mass captive
audience meetings and letters to the very specialized and
individualized campaign that we called very early on simply "Different
Strokes for Different Folks", where we used the supervisorss on
specific assignments to campaign with each of their individual
employees in a "one on one" manner based on those peoples strengths
and weaknesses and over all profiles. The thinking behind this new
"one on one" theory was that you could identify the individual reasons
for each employee supporting the union, develop an individualized
campaign to convince him to vote no and them by isolating them from
the support of their co-workers and making them face the power of
their supervisors and the company, time and time again, put the
maximum psychological pressure on them to break their spirit and
change their vote.
The Sheridan Firm revolutionized that concept and several Sheridan
Partners at 'the tim-e, left John -Sheridin to form a firm iri-the early
70's known as Melnick, McKuen, and Mickes, later to change their name
to Modern Management Methods. The 3M Firm, in the late 1970's, grew
to be the largest and most successful of its kind in the country. They.
took the Sheridan techniges and made them the standard operating
procedure for the entire union-busting industry, and those "one on
one" strategies continue to be the M.O. today of the thousands of
practitioners that now smash unions.
When I joined Sheridan in 1969, I joined him because three of his
partners and about five of his associates had left him to form their
own firm called 3M. I left Sheridan in 1973 and joined 3M. In my case
it was not that I was dissatisfied with Sheridan, I wanted to move to
California, and 3M was willing to move me to California~, Sheridan was
not. 3M was really the firm that refined the Sheridan Techniques, the
overwhelming "one on one" campaign as the key to succcess in smashing
a union drive or smashing a union. I stayed with 3M until late 1975,
at which time I chose to go out on my own and I formed what I called
the Human Resources Institute which I operated until 1987 and which
came to be recognized as one of the pre-eminent firms in the country,
just carrying on those same techiques. It's important to note, that
alongside of my own career in that industry, dozens and dozens of
other Sheridan and 3M people also went out on their own and formed
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firms. Even today, where you have approaching 10,000 people
practicing some form of union-busting, 90% of them or better use the
Sheridan/3M techniques - use the supervisor and use tde whole "one on
one" onslaught as their primary M.O. And it has pro% en, without a
doubt, to be the most effective way to smash a union. : Unfortunately
what it leaves in it's wake becaue of the barrage on people is very
often irreperable in a variety of ways.
I ran over 220 campaigns, where I directed the strategy or was the
primary. I backed up probably another 100 or so. I was personally
involved in well in excess of 300 anti-union campaigns. I don't think
there was a union in the country that I didn't come up against at some
point. During the 70's, 1199 was probably as much an opponent as any
other combination of unions and most of the clients, especially during
my Sheridan and 3M days, were health care facilities. Some of the
larger ones very early in my career would have been the Henry .Ford
Hospital in Detroit, Baptist Hospital in Tennessee, and the Houston
Medical Center, As far as my own track record, out of the more than
300 campaigns, I was involved in five campaigns where the union was
successful in the election. Out of those five, only two of those ever
went to contract. The others went to surface bargaining and union
destruction through other channels, with continued use of the "one on
one" even post election to continue to battle the union and discredit
the union and do everything I could to the union. When intensive "one
on one" campaigns are used, the success rate for companies is at least
98%, 99% for first campaigns.
Today, I am educating labor as well as government on the treachery and
terrorism that is the reality and substance of union busting - that
the intensity in which a campaign is waged, the individual warfare on
people, can do damage not only to people's working lives, but to their
personal lives. Because a union-buster-thinks-nothing of-setting up
an employee under false pretenses once they have an awareness of that
individual's profile, if that's what it takes to destroy the union
efforts. So I left really in largest part because of the victims. Ijust couldn't deal with it anymore. On a very personal side, I
discovered that I was an alcoholic and went through a treatment Center
in Minnesota, a place called Hazeltown. And it was really there that
I opened my eyes not only to myself but the damage that I had done,
and my industry had done, and part of that 12 step program is to make
amends to the people you have harmed. So a big part of what I'm doing
now, is that continuous pursuit of amends.
The key to the success of this technique was first establishing
absolute control over supervision which was turned over to the
consultant by the Chief Executive or Chief Operating Officer of the
Company. That person made it clear to supervisors that the anti-union
campaign was going to be the number one priority at the establishment
for as long as it lasted. And that it would be a daily event and
nothing, even if it was patient care in a health care facility, would
be more important than that supervisor's involvement in the campaign.
Once that control was turned over to the consultants and it was made
very clear to management who was in charge, the supervisors were then
required to give to the consultant as much individual and personal
information as requested on each worker.
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The way we've worked over supervisors, and I mean worked over in the
literal sense of the word, was initially to get everybody in
management together in what we called a "Kick off Meeting". And this
meeting would ~involve every member of management: whether they
supervised proposed bargaining unit employees or not to make it very
clear that the campaign was a crisis to the company' probably the
biggest crisis that the company ever faced, that it was a declaration
of war by the union, and that nobody in management was going to be
excused from participation in the campaign whether they directly
supervised eligible voters or not. It would be the number one
priority in the company for its duration and anybody in supervision or
management that did not follow the directions or orders of the
consultants would in fact not be doing their jobs and would be dealt
with accordingly. So the supervisors very quickly became hostage to
the union buster and the union buster's role.
The "one on one" is so overwhelming, so stress filled, so intensive,
that it wears down people to their breaking points. It is designed
specificcally to make people give up a commitment they hold dearly.
Given the 99% success rate of "one on one" campaigns, it clearly
works.
There was no regard for labor law, not only because a rerun would just
as easily. be won, because by the point of the next election, the
people had been so worn down, their spirit so broken, that they felt
it was almost useless to go through a campaign again, but also a lot
of consultants did it because they wanted the extra billing. There
was no regard for labor law because the penalties for violating labor
law were a slap on the wrist and we told supervisors and management at
the onset of a campaign that although we would work within the
guidelines of the labor law, we weren't that concerned about breakinc
.it and breaking.it routinely. I don't think-there's a union buster in-
the country that can lay claim to not breaking a law regularly in a
campaign. You try not to get caught, but you do what you have to do
because you know that 90% of the penalties are going to be nothing
more than putting up a notice, or facing a re-run election that you'll
win anyway. We used to call the notices wallpaper. All they did was
acknowledge that we did something and promised not to do it again. So
we alwway had blatant disregard for the law, although we would assure
our clients that we were going to be law abiding, and only break the
law if it was critical to succeed.
We told supervisors that we were going to abide by the law and work
within a legal framework but at the same time, we instructed them that
when they were communicating to their employees they would do it one
on one so that if they got carried away and stepped over the line,
there would obviously be no witness to that irregularity. We didn't
scare them into fearing the law, we just simply let them know that the
law was there, and we would do our best, which was a blatant lie, to
work within its framework. But the law would not stand in our way.
We had a theory that in any non-union situation, the percentages
usually went 10-80-10, that you'd always have 10% of a work force that
was pro-union and would be pro-union no matter what, be it their
heritage, something in their history, or whatever. You had 10% on the
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other end that were just anti-union for whatever reason and nobody was
going to change that. You had 80% that either favored or disfavored
the union for different reasons. They wanted it tfor protective
reasons, economic reasons, lack of recognition reas 's. The feeling
was that although you could attack the union in general, which is part
of the campaign through letters and speeches and captive audience
meetings, if you couldn't get to the individual and identify that
particular person's strength, weakness, and commitment to the union,
you could not ensure success. So the "one on one" process, the
"Different Strokes for Different Folks", in theory, really started in
large part to develope individual profiles on people, to find out
what it would take with that individual, using the supervisor who was
the first line of power and control over that individual, to put
personalized pressure on to change that person's mind. And when I say
pressure, there is nobody in this field that can succeed without
seeing to it that the campaign is a daily, stress-filled event. The
supervisor must be doing something "one on one" with all of his
subordinates, every day, whether there is a "Dear Fellow Employee"
letter being distributed, whether there is a small group meeting, or
some other prop that may be put up like the display in groceries that
would be bought with the equivalent of one year's union dues, but
whatever the props were, the tools, they were the blanket, they were
not the real arsenal or ammunition. That was the unending, private
one on one work.
The way the "one on one" campaign was waged, after the kick off
meeting, after the supervisors clearly understood that the consultants
were in charge of the campaign, that the campaign was the number one
priority of the company, the consultant would develop, with the
supervisors, profile charts on each employee in that particular
department, and those profiles would consist of very general
information, the person's disciplinary record, the person's work
record, work habits, what ever we could find from their personnel file
and elsewhere. When we developed the charts, the chart would have the
employee's name, their date of hire, their age, the amount of their
last increase, general information. I would have little boxes for
rating them on their union strengths or union support, off to the
right. There would be plenty of writing room and on almost a daily
basis, we would call the supervisors into our office, one on one, for
the purpose of going over their people, and this was a daily ritual.
What did the person say that day, who did the person have lunch with,
who did the person ride to work with, was the person wearing a union
pin, or was the person wearing some company prop. We would rate these
people with a plus, question mark, or minus. A plus was being for the
company, and so on. We would challenge the supervisor, if the
supervisor tried to convince us that the person was anti-union and
deserved a plus, we would ask a supervisor if he would bet his
paycheck on it. We were very stingy with pluses. We forced that
supervisor to convince us in every way, shape, or form, that that
person was going to be a no vote.
Every supervisor was responsible for his or her respective department
or a subgroup of their department. Every day they had to report to us
how their people would vote if the election were today. We made them
report everything, when the person went to the bathroom, personal
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habits, if they picked their nose with their right index finger. The
supervisors with the more labor intensive departments, or the more
pro-union departments, obviously saw us more, sometimeg- twice or three
times a day. Because along with this information tat we would be
drawing on a daily basis, and the information we drewifrom personnel
records, we also had our clients secure for us credit information on
each employee, criminal investigations, we got into their sexual
preferences, we got into the strengths of their family, any substance
abuse problems. We needed to know every possible vulnerability on
every individual worker. As the supervisor would come in and we would
update the charts every day, at the same time we would have "Dear
Fellow Employee" letters going out, that we exclusively wrote, that we
called tools for supervisors to engage in daily dialogues. This
would take away their excuses such as - how can I talk to this
employee again today. I just spoke with him yesterday. I would
explain you have to discuss this letter with him. We explained that
the letter itself is not going to.win the campaign, it is how you
"work " it.
We forced supervisors to violate friendships. I would force them to
take family members and force personal appeals. I would use any
personal leverage possible to change a vote. Many supervisors had
close personal relations with their subordinates. And if a supervisor
was not delivering a majority of votes from his list - or what I
called precinct - I would go so far as to force the supervisor to call
in any personal favors - if I lent you some money or anything else, if
my kid babysat for your kids or whatever. I've told supervisors to
say "You and I have been friends for a long time and I know this union
is right for you and will probably improve things around here - but if
I don't get your vote, I'm out of here, and I've got three kids to
support."
I forced them where there was a personal repore to make it personal.
The supervisors were told from opening day that if an election
occured, on election day the employees would not be voting for or
against the union, they'd be voting for or against management and
specifically the individual supervisor. So I made it clear that any
vote the supervisor couldn't deliver, was a slap across his face. It
was a statement by that employee that he was not good, that he was
ineffective. I forced this on the supervisors in an ego fashion, and
a personal fashion. If the personal pitch didn't work, I let a
supervisor know it was on him, it was his responsibility. Whatever
was necessary to change a person's mind was used.
If we knew that an emplopyee had some kind of personal problem we
would attack that personal problem. We would go after-that person's
credibility. We would circulate a false, reputation-ruining rumor
throughout the facility on a pro-union person and then have the
supervisor reinforce that one on one. The whole campaign was
individualized to every employee. No two employees heard the same
words from their supervisors.
If supervisors were not relentless on a daily basis, and if we got
wind of it, we would call them into the office and make it clear to
them that a big part of our role was to assess the effectiveness of
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supervision, and we had a responsiblity to report that to our clients,
the President, or the CEO. So that if you're not talking to everybody,
every day, with what I'm telling you to say, you're~not- doing your
job. In my opinion, the victims of this kind of cakpaign were not
just the unit people who received the barrage - equal tictims were the
supervisors. I would say a majority of the supervisors that I worked
with, and all my former colleagues worked with, did not want to do
what we instructed them to do. They were forced to do it. Many of
them, because they are not unintelligent people, knew that on
occassion they would be breaking the law, knew on occassion that they
would be hurting somebody's personal life, ruining somebody.s
marriage, destroying something. But the very fear of their own job
security became so intense that they would execute for us no matter
what. And I don't think a supervisor ever got away with deceiving us.
If they kept repeating the same responses from some of the workers, I
knew they were not "working it" hard enough and would challenge the
supervisor. Some supervisors would "protect" some of their workers.
In that case, I would give him a specific assignment. I would give
him two or three sentences to go out and say to someone, very
controversial and very hard hitting remarks. When he went out, I
would tell him, he had to report to me within one hour. When he left,
I called in the supervisor's supervisor to also go out and talk to the
same person, and discuss the same issue, forcing confirmation of
assignment.It was my method of cross-checking. If I found out that
the supervisor did not carry out their assignment, we could put the
fear of God into them. In some cases, supervisors would be
disciplined, transfered, or even discharged. Usually you didn't have
to go that far. They usually got the message.
What ever we had to do to individual employees to set them up and wear
them down, with the wearing down process being the most effective, we
would do it. Short of that ten percent of the staunchest union
supporters, the daily harassment, the relentless daily onslaught,
would get most employees to want to eventually forget that union drive
ever happened. We made sure they were most interested in simply
-ending the tension and the conflict. If you make the process of
organizing a union difficult and stressful enough most workers will
give up. We told supervisors at the beginning we knew we were going to
be successful when employees were sick and tired of hearing about it,
and they were sick and tired of talking about it. And we kept that
promise. Except the things we made them talk about and forced people
to listen to , the stress that it imposed on people, probably damaged
the health of a lot of people. I mean it was relentless - the same
subject, the same message, the same implied threats, over and over
daily, coming from people who have a lot of power over your life after
time it breaks anybody down.
We routinely would create issues, meaningless unit issues, to delay
the whole process and force a hearing, to delay the vote for weeks.
We needed time to get the supervisors properly trained. Plus time was
essential to wearing people down - making them feel the effort was too
tough and futile. I don't think I ran a campaign in my twenty years
where the election happened sooner than three months after the
petition, or longer. That usually gave us at least four months to do
our work. The more time you had to wear these people down and break
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their spirit, the better. We had to break the obvious momentum that
the union had at the point of filing the petition, because that's when
the showing of interest and support was at it's , vpeak. Besides,
attacking the union as an outside, disinterested third party, as a
dues collecting machine, that they can only survive by keeping
conflict alive, and hitting dues, fees, fines, -assessment, we
emphasised the whole futility surrounding collective bargaining. A
very standard approach was showing the contract before being
negotiated, as being a blank sheet of paper, as comparing negotiations
to horse trading, claiming that employes can get more, or they can get
the same or even less than they had before the negotiations. That the
union is a self interest group and will trade away employees
benefits to win union security, bulletin boards, union shop and
checkoff, and on and on. When we showed contracts from competing or
similar organizations, we rarely showed the entire documents, we
simply cut out those clauses that were clearly less than what existed
at the client institution and showcase those. I don't think we ever
showed a complete document whether it be union bylaws, LM- 2's or
whatever. Part of the motive is to get the union on the defense and
keep it on the defense.
We always gave hope, which always led and proved to be false hope. We
always had to convince supervision and then their employees that
things were going to be changed for the better without the union. If
we found little things we could change after the midway point of the
campaign, we did it - we fixed the microwave, put new tiles in the
bathroom, painted the walls, etc.,-little fix-its we called them, but
we would do these things very subtly. We did a lot of staging, a lot
of drama, a lot of surface things, they were smoke screens .to conceal
where the campaign was really being fought and won, and that was in
the trenches, in this relentless, every day "one on one" beating up of
employees by supervisors.
We would sometimes use dirty tricks. We would plant company property
in an employee's car and then have it discovered by supervisors, or
plant drugs in an employee's locker, or call the employee's spouse and
suggest they were not at a union meeting, but having an extramarital
affair, or start rumors about flattened tires, broken windows, and
"union vandalism". We went as far and to whatever degree necessary to
win. Because to win, we had to divide to conquer. We would study the
demographics, early in the campaign. If we had to pit black against
white, or old vs. young, or educated vs. non-educated, we would.
Playing up racial divisions was very standard. All that is going on.
But none of this was the key. The key was the day in, .day out, "one
on one" campaigning of supervisors. Making sure that poor supervisor
- who had no choice - spent every day relentlessly "beating up" on
their subordinates. We had some supervisors who were such "ass-
kissers" they saw doing well in this campaign as their road to
success. They became obsessed. They almost got off on the thrill of
victory.
Once anybody pro-union changed their mind, we would put that word out
through the supervisors to try to create a snow ball effect. Towards
the end of the campaign with virtually every supervisor, spending
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virtually all their time campaigning against the union - we could put
out any piece of information or rumor we wanted instantly - which of
course the union could not duplicate. We would use rumors about
people being gay, sexual affairs, really anything, some pretty raunchy
things to win.
The essence of our success was every day getting the reports from
supervisors and sending them out, like a puppetmaster, again, and
again, and again. Without this, the success rate of union busters
would be cut in half. It is more effective than any other combined
events that might include blatant discharges of pro-union employees,
threats of closure and moving, granting increases in wages and
benefits, or any other grandiose acts, fall short of potency when
compared to the effectiveness of the "one on one". But unfortunately,
the human tragedy that comes out of it because of the destruction of
real spirit, and sometimes person due to the onslaught is tremendous.
The real ruse in peddling union-busting, because now it is being sold
door to door, is that union-buster will come in and improved the
company. He feeds on the ego, ignorance, and fear and very often the
greed of the perspective client. He lets the client know that he's a
blessing in disguise. He can improve the quality of work, improve the
image of the company, make the company a kinder and gentler company,
take the supervisors and turn them into leaders and communicators, and
make them a management team. A lot of employers will buy into that
believing that is going to be how the whole process is run. But the
union buster knows better. He knows that it is just a marketing tool,
that it's not going to change and improve conditions, if anything,
things will go back to the way they were, or get worse because of the
loss in credibility, the loss in trust, the polarization, division,
and a variety of other factors. So that is a ruse, but it's standard
M.O. as far as a marketing and sales tool of the union buster.
I swear the foregoing is true.
Martin Levitt Date
Notary Public
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APPENDIX B
HERE LOCAL 217 TRAINING MATERIALS
FROM JUNE 18, 1988 WORKSHOP
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LOCAL 217 TRAINING PROGRAM
SOLVING PROBLEMS ON THE JOB
Solving Problems on the Job: Preparing to Win
1. Getting the "victim" to fight
a) pushing people to win, not whine
b) know about time limits and how to file a grievance
2. Organizing and investigating
a) talk to other stewards and committee people
b) get good members lined up
c) get other people interested (who? how?)
d) get all the facts, especially the ones that hurt us
i) the grievant's whole story
ii)background information from other workers
iii)information on past practices, contract language and side letters from stewards,
members or staff. Request information from the employer, if you need it.
iv) Was the grievant treated fairly?
v) Was everyone treated the same?
vi) How will the union be affected in the future if we agree to this?
3. Prepare to meet with the boss
a) plan your argument
b) bring in members and stewards. Let them know what the meeting will be like. Make
sure they know what to say and what not to say. Plan it out.
c) think about some kind of action before the meeting that would let the company
know everyone feels strongly about the grievance
d) let all members know what you are doing before and after you meet with the boss
4. Meeting with the boss
a) keep control of the meeting
b) stay united
c) caucus if necessary
d) keep good notes
5. Confirm settlement in writing
6. A good settlement
a) What would be a good settlement to this problem?
i) Does it seem fair? What do the members who are involved think? What do
people with a little distance from the immediate fight think?
ii) Does it solve the problem for the future or set us up to do better the next time
the problem comes up?
iii) Can we do any better?
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b) how to get it
i) regularly discuss "What would be a good settlement?" with the involved stewards
and grievants. Know and agree on what we want before we talk to the boss.Build a
consensus in the group, so that if one person is being unreasonable, everyone else can help
organize them.
ii) be prepared for what the company might offer. Talk through possible offers with
the grievants and stewards beforehand.
iii) think about what will move the company to agree to a good settlement sooner
rather than later. If they seem to want to settle but can't figure out what offer to make,
feed them one. If they need a face-saving way to concede, provide it!
iv) but never, ever cut a deal with the boss without consulting everyone involved
and building a consensus about what to do beforehand. No matter how good the
settlement is, arriving at it alone with the boss without people knowing about it will come
back to haunt you. You're not Perry Mason, you're a steward. If you work without your
team, sooner or later you will be isolated and lose your effectiveness.
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APPENDIX C
NEW ENGLAND HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES DISTRICT 1199-SEIU
TRAINING MODULE "OUR ROLE AS AN ORGANIZER" OUTLINE
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OUR ROLE AS ORGANIZER
Premise:
The ideas in this program are taken from the union's experience
organizing the unorganized, applied to an organized worksite
setting.
The program is based on the premise that each management has a
plan to weaken and destroy the union. only by thinking and
functioning as organizers can union leaders defend and
strengthen their union at each worksite.
Goal:
To teach union leaders to think as organizers.
Obiectives:
1. To teach that the source of workers' power is their united
action.
2. To teach that an organizer's job is not to solve problems,
but to lead workers into struggle so they learn from their
experience that their power comes from their united action.
3. To introduce principles and concepts to help leaders think,
plan and function as organizers.
Class Format:
Arrange class into small discussion groups of five (5) to twelve
(12) depending on size of the group.
Materials Needed:
Flip chart, tape, markers
Handouts:
1) What makes the boss give in?
2) Grievance Handling - 101 Guides for supervisors
3) Can they do that?
4) Greivances and unity: Who do you talk to first?
5) How would you handle this?
6) Which grievance is more important?
7) Picking your fight
8) "The three gottas"
9) Building the chapter
10) Agenda "Our role as Organizers"
Introduction: - 20 Minutes
Welcome group, have class introduce themselves (name, job,
facility), write down "Goal" of program, go over agenda and
housekeeping (lunch, breaks, smoking, etc.)
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Discussion: Their Power, Our Power - 15 Minutes
Tell group that the issue of power is the central theme of
the entire program.
- Ask group: What is the source of management's power?
What gives management power? List responses:
in-charge, authority, hire and fire, ownership, $, law
- Ask groups: What is the source of workers' power?
What gives us power? List responses: Unity, each
other; we do the work, can't run place without us
Some will say that the union gives workers power, or the
contract gives us power. Probe a little to draw out what is the
power behind "the union" or the contract.
- Ask: What would happen if any of you as individuals
tried to increase your pay or benefits or staffing
levels? Answer, nothing. only by acting together do
we have power. We do the work.
- Ask: Who is connected with your chapter who does not
do the work? Some will answer the boss, supervisors.
You may ask them to look more closely at the union.
Sometime later someone will answer the union
organizer.
The point is the workers have power because they can affect
the running of the facility. Staff cannot. The boss does not
care if the organizer doesn't show up for work.
Post their power, our power responses on wall for future
reference.
II. Discussion: What we do - 20 Minutes
- Ask group: What are some of the things we do as union
leaders? Have each group make a list. List
responses: Represent workers; educate about union,
rights, etc.; enforce contract; run the union at
chapter; file grievances; spokesperson with
management, etc.
Ask: Is it enough just to file grievances and enforce
the contract or must our role be broader? Why?
- Ask: What's the most important problem our members
face on the job? Answer: Understaffing. What's your
contract say about staffing? Nothing or very vague.
Does this mean we don't fight understaffing, because it's
not in the contract? What do we do? Ask for experiences and
examples on fighting for proper staffing?
4&Q
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Discussion: What makes the boss give in? - 30 Minutes
Handout: "It's the last night of contract negotiations. What
do we want to have in place by the last night of negotiations
to convince management to give us a fair contract." Have
people discuss, choose among themselves a reporter, and list.
Unity, communication, goals, demands, deadline, plan of action,
etc. Post responses.
- Ask: If this is what we do to get the boss to give in
when we negotiate a contract, what about getting the boss
to give in during the contract? Is it the same? Or
different? Answer: The same.
Conclusion contract is a "snapshot" of what we had the power to
force the boss to agree to in writing at that moment.
Therefore, what can happen during contract? Answer: We can
lose power, or gain power.
IV. Discussion: What's a grievance? - 30 Minutes
- Ask group: Answer: Any unjust act, practice or condition
by management.
- Point out that key words are any (broader than contract)
unjust (not everything management does is unjust) and by
management (a dispute between two coworkers is not a
grievance).
Let's see how management views the grievance procedure?
- Handout: Grievance handling: 101 Guides for Supervisors?
- Ask groups to discuss and pick a couple of favorites.
"Don't settle grievances on the basis of what is fair?
Don't live quietly with bad contract propositions?", etc.
- Ask: How does management view grievances? Answer:
What's good for them, what's in their interests.
Conclusion: Grievance procedure is not a neutral court of law,
but rather another battlefield of power struggle between
workers and management. Management will do whatever we let
them get away with.
Handout: "Can they do that"
Therefore, we have to view grievances as a way for us to exert
our power. How? By using grievances to increase our unity.
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III.
The first question you should ask yourself when there is a
grievance -- how does this grievance affect members'
unity. How can I handle the grievance to increase members'
unity. Write down and post.
Handout: "Who do you talk to first?" (grievance involves
two workers fighting over a job). Have small groups
discuss, report back.
Conclusion: We should talk first to the worker who
management offered the job to, so as not to allow the
grievance to divide workers.
V. Discussion: What's the Union? Instrument of workers'
power or service organization? - 15 Minutes
Have small groups discuss, report back. Answer:
Instrument of workers power. Refer to posting of earlier
discussion. Source of workers power, what makes boss give
in, etc.
But too often, our problems and inefficiencies stem from
working as representatives of service organizations, rather
than as organizers.
- Ask: How do you feel when you're real busy and a
member comes to you with a big problem? Answer: "Oh
no!, not now." Right?
Conclusion: Do we celebrate problems as opportunities or
shun them as interruptions of our schedule.
VI._ Discussions: Our goal: Solve problems or lead
workers? - 55 Minutes
- Ask: How many have heard this? "Solve this problem
for me. After all, that's what I pay dues for".
How does that make you feel? Crummy, angry, etc.
That's because our goal, as organizers, is not to solve
problems:
Write Down: Our goal is to lead workers into struggle, so
they learn from their experience that their power comes from
their collective action.
Handout: "How would you handle this?"
Situation can be handled by either going over supervisor's
head, filing a formal grievance, or mobilizing members to
confront supervisor. object is to have groups think about the
situation as an opportunity to organize to carry out "our goal".
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Ask: Is it better to try to win grievances with our supervisor,
or is it better to try to win with the Dept. head or
administrator. Where do we have more power? Answer: At the
supervisor level. That's where the workers are, the source of
our power. Supervisor has to "live" with us.
Handout: Is every grievance as important as the next? If
not what makes one grievance more important than another?
Discuss exercise, report back.
Conclusion: Those grievances which provide opportunities
to lead workers into struggle are more important. In other
words, we have to pick our fights.
Handout: "Picking your fight" (the object of the exercise
is to choose the grievance in which you can involve a lot of
members and which you have a good chance at winning.
VII. organizers and Leaders - 30 Minutes
- Handout: "Which phrase most closely defines the role
that the organizer should play in the chapter?
Write and Post:
a) leader of workers
b) technical advisor to workers and their leaders
c) leader of rank and file leaders
Have small groups discuss. Report back.
Answer: leader of rank and file leaders. One person can't
possibly lead an entire chapter.
VIII. What's a leader? - 30 Minutes
- Ask: small groups to list what a leader looks like.
List responses (smart, hard-working, outspoken, etc.).
- Ask: Can a drug dealer be a leader? Can a racist be
a leader? Can a quiet person? A stupid person?
Conclusion: The only useful definition of a leader is
someone who has followers. Our view of a leader is who we would
follow or who agrees with us. If we try to pick the workers'
leaders we will fail. Our challenge as organizers is to get the
leader on the union program and the others will follow.
- Ask: how do we identify leaders? Answer: ask
workers, observe, test. E.g., who organizes the
softball game? Who do people gravitate to at lunch?
Who should I talk to?
- Ask: Go around the room and ask people, are you a
leader?
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Leaders and Work Areas - 40 Minutes
-We know that a leader is someone who has followers.
- Ask: but who are these followers? Where do they
work? Can a leader. lead an entire shift? Or all
shifts on a given ward, wing, or unit? Or can a
nurses aide lead a nurse? Or housekeeper lead a
nurses aide? what about our delegate structure of 1
to 25, does that work?
- Conclusion: Every chapter is made up of "work
areas". (write and post work area) A work area is
the smallest group of workers that relate to each
other on the iob with one leader, usually no bigger
than about five. We must identify the leaders and the
work areas to be successful.
- Exercise: Hand out flip chart sheets and ask people
to draw their work area. Post a couple and discuss,
illustrating the various points about work areas.
X. Who do you represent? - 20 Minutes
- Ask: How many of you know who you represent? Know
how many? Their names? And their faces? Their work
schedules? Their home phone?
The Union's going to have a rally at the facility.
How many of your people show? At the State Capital?
What happened to the others?
Ever have nobody at the rally?
If you don't know exactly who you represent fall into the
"everybody syndrome" e.g., "everybody's coming", and maybe it's
the 2 or 3 people you talked to.
You alone cannot lead 25 people, but if you ID the leaders
of each work area, recruit them, you'll have much more success
and our bosses won't be able to take the union from us.
Otherwise, we set ourselves up to fail, and then we blame
the workers. It's up to us.
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IX.
Evaluating a chapter - the 3 gottas - 15 Minutes
- Ask: How many of you have an area in your chapter
that is really weak? Why is that? List responses:
Point out it's not the water or the air. In order for
workers to organize three things must exist.
Handout: 1) workers' grievances, not ours; 2) expectations
that things can change; 3) leaders involved early and committed
to see the fight through. Write and post.
Conclusion: We can use these points to help evaluate
what's missing in an area where there is no union.
XII Building the chapter - 40 Minutes
- Handout: Case study, have small groups discuss and
come up with plan.
- Go over each plan with an eye towards the "three
gottas".
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130 HUYSHOPE AVE., HARTFORD, CT. 06106
1570 WESTMINSTER STREET, PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02909
1453 DORCHESTER AVENUE, DORCHESTER, MA. 02122
WHAT MAKES THE BOSS GIVE IN?
"it's the last night of contract negotiations. What do we want
to have in place by the last night of negotiations to convince
management to give us a fair contract."
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(617) 436-9911
GRIEVANCE HANDLING
101 GUIDES FOR SUPERVISORS/AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC.
DON'T admit to the binding effect of a past practice.
DO evaluate any political connotations of the grievance.
DON'T permit misconduct by the union representative.
DO command respect from union representatives.
DON'T relinquish your authority t'o the union.
DON'T forget the union is sometimes politically motivated.
DO hold your grievance discussions privately.
DON'T settle grievances on the basis of what is fair.
DO use grievance settlements to reinforce your relationships.
DON'T make mutual-consent agreements regarding future action.
DON'T live quietly with bad contract propositions.
DO use the grievance meeting as another avenue of communication.
DON'T concede to implied limitations on your management rights.
DO control union activity during working hours.
DON'T discuss grievances of striking employees during an illegal
work stoppage.
DON'T settle a grievance'while ins doubt.
DON'T refer a grievant to a different forum of adjudication.
DO demand that proper productivity levels be maintained during
processing of incentive grievances.
DO support your industrial engineers during time-study and
standards disputes.
DON'T negate management's right to promulgate plant rules.
DO compete with the union for employees' loyalty.
DO understand and apply the fundamental principles of psychology.
DON'T inconvenience production operations to facilitate grievance
handling.
DO maintain records of matters relevant to your labor relations
situation.
DON'T fail to keep employees advised as to where they stand with
you as their supervisor.
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"Hey! They're lighting their arrows! ...
Can they DO that?"
~ ~99~
130 HUYSHOPE AVE., HARTFORD, CT. 06106
1570 WESTMINSTER STREET, PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02909
1453 DORCHESTER AVENUE, DORCHESTER, MA. 02122
(203) 549-1199
(401) 273-8140
(617) 436-9911
GRIEVANCES AND UNITY
Third shift nurses aide Sally Jones comes to you and says she
requested a transfer to an open position on 1st shift, but
management gave the transfer to nurses aide George Edwards, who
has less seniority.
Sally has worked as a nurses aide for five years, while George
has only three years seniority. The contract states that when
more than one employee requests a transfer "management shall
transfer the most senior employee with the ability to do the
work".
You decide to pursue the grievance. Who do you talk to first?
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1453 DORCHESTER AVENUE, DORCHESTER, MA. 02122
(203) 549-1199(401) 273-8140
(617) 436-9911
HOW WOULD YOU HANDLE -THIS?
Your supervisor is one who ignores workers' grievances and
delays dealing with them, expecting the workers to give up or
"get over it". The workers are steamed up by the supervisor's
failure to resolve one of their complaints after promising that
the situation would be corrected right away.
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1570 WESTMINSTER STREET, PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02909
1453 DORCHESTER AVENUE, DORCHESTER, MA. 02122
(203) 549-1199
(401) 273-8140
(617) 436-9911
WHICH GRIEVANCE IS MORE IMPORTANT?
A member is suspended a week for patient abuse.
Management changes work schedules on a unit.
A member says she is being harassed by her supervisor.
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130 HUYSHOPE AVE., HARTFORD, CT. 06106 (203) 549-1199
1570 WESTMINSTER STREET, PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02909 (401) 273-8140
D o s 1453 DORCHESTER AVENUE, DORCHESTER, MA. 02122 (617) 436-9911
PICKING YOUR FIGHT
The Situation:
You are trying to strengthen the Union in a weak area.
After talking with members, you identify four issues of concern,
although most members are reluctant to do anything about it.
Below are the problems. Which one should you work on first?
1. UNDERSTAFFED: There are not enough staff to provide
quality care.
2. NO INPUT IN PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING: Workers' ideas
are not considered.
3. FAILURE TO POST SC-EDULES: In the past, work schedules
were posted two weeks in advance. Now workers get very late
notice of schedules.
4. SICK LEAVE WARNINGS: A few employees are routinely
written up for sick leave abuse.
Why do you think this is the best
answer?
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"THE THREE GOTTAS" - for evaluating a Chapter
In order for workers to organize three conditons must exist.
1. Perceived grievances - The workers must have issues they
are concerned about, not our issues.
2. Expectations for change - The workers must believe or have
hope that their efforts will make a difference.
3. Leaders committed early - The leaders of workers must be
involved early and committed to seeing the fight through
to the end.
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BUILDING A CHAPTER
Exercise 13A: Background information on
is a 300 bed hospital located
in . It has been
unionized for 15 years. There are 500 members including Rs, LPNs
and service and maintenance. The contract includes a Union shop
provision and economic standards are OK. The workers have never had
to strike and the Chapter isn't at all active in the Union. On
paper, there are 15 delegates, but in reality only 2 delegates
really function (1 nurses aide and a cook).
The RNs and aides are at odds with one another on a regular
basis and the boss has played off this division successfully.
You are the third organizer to be assigned in the last three
years and, frankly, some workers are cynical about how long you'll
be around.
Unfortunately, no one on staff seems to be able to give you any
more information thatn what you've just read and the files
for were in someone's car and the
car was stolen.
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BUILDING A CHAPTER
Exercise 13B: Background on Golden Arches
The contract at Golden Arches Nursing Home expires in a year.
You, the Chapter President are concerned because the home has
just been bought by a big chain, that has fought the union at
other homes.
The Chapter is in fairly good shape, except for 3rd shift
nursing and dietary. Dietary has no delegate and 3rd shift
nursing has a delegate who doesn't function.
You want to get the Chapter in the best possible shape in
anticipation of tough contract negotiations.
Your organizer is off on an organizing drive five hours away and
some of the other delegates are anxiously demanding that
"someone from the union office" come in to help.
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APPENDIX D
WRITTEN NARRATIVE ACCOMPANYING SLIDE PRESENTATION BY
ROBERT MUEHLENKAMP
"HOW WILL THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY AFFECT US
IN 1199 NEW ENGLAND?"
PRESENTED DECEMBER 2, 1988
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How Will The Country's Economy Affect Us
In 1199 New England?
A Slide Presentation
by
Robert L. Muehlenkamp
Director of Organization
Delegates Assembly
Hartford, Connecticut
December 2
1988
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UNIONS MAKE THE DIFFERENCE
41 8
IDEOLOGY
refers to ideas and beliefs that tend to provide moral justification
for a society's social and economic relationships. Most members
of a society internalize the ideology and thus believe that their
functional role as well as those of others is morally correct and
t-hat the method by:which society divides its produce is.fair.
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS
Problem:
solution:
Planned Result:
Need Capital for New Plants,
Equipment
Take from Working Families
Give to Wealthy and Corporations
More, Better Jobs for
Working Families...
REAGANOMICS
1. Reduce Workers' Income
2. Major Tax Cuts for Rich/Tax Hikes
for Workers
3. Cut Social SpendinglIncrease
Military Spending
4. Massive Budget Deficits
It's No Accident!
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 1987
Although it is hard to imagine
workers' wages in the United States
falling to the levels in Brazil or
Korea, some American executives
seem determined to close the gap.
"Until we gek real wage levels down
-much closer to those of the Brazils
and Koreas," said Stanley J.. Mihe-
lick, Goodyear's executive vice presi-
dent for production, "we cannot pass
along productivity gains to wages and
still be competitive."
HOURLY LABOR
PRODUCTION WORKERS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF
1975
Brazil
Hong Kong
Korea
Taiwao
Mexico
15
12
6
7
32
COSTS FOR
IN MANUFACTURING
U.S. LABOR COSTS
1980 1985
16
15
11
12.
30
10
14
11
*11
15
Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor
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AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMEN7
RATES BY DECADE
x4
M*4****
-6 a __
1960s 19703 1980s
Soure Labor Research Association
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U.S. AVERAGE GROSS REAL WEEKLY
EARNINGS, 1947-1987
1
1977
dollars
1
Year
Source: U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statisbcs
.S
7
4
3
2
.4
- a
1950s
1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987
M
.4t Z
True Rates ofLUnemployment
INVOL PARTTIME
DISCOURAGED WORKERS
BLS UNEMPLOYED
Source: Economic Policy Institute
Workers Who Work for a Wage
1984 by Income
BELOW $7.012 $7,012-28,048 ABOVE $28,048
Source: Current Population Survey
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Growth and Destruction,
Totals
1979-84
BELOW $7,012 $7.012-28,048 ABOVE $28,048
Source:Current Population Survey
LABOR COST VS. TOTAL BUDGET
FOR ALL CONN. HOSPITALS
'82 '83 '84 '85 '88 '87
83.2% 03,7% 633% 6461% 62.7% 62.3%
Note: Included Physicians and managent costs.
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GROWTH IN JOBS BY TYPE
Percent Change
1979-1987
I~. -~
Total Full-Time
do
Voluitary - Involuntary
Part-Time it-Time
Source: Bureau of Labor Stadsbcs
1983 MEDIAN WEEXLY EARINGS
Males
White
Black
Latino
Females
White
Black
Latino
$458
343
,307
$315
295
261
.Source:. Bureau. of.Labor Statistics.
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PERCENTAGE BLACK OF WHITE
MEDIAN FAMAILY INCOME
1945-1986
Percentage
I
Source: Victor Perlo, Economics of Racism
REAGANOMICS: TAKE IT OUT ON
THE MOST VULNERABLE
e 35% of Working Women: Below Poverty Line
* 77% of Poor: Women and Children
* 25% of Full-Time Working Women: Earn
Under $10,000
* 6% of Full-Time Working Women:
$30,000 (Versus 25% for Males)
Earn Over
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FEMALE-MALE WAGE GAP:
UNCHANGED FOR 50 YEARS
Women's Wages as
Male Wages
1939
1984
1987
a % of Full-Time
63%
64%
65%
PERCENTAGE FEMALE OF MALE FULL-TIME
MEDIAN EARNINGS 1970 vs.
1970*
U.S.
France
West Germany
Great Britain'
Italy
Sweden
64%
76%
69%
.54%
74%
71%
1980**
63%
78%
73%
66%.
86%
81%
* Figures from Italy and West Germany are from 1968. France, 1964
Figures for Great Britain, Italy, Franc aN West Germany Are from 1982
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REAGANOMICS
2. Transfer Wealth by Changes in Tax Laws:
a)
b)
At the Federal Level
At the StatelLocal Level
TAXES UNDER REAGAN:
CHANGES FROM 1981 - 84
Personal Income Taxes
Income
Uner $ 10s,000
$15,000-$2;000
* ,00$2oauo
$30.000-$'9.P0OO
$"s1000 -100000
$1001000 -200,000
$20o;oo. -+
After Tax
chanse
+ $ 0.00
+$ 296.00
+ $ 521.00
*8 8600
+ $ 3.193.00
+ $28,6540
.#GASG
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Winners in the 1987 Corporate Tax Ripoff Contest:
1987 taxes paid ($ millions) % tax rate
Merrill Lynch $.47 0.1
IBM 37.0 1.3
Chase Manhattan 10.0 1.6
Shell Oil 61.0 3.5
International Paper 53.0 8.9
CSX 24.0 3.7
AveraCe iccrne Tax Rate on Worker Making $25, 000 in 1985: 19.8%
Source: Citizens for Tax Justice and Labor Research Association
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CORPORATE INCOME
TAX RATE
1950 1960 1970 1980 1983
38% .41% 33% 23% 15.3%
CORPORATE TAX SHARE
Corporate Taxes as % of Total Federal Tax Receipts
25
20
15 -
10
5-
0 1111
1966, 1076 1869I87**
Source:Labor Aa ennn-r Leeo-
NATIONWIDE STATE & LOCAL TAXES IN 1985
As Shares of Family Income
I II III IV V,15% Top 5% Top 0
85 INCOME $7,564 $17,848 $27,266 $38,853 $57,701 $161,341 $527,
Income Tax 0.5% 1.8% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.3
Property Tax 3.4% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.5% 1.9% 1.1
Sales Tax 3.1% 2.2% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7
TOTALTAX 6.9% 6.6% 6.8% 6.8% 7.1% 6.3% 5.1
way . . - -_. .. Sales.
Prop.1
3.
6 - -- - -- - - Inc.Ta
3E -
2 - -
13 Mi IV V.152 Top 51 . Top 0.7%
Family Income QustW
.7%
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Tax
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source: Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation 6 Economic Policy
The "Terrible Ten"
States Taxing Their Richest Taxpayers
At Half or Less the Rate on Middle-Income Families
-Taxes as a Share of Income On- Rich Tax Rate/
The Middle 20% - The Richest 0.7% Middle Tax Rate
South Dakota
Wyoming.
Washington
Nevada
Texas
Tennessee
Utah
Missouri
New Hampshire
Indiana
6.6%
2.5% 9
5.4%
7.4%
3.6%
4.6%
8.4%
7.4%
3.4%
7.7%
2.2%
0.9%
2.0%
2.8%
1.5%
2.0%
3.9%
3.5%
1.6%
3.9%
33%
34%
37%
38%
41%
44%
46%
47%
48%
50%
The "Filthy Fifteen"
States Taxing Their Richest Taxpayers
At Less than Half the Rate on the Poorest Families
-Taxes as a Share of Income On-
The Poorest 20% The Richest 0.7%
Rich Tax Rate/
Poor Tar Rate
Wyoming
South Dakota
Texas
New Hampshire
Tennessee
Nevada
Washington
Iidiana
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Missouri
Pennsylvania
Utah
Iowa
Meleee Cttees Ifo m Jeette a the toetItute 40 Tanettes 6 2e811e eily
430
4.4%
10.8%
6.9%
7.6%
9.4%
10.3%
6.0%
11.0%,
11.9%
6.8%
9.5%
8.1%
15.1%
8.5%
11.0%
0.9%
2.2%
1.5%
1.6%
2.0%
2.8%.
3.9%
4.2%
2.5%
.. 4.1%
3.5%
6.8%
3.9%
5.4%
20%
20%
21%
21%
22%
27%
3%
36%
38%
43%
44%
45%
46%
49%
CONNECTICUT TAXES IN 1985
As Shares of Faimily Incoime
I If III IV V,15% Top 5% Top 0.7%
85 INCOME $11,376 $26,156 $37,791 $52,457 $78,767 $227,094 $742,110
Income Tax 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 1.5%
Property Tax 9.7% 6.6% 6.0% 5.9% 7.2% 4.8% 2.1%
Sales Tax 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6%
TOTAL TAX 11.9% 8.2% 7.4% 7.1% 8.4% 6.1% 4.2%
12
1M Sales Tax
10 Prop.Tax
9g Inc.Tax
8
4
C 3
2
i-I
0
I a III IV V.15Z Top 3X Top 0.7%
Family Income QuinUle
CONNECTICUT TAXES UNDER TAX REFORM
I U III IV V,15% Top 5% Top 0.7%
Income Tax 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 1.0% 3.0%
Property Tax 9.7% 6.6% 6.0% 5.9% 7.2% 4.8% 2.1%
Sales Tax 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 11% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6%
TOTAL TAX 11.9% 8.2% 7.4% 7.1% 8.6% 6.6% 5.8%
12
11 WSales Tax
10 Prop.Tax
g 9 Inc.Tax
a
. a-1---
I I V [ V.151 Top 5x Top 0.?
Fatally Income QuinUle
fW... Citin.. r, I=. JMstse aMW ese :VAUes M. TAsasse0 & UVM..* fter
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RAEAHICS
3. Reduce Social Spending
Increase ilitary Spending
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING
1982-85
Military
Spending
Social
Spending
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SOCIAL BUDGETS VS. MIUTARY
CONTRACTOR AWARDS
$ billions
Military Contracts
year ending 9/87
McDonnell Douglas
$7.7
General Dynamics
$7.0
General Electric
$5.8
Lockheed
$5.6
Martin Marietta
$3.7
United Technologies
$3.6
Social Program
Budgets 1989
Child Nutrition
$7.8
Training/labor
$6.5
Energy
$4.8
Pollution control
14.6
Consumer/worker
safety
$1.3
Mass transit
$1.6
Sources: DOD; OMB Budget FY1989.
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WINNERS & LOSERS
FEDERAL SPENDING FROM 1982-88
(After Inflation)
3010 - Communit-11% 4 %
-60 EarpioyHmnt
-70 - aTraaan
-30 . mg
Chart measures how much spending has changed as a result
of federal budget oolicies from fiscal years 1982-86.
Source: Jobs with Peace Camoaign
NATIONAL DEBT
OVER 200 YEARS
2.0
$1.5 Trilon
1.5 ;m o
1.0
0
1787- 1981 1981 -1986
Source: Labor Research Association
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Question: What did they do
with the meney?
ANSWER:
1) Profits soared
2) Executive pay soared
3) Billions went into merger mania
4) Investments abroad soared
General
Profits
1985 $7.44 Billion
1986 $9.02 Billion
1987 $10.0 (estimate),
Workforce
1981 404,000
1987 295,000
Electric
N, Wages of
Production Workers
m-
$5.9 Billion
Sales per worker
$65,000
$130,000 (estimate)
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PROFITS AT FOUR MASS.
NURSING HOMES 1987
Beds Profit
Pleasant Manor, Attleboro 133 $418,451
non-union Beverly home
1199 Organized Homes
Ridgewood Court, Attleboro 120 179,212
Beverly
Spruce Manor, Springfield 150 -74,000
HCR
Woodridge Home, Brockton 125 158,697
Note: Profits are based on reported profits
plus 75% of management fees, which the
Mass. Rate Setting Commission says are
hidden profits. Does not include
other hidden profit schemes.
TOTAL NURSING HOME PR0OF1TS
FOR MASS. IN 1985
$35,704,4S - - an 80% 3n=rease Since 1932
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Change In Profits, investment,
Dividends, Employment a CEO Pay
For 44 No-Tax Companies, 1981-84
54
40
Pre-tax Profits Imnvetment Dividends m"pOree C20 Pay*
Source: Citizens For Tax Justice
'6.4- ~
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Corporate Mergers
& Capital Spending*
340
30
Mergers
290
1260
:140
220
200
IO
100
140
120 Investment
100
80
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1936
mel)din Oct.fblidg.. off. ape. a mum
NUMBER OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
1980-1986
4500 -
4000 .. .
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000-
00 -1980 1982 1984 1986
Source: Labor Research Association
REAL RESULT OF REAGANOMICS:
- ost Unfair Distibuton of Weaalh in
the 20thoantury
438
409-
30%
20%
10% Share of Net Assets Owned by
The Top One-Half of One Percent
Of the U.S. Population 1922-1983
1 191 194 1949 1953 1958 196 196 19691172 19 5 9a
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IDEOLOGY
UNIONS MAKE THE DIFFERENCE
440
refers to ideas and beliefs that tend to provide moral justification
for a society's social and economic relationships. Most members
of a society internalize the ideology and thus believe that their-
functional role as well as those of others is morally correct and
that the method by which society divides its produce is fair.
Union Density in the United States, 1935-1980
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283 36.0 38.8
UNION/NONUNION HOURLY WAGES AND BENEFITS, 1987
Benefits N Wages
Nonunion
workers
3 $13.30
Union'
workers
$18.51
$0.00 $2.00 $4.00 $6.00 $8.00 $10.00 $12.00 $14.00 $16.00 $18.00 $20.00
Source: AFL-CIO Executive Council Report, 1987.
WAGES FOR UNION AND NONUNION
MEN AND WOMEN 1988
union
500
450n
400-
350
300
250-
200-
150<100 -
0
Source: U.S. Dept of Labor.
Median Weekly Earnings
ionunion
$406 union
V $388
PERCENTAGE FEMALE OF MALE FULL-TIME
MEDIAN EARNINGS 1970 vs. 1980
1970* 1980**
U.S. 64% 63%
France 76% 78%
West Germany 69% 73%'
Great Britain 54% 66%
Italy 74% 86%
Sweden 71% 81%
Figures from Italy and West Germany are from 1968. France 1964
Figures for Great Britain, Italy, France and West Germany Are from 1982
% Working Women
in Unions
14%
25%.
42%
53%
60%
70%
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APPENDIX E
PLANNING MEETING AGENDA
ASYLUM HILL ORGANIZING PROJECT
SENIORS GROUP
JULY 27, 1987
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SENIORS FOR ACTION IN ASYLUM HILL
SAAH ISSUES rnMMITTEE
AGENDA
July 27, 1987
CHAIRPERSON: Gladys Gallagher
I. WELCOME
A. Who is here?
11. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
1. SAAH taking lead on this issue
2. What we have done in the past when we organized
B. REVIEW OF LAST MEETING (See other side)
C. STRATEGY OF A LARGER MEETING
Ill. DECISIONS TO BE MADE TODAY
A.PRIORITIZE ISSUES
1. What is our bottom-line demand
B. WHO WILL TAKE PIECES OF AGENDA AT LARGER MEETING ?
C. WHO SHOULD WE INVITE TO A LARGER MEETING ?
1. Pulbic Officials?...Who?
2. How will we invite these guests ?
D. ASYLUM liLL L CRIME MEETING.. .DATE?... TIME?... PLACE?
1. Who will make arrangements ?
Ill. DETAILS FOR ORGANIZING THE MEETING
A. HOW DO WE GET THE COMMUNITY INVOLVED?
1. Flyers ?
2. Phone calls ?
3. Press Release ?
4. AHOP Mailing ?
5. Posters ?
6. Other ideas ?
B. WHO WILL CHAIR THE MAJOR MEETING ?
C. SHOULD WE INVITE THE MEDIA TO THE MEETING ?
D. SHOULD WE INVITE ANYONE ELSE?.. .Representatives from other organizations
E. OTHER
IV. NEXT PLANNING MEETING
Date?/Time?/Place?
V. OTHER
445
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SENIORS FOR ACTION IN ASYLUM HILL
SAAHl ISSUES COMMITTEE
THE SAAH CRIME COMMITTEE MET ON JULY 9,1987, AT THE IMMANUEL CONGREGATIONAL
CHURCH AT 10:00AM. THE COMMITTEE DISCUSSED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CRIME
PROBLEM IN ASYLUM HILL. THE COMMITTEE HEARD AN UPDATE ON THE NEW "ASYLUM
HILL CRIME LINE". THE COMMITTEE HEARD A REPORT ON WHAT OTHER NEIGHBORHOODS
ARE DOING ABOUT CRIME. THE COMMITTEE HEARD TESTIMONY ON INCIDENTS OF
CRIME FROM THROUG4OUT ASYLUM HILL.
IT WAS THE CONSENSUS OF ALL TIIOSE PRESENT THAT THE SAAH CRIME COMMITTEE
SHOULD TAKE TIlE I EAD IN ASYLUM HILL AND ADDRESS THE CRIME PROBLEM TO
PrIo IC OFFICIAl S AND TO DEMAND A RESPONSE TO OUR CRIME CONCERNS.
THE AREAS OF CONCERN WERE:
MORE OF A POLICE PRESENCE IN ASYLUM HILL TO DETER CRIME.. .FOOTPATROL
PETTER SECURI'Y IN SENIOR BUILDINGS
BETTER POLICE RESPONSE TIME
MORE FUNDS FROM THE STATE FOR POLICE
MORE FDUCATIOh OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING OURSELVES
MOVE PANHANDLERS OUT OF TifE NEIGHBORHOOD
CRACKDOWN ON AETNA EMPLOYEES PARKING IN NEIGHBORHOOD
CRACKDOWN ON CRIMINALS
RETTER RESPONSE OPERATORS IN POLICE DEPARTMENT
CIHANGE DISTRI(r LINES FOR POLICE RESPONSIBILITY IN ASYLUM HILL
THE PLANNING COMMITTEE PRESENT TODAY WAS ESTABLISHED TO ORGANIZE AN ASYLUM
HILL NEIGHBORHOOD MEETING TO ADDRESS OUR CRIME CONCERNS TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS
AND GET ACTION.
WE ARE HERE TODAY TO FORM A STRATEGY AND PLAN THIS MEETING.
PLEASE FOLLOW THE AGENDA AND PARTICIPATE.
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Map of Hartford with
Neighborhood Designations
and
OrganizationNeighborhood Boundaries
ASYLUM HILL
DOWNTOWN
GWO a N
THE CITY
City of
- N
CITY OF
HARTFORD
NEIGHBORHOODS
SEPT. 1983
Hartford.
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I
City Planning
VITA
LOUISE B. SIMMONS
814 Capitol Avenue
Hartford, CT 06106
Tel. (203) 232-0111
EDUCATION:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, - Doctor of
Philosophy, 1991 in Urban and Regional Studies.
Academic areas: Political Sociology and Urban
Politics. Dissertation title: Labor and Neighborhood
Organizing in the Context of Economic Restructuring:
Six Organizations in Hartford, Connecticut
University of Connecticut - Master or Arts in
Education, 1980. Concentration: Higher Education
and Community Education.
University of Wisconsin-Madison - Bachelor of Arts,
1971. Graduation with Distinction. Major:
Sociology.
RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT AND EXPERIENCE
University of Connecticut School of Social Work,
1980-Present
Lecturer in Social Work and Director, Urban
Semester Program - Directs all facets of
undergraduate urban internship program;
teaching responsibility for two weekly seminars
on urban issues; administrative responsibility
for placement and supervision of student
interns; liaison with faculty, administration
and agencies. Graduate level teaching
experience in MSW program in areas of politics
and urban policy. Work with Community
Organization Sequence to develop Urban Policy
Center with labor and community organizations.
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University of Connecticut School of Social Work,
1979-1980.
Coordinator of Projects, Center for Human Resource
Planning and Utilization.
Assist Center Director in proposal writing, grant
administration; supervise statewide Title XX
training needs assessment; participation in
research design and implementation of projects.
University of Connecticut School of Social Work,
1977-1979.
Assistant to the Director of Field Education;
Administration of Graduate Social Work Field
Education Program for 300 full-time students;
coordinate with faculty, agencies and students.
Connecticut Public Interest Research Group, 1975-77.
Organizing Coordinator: Coordinate organizing of
the chapters of the college consumer advocacy
organization; supervision of student projects.
Yohel Camaid Freixas Associates, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1985.
Consultant in training project "Hispanics in
Lawrence (Mass.)" sponsored by Mass. Dept of
Social Services.
MIT Department of Urban Studies Community Fellows
Program, 1984.
Coordinator, "Barriers to Reform, The Problem of
Mayors of Color," October, 1984.
Boston College Social Welfare Research Institute,
1983-84.
Research Assistant on study of social and economic
dislocation of laid-off autoworkers in Southeast
Michigan, sponsored by U.S. Dept. of
Transportation.
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PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
"Organizational and Leadership Models in
Community-labor Coalitions." in Building Bridges
The Emerging Grassroots Coalition of Labor and
Community. Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello,
Editors. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990.
with Joan Fitzgerald, "From Consumption to
Production: Labor Participation in Grassroots
Movements in Pittsburgh and Hartford." Urban
Affairs Quarterly. forthcoming, 1991, Vol. 26,
No. 4. (June)
with Joan Fitzgerald, "Citizen Participation in
Economic Development Planning." Presented at
Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning 31st
Annual Meeting, October 5, 1989, Portland, Oregon.
"Labor and Community Organizing in the Context of
Economic Change." Presented at Association of
Collegate Schools of Planning 29th Annual Meeting,
Nov. 7, 1987, Los Angeles.
Co-authored and edited with Ronald Fletcher.
Hartford Human Relations Commission. "20 Year
Update on the Civil Uprisings of 1967", 1988.
Panelist and Guest Lecturer in numerous settings
on civil rights and community-labor alliance
topics.
PROFESSIONAL AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
Commissioner, Hartford Human Relations Commission,
1981-Present. Chairperson, 1990, 1983. Vice
Chairperson, 1989.
Citizen Research Education Network, Member, Board
of Directors, 1989-Present.
Community Labor Alliance for Strike Support,
Steering Committee Member, 1986-Present.
Grassroots-Labor Forum, 1987-Present - Participant.
Conference Coordinator, Sept., 1989.
Anti-Racism Coalition of Connecticut, Steering
Committee, 1982-1987.
People For Change. Steering Committee Member,
1987-Present.
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Hartford Community Mental Health Center, Member,
Board of Directors, 1980-1987.
Connecticut State Federation of Teachers, Executive
Board Member, 1979-1980.
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement,
Member, 1977-1980.
Coalition for Human Dignity, Steering Committee,
Member, 1980-1982.
Friends of the William Benton Museum of Art, Member
since 1980.
AWARDS
United Auto Workers International Union Douglas
Fraser Community Service Award, Recipient, April,
1990.
Marion Davis Scholarship Fund Recipient, 1984
through 1986. (now the Putter-Davis Scholarship
Fund).
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